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FLOWCHARTING THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Fred C. Zachariast
When may the government restrict political dissent? The
Supreme Court last confronted that question in 1984. In Wayte v.
United States ' a group of eighteen-year-old draft protestors claimed
that the government had singled them out for prosecution because
of their vocal refusal to register for the draft. In National Gay Task
Force v. Board of Education2 (NGTF) a gay rights organization challenged an Oklahoma law forbidding public school teachers to "advocate" homosexuality. The two cases presented the same broad,
overriding first amendment issue: to what extent may the government identify citizens on the basis of their political expression and
3
subject them to regulation?
Neither case produced a satisfactory response. With one cavalier sentence in Wayte, Justice Powell dismissed the conflict between
the government's law enforcement needs and the draft protestors'
right to express themselves: "prosecuting visible nonregistrants was
[legitimately] thought to be an effective way to promote general deterrence, especially since failing to proceed against publicly known
offenders would encourage others to violate the law." 4 Justice Powell enabled the Court to avoid deciding the NGTF issues altogether
by declining, on grounds of ill health, to participate in the decision.
The resulting four-to-four division among the remaining Justices
5
produced a per curiam affirmance of the lower court's decision.
t Associate Professor, Cornell Law School. I gratefully acknowledge the assistance
of colleagues at Cornell and elsewhere who took the time to comment upon earlier
drafts of this manuscript. They include Professors Sheri Johnson, Michael Perry, Stewart Schwab, Gary Simson, and Geoffrey Stone. My secretary, Carol Kautz. and research
assistants, Beth Anderson and Glenn Gordon, also provided yeoman-and much appreciated-support services. Finally, but not least, a special thanks must go to my wife,
Sharon Soroko, for her technical, substantive and psychological assistance in creating
the flow charts included in the Article.
1 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
2
470 U.S. 903 (1985), ay]gper CIouiaJ by an equally divided Court 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984).
3 Of course, the government will ordinarily justify such regulation on the basis of
independent, allegedly legitimate goals; in ll'aye and A'GTF, for example, preserving the
integrity of the draft and protecting the morals of school-aged children.
-1 470 U.S. at 613.
5
One hesitates to criticize the Supreme Court's failure to provide a rationale in
such a per curiam affirmance. Justice Powell's unavoidable absence at oral argument on
January 14, 1985, due to surgery left the particil)ating members of the Court evenly
split. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court did order reargument for three other cases ar-
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This Article focuses on political speech cases 6 and addresses
the broad question the Supreme Court ducked. One can easily hypothesize a spectrum of situations in which federal or state authorities pursue legitimate or allegedly legitimate activities in a way
designed to stifle protest. If the government concedes a desire to
limit dissent or its influence on listeners, the strict "clear and present danger" or traditional "compelling state interest" test controls.
But where the government has asserted independent justifications
for regulation of political protest, courts have responded inconsistently. This Article proposes a model for analyzing all cases in
which the government selects and regulates individuals as a result of
7
their political speech.
The Supreme Court has decided most first amendment issues,
including political protest cases, with some form of value balancing.8 Rather than discuss yet again the propriety ofjudicial balancing, this Article addresses more practical and concrete questions:
(1) Has the Court ever adopted a full, all-encompassing balancing
approach? (2) If not, why not? (3) If comprehensive balancing
would be a reasonable approach, what factors should courts consider in implementing the balance? and (4) How would courts
weigh these factors? The Article's practical framework represents
an appendix to the general theoretical debate over first amendment
balancingY Its model should enable courts to resolve the spectrum
of protest cases in a more coherent way.

gued that day in which the eight participating Justices could not assemble a majority.
Without explanation, the Court chose to follow a different course in .VGTF. Greenhouse, 4-1o-4 mote Upholds Teachers on Homose'ual Rights Issue, N.Y. Times, Mar. 27, 1985,
at A23, col. 1.
6 The term "political speech" refers broadly to expression or association based on
current events, controversial viewpoints, and governmental or "political" issues that are
of widespread public interest. Although the Supreme Court failed to define its terms in
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983), it was perhaps addressing "political
speech" when it discussed "speech on matters of public concern."
Because religious expression occupies a special place in the constitutional scheme,
U.S. CONsT. amend. I, I do not consider it here. Nor do I address those categories of
expression that arguably deserve less than the fullest degree of first amendment protection, including but not limited to commercial, artistic, and scientific speech. See infra
note 240.
7 I do not use the phrase "as a result" as a term of art. I mean, quite simply, that
the expression prompts the regulation in question either because the expression identifies the target, as in ll'ayte, or because it is the reason for the regulation, as in .VGTF.
8 See infra notes 59-73 and accompanying text.
:) Numerous scholars have commented on the substantive issue of whether courts
should balance governmental interests against first amendment rights. See infra note 101.
To my knowledge, only Professor Karst has addressed in any detail the issue of how
courts should undertake the balance. See Karst, Legislative Factsin ConstitutionalLitigation,
1960 Sil,. C-'. RE.v. 75.
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II
THE PROBLEM

A.

Wayte and NGTF

Cases like Wayte and NGTF are difficult because they involve
conflicts between important societal values. In Wayte the government had a legitimate interest in ensuring that young men register
for the draft. Deterrence considerations seemed to require prosecutors to pursue publicized offenses. Wayte's vocal refusal to register
encouraged other eighteen-year-olds to break the registration law.
Wayte in effect challenged the government to act. Had the government failed to prosecute, others subject to the registration law
might well have determined that the law was a farce. Thus the case
that most threatened the integrity of the Selective Service specifically involved public protest.
On the other hand, Wayte's speech was a but-for cause of his
selection for punishment. 10 Only his exercise of first amendment
freedoms distinguished Wayte from nonvocal nonregistrants who
were not prosecuted."I As a practical matter, the government's passive enforcement program taught two related lessons: first, that it
pays not to express one's political views, for the government pursues public speakers for crimes it otherwise ignores; second, that
2
nonregistrants who remain silent are immune from prosecution.'
These axioms contradict the ordinary teachings of the first amendment.' 3 Congress may not, for example, pass a law forbidding "vocal nonregistration" while immunizing silent noncompliance with
the system.' 4 Yet the Wayte Court ultimately allowed the executive
to accomplish the same end through selective prosecution.
NGTF presented a similar conflict of interests. From one perspective, the anti-advocacy law forced politically active teachers to
See Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 601-03 (1985).
11 The government disputed this characterization, arguing that it prosecuted all
nonregistrants who came to its attention. Id. at 609-10. As a practical matter, however,
the government's failure to look actively for nonregistrants combined with its willingness to allow identified violators to register meant that only principled, vocal nonregistrants would face trial.
12 As the Justice Department official responsible for the registration law's enforcement stated in a letter: "[1]ith the present univers[e]ofhundreds of thousands of non-registrants,
the chances that a quiet non-registrantwill be prosecuted isprobablyabout the same as the chances that
he will be struck by lightning." Id. at 627-28 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (emphasis by justice
Marshall).
13
Indeed, the Supreme Court has taken pains to point out that diversity of views is
healthy for society and that open disagreement and debate should be encouraged. See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 783 (1978); United States v. United States
Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972); Teminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).
14 ll'ayte, 470 U.S. at 610. Congress may enact a law punishing the speech aspect of
such conduct only if the speech is "directed to inciting... lawless action and likely to...
produce [it]." Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
10
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risk their jobs. It chilled their exercise of free expression. In contrast to Wayte,15 the statute explicitly conditioned regulation upon
particular types of expression.1t 6 Since a state may not, in the abstract, constitutionally select one political viewpoint and ostracize
it,17 the NGTF statute seemed less justifiable than the governmental
actions in Wayte.t 8
Nevertheless, NGTF does parallel Wayte because the state officials, like the Selective Service in Wayte, had a valid regulatory rationale independent of any distaste for the teachers' political views.
Teachers serve as role models for children. 19 Their status in the
classroom gives them significant influence over the views of students. 20 To the extent the teachers approved illegal acts, 2 1 the state
had reason to single them out and to prevent their advocacy from
reaching students' ears. Even where the teachers' speech fell short
of encouraging illegality, society's interest in allowing parents to
guide children's moral development served as a counterweight
22
against the notion that teachers' speech should never be abridged.
Wayte and NGTF are two examples of situations in which indi15 In l'ayte, the government could reasonably argue that the decision to prosecute
had nothing to do with the content of the defendant's expression; it prosecited only
because Wayte had broken the law by failing to register. IVayte, 470 U.S. at 600-01.
16 The Oklahoma statute prohibited public school teachers from "[e]ngagring] in
public homosexual conduct or activity." 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 189, amended by
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-103.15 (West Supp. 1987). The statute defined public ho-

mosexual conduct as "advocating, soliciting, imposing, encouraging or promoting...
homosexual activity." Id.
17 Cf Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972) ("Selective exclusions from a
public forum may not be based on content alone, and may not be justified by reference
to content alone."). See generally Karst, Equality as a Central Principlein the FirstAmendmtent,
43 U. Ci. L. REv. 20 (1975).
18 These differences in the focus of the two regulations at issue in the two cases may
indeed affect the iway courts should assess their constitutionality. See infra notes 187-90
and accompanying text.
I) See Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 78-79 (1979) ("a teacher serves as a role
model for his students, exerting a subtle but important influence over their perceptions
and values"); East Hartford Educ. Ass'n v. Board of Educ., 562 F.2d 838, 359 (2d Cir.
1977) (en banc) (approving dress code for teachers because it promotes respect for authority and traditional values as well as discipline).
20 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) (teachers "have
captive audiences of young minds"); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 493 (1952)
(a teacher "shapes the attitude of young minds towards the society in which they live");
see also Ambach, 441 U.S. at 78-79; of.Note, National Gay Task Force v. Board of Education of Oklahoma City, 19 AKRON L. Rrv. 337, 348-49 (1985) ("The difficulty lies in
evaluating at what point the teachers' expression becomes so disruptive as to warrant
the state's interference with the teachers' right to free speech.").
21 Twenty-three states have passed sodomy statutes that criminalize sexual acts by
homosexuals. See Note, Bowers v. Hardwick- The Fxtension of the Right to Privacy to Private
ConsensualHomosexual Conduct, 10 NovA 1J. 175, 176 n.6 (1985). In Bowers v. Hardwick,
106 S.Ct. 2841 (1986), the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such laws.
22 Cf., e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972) (recognizing importance
of parents' interest in guiding child's religious and moral development); Ginsberg v.
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vidual government regulators 2 3 may not personally disagree with
the views of the targeted speakers, but nonetheless feel compelled
to restrict the speech. In each case the regulation is content-based.
It deters protest by others similarly situated. But because the regulators may have legitimate independent goals in mind, one cannot
necessarily ascribe to them the specific motive to stifle the substance
of the political beliefs. 24 The problem for the courts is whether and
how the government may implement its interests by singling out
particular speakers. That determination necessarily requires some
assessment of whether the governmental interests are important
enough to justify the chill on free expression.
B.

Some Examples

It is important to place Wayte and NGTF into broader context.
In the classic example of state regulation of political dissent, the
government attempts to punish "dangerous" political advocacy directly. The Supreme Court has adopted the Brandenburg test to resolve such situations: The government may not punish political
advocacy unless "such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing
imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
25
action."
Wayte and NGTF suggest, however, that courts must evaluate
regulation prompted by speech content in a broad range of other
27
contexts. 2 6 Consider the following examples:
New York, 390 U.S. 629, 639 (1968) (recognizing parents' authority to direct the rearing
of their children).
23
Throughout this Article, I use the terms "regulator" and "government regulator" in the broadest sense. They encompass all governmental actors who may make or
enforce rules that potentially infringe on first amendment freedoms.
24 In cases arising under the Smith Act, 18 U.S.C. § 2385 (1982), for example, the
government's political distaste for communism may well have motivated the regulation.
Yet during the early periods of labor unrest and the subsequent "cold war," well-meaning legislators did, in fact, fear a communist rebellion. The threat of violence rather
than political disagreement may thus have fueled anticommunist regulation. Cf. Scales v.
United States, 367 U.S. 203, 228-30 (1961) (Congress may forbid attempts to accomplish communist goals through violent means); Yates v. United States, 354 U.S. 298, 319
(1957) (Smith Act prohibits specific actions aimed at overthrowing government, not
mere abstract ideas); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 502 (1951) (Smith Act is
"directed at advocacy not discussion").
25 Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam).
26 The term "regulation" refers broadly to all governmental rules or actions that
affect free expression. See supra note 23.
27
This Article focuses exclusively on political protest situations. A virtually endless
variety exists, ranging from "dangerous advocacy," see Brandentibg, 395 U.S. 444, to student protests, see Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969), to simpler, milder expressions of viewpoint. See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15
(1971) (wearingjacket with vulgar antidraft slogan). Under any view of the first amendment, political protest deserves the highest order of protection. See i'fra note 240. This
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1. Discharges of Public Employee Whistleblowers-Connick
A dissatisfied assistant district attorney distributes a questionnaire critical of the District Attorney's supervision of both internal
and "public" aspects of the office. The questionnaire affects office
District Attorney orders the assistant
routine and morale. The
28
fired.
Attorney
District
2. Public Benefits Conditioned on Loyalty Oaths
As a requirement for public employment, admission to the
bar, or receipt of other public benefits, a state requires recipients
to pledge to uphold the U.S. Constitution and to deny memberthat seeks the overthrow of the state and
ship in any organization
29
federal governments.
3. Prosecutions of Tax Protestors
A protestor against the federal income tax program refuses to
file an income tax return. In deciding when to criminally prosecute those who fail to file returns, the Internal Revenue Service
considers the flagrance of the violation and the potential deterrent effect of prosecution on other taxpayers. 30The I.R.S. has a
policy of selectively prosecuting tax protestors.
4. Prosecutions of Draft Protestors-O'Brien
Protestors against U.S. involvement in a war burn draft cards
as a means of highlighting their views. Their actions automatically violate laws requiring full-time "possession" of the cards.
Nevertheless, in response to a rash of card burnings, Congress
passes a supplemental statute punishing draft card mutilation.
The government prosecutes O'Brien, a war protestor, for violating both the nonpossession and mutilation statutes. 3 '
5. Reclassification of War Protestors
The Selective Service adopts a policy of withdrawing draft
deferments and accelerating induction of protestors who participate in demonstrations that illegally interfere with draft
32
recruitment.
Article declines to address regulation of nonpolitical expression in order to avoid being
sidetracked into arguments over the societal "importance" of particular types of speech.
28
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
29
See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (bar admission); Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (employment); Elfbrant v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966)
(employment); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) (state tax exemptions for veterans). See generally Askin, Loyalty Oaths in Retrospect: Freedom and Reality, 1968 Wis. L. REV.

498.

30
See, e.g., United States v. Amon, 669 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 825 (1982) (prosecution of a vocal tax protestor); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d
864 (8th Cir. 1978) (same); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), rert. denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978) (same); United States v. Kahl, 583 F.2d 1351 (5th Cir. 1978)

(same); United States v. Ojala, 544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976) (same); United States v.
Scott, 521 F.2d 1188 (9th Cir. 1975) (same), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 955 (1976).
31
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). See generally Alfange, Free Speech
and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-CardBurning Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1.

32
Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970); see also National Student Ass'n
v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (government deferment policy). See generally
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Criminal Surveillance of PoliticalActivists

Law enforcement authorities adopt a policy of identifying,
photographing, and gathering information on participants in
political demonstrations.33

In each of these situations, the targets can claim that the government has singled them out because it disapproves of their political
views and expression. In addition, others who share the protestors'

opinions may well feel threatened in the exercise of their own first
amendment freedoms.
As Figure A shows,3 4 the government has several possible responses. First, it can argue that it did not consider the content of
the target's speech, but rather that it merely exercised a legitimate,
independent legislative or executive function in a nondiscriminatory
way. Second, the government may admit that the speech was a butfor cause of the regulation, yet assert that the effect rather than the
content of the expression was the key. In other words, the government had the right to consider the speech's interference with soci-

ety's independent interests. Third, the government may concede
that the expression-even its content-was a but-for cause of the
regulation because it alerted the government to the target's transgression. Once alerted, however, the government did not consider
the expression further. Finally, in a few of the contexts, the government may be willing to admit that it did indeed intend to regulate
speech content and claim an overriding right to do so.
These "defenses" overlap. In some cases, the government may
35
use one or more to disguise the true justification for its regulation.
Schiesser & Benson, The Legality of Reclassification of Selective Service Registrants, 53 A.B.A.J.
149 (1967).
33 See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D.
Ill. 1985) (police infiltration of organization); Berlin Democratic Club v. Rumsfeld, 410
F. Supp. 144 (D.D.C. 1976) (army surveillance); Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d
678 (1970) (maintenance of police dossiers). See generally Askin, Police Dossiers and Emerging Pinciples of First Amendment Adjudication, 22 STAN. L. REv. 196 (1970).
34 For descriptions of the categories portrayed in Figure A, see supra text accompanying notes 28-33. For citations to cases fitting within the categories, see infra notes 5761.
35 In O'Brien and ll'ayte, for example, the defendants claimed that the government's
primary purpose was to stifle antidraft sentiment. See Brief for the Petitioner at 22,
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (No. 83-1292); Brief for David Paul O'Brien
at 14-22, United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Nos. 232, 233); see also Shane,
Equal Protection, Free Speech, anzd the Selective Prosecution of Draft .Vonregistrants, 72 Iowa L.
REV. 359, 362-71 (1987) (discussing Wayte's arguments). The government denied such
motive, claimed an independent interest in prosecution, and asserted that it pursued all
violations that came to its attention. See Brief for the Respondent at 26, 30, Wayte v.
United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985) (No. 81-1292); Brief for Petitioner at 22-31, United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (Nos. 232, 233). Similarly, the government routinely contends that it has fired whistleblowers not for their public disclosures, but
rather for other, independent reasons relating to their competence. See, e.g., Connick v.
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Only rarely3t 6 is the speech-inhibiting purpose of a regulation obvious or undisputed.
C.

Factors Relevant to the Legitimacy of Regulation of Protest
1. The Factors

In order to assess the conflicting justifications in the protest
cases, one would expect the courts to be flexible. Several factors
seem appropriate for judicial consideration.
Motive for Regulation. Courts should be able to evaluate the government's claim that it has no intent or desire to suppress the content of expression. If independent objectives rather than a distaste
for a protestor's message in fact prompt a rule, a court can more
easily accept the need to regulate. Conversely, proof of an intent to
"stop" or "get at" protest activity should logically color a court's
37
assessment of a regulation's importance.
A court can attempt to determine motive objectively. It can, in
other words, look to (1) whether a regulation abridges speech expressly and (2) how substantial the abridgment is.38 Reference to
subjective evidence would, however, enable courts both to evaluate
the motives underlying a broader range of regulation and to do so
more realistically and accurately.
Effect on Speech and Speech Values. The first amendment mandates
Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (insubordination and undermining of office morale); Givhan
v. Western Line Consol. School Dist, 439 U.S. 410, 412 n.2 (1979) (unfair grading of
students and violations of school rules).
36 The few examples include the draft reclassification cases, see supra note 32 and
accompanying text, and cases involving McCarthy-period legislation directed against
membership in communist organization. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961). More frequently, however, the government's obvious distaste for the speaker's message is interwoven with a fear of its dangerous effects.
See, e.g., Board of Educ., Island Trees Union Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S.
853 (1982) (plurality opinion) (distasteful books pulled from shelves because of potential effect on students); National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th
Cir. 1984), aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Colrt, 470 U.S. 903 (1985) (teacher advocacy of homosexuality banned, in part, because of impact on students). See generally
Barnes, Regulations of Speech hiltended to Affect Behavior, 63 DEN. U.L. REV. 37 (1985).
37
The more a court defers to administrative or legislative regulatory decisions, the
more critical it becomes for the court to inquire into the regulators' motivation. If a
court is willing to assess the relative importance of the governmental and private interests, it has independent tools with which to strike down speech-repressive laws. When
the Court relies primarily on a regulator's discretion, however, the Court gives up those
tools. Only by reserving the right to examine the regulator's motive can the Court justify trusting the judgment of the coordinate branch. It is the Supreme Court's failure to
acknowledge the role of motive analysis that caused the Court to abdicate its function as
guardian of free expression in O'Brien, 391 U.S. 369.
38
1 define the terms "objective" and "subjective" motive i'fra notes 164-71 and
accompanying text.
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concern for protestors' rights. It thus requires at least some evaluation of the effect of a regulation on free expression. A court might
first ask whether the regulation influences free expression at all.
Does the regulation restrict the speech of the targets and persons
similarly situated? Does it deter others from expressing their views?
A careful court would pursue the analysis further by determining
how much free expression the regulation deters, whether equally effective means of protest exist, and whether citizens who share the
target's views will be willing and able to use the alternatives. 3 9
Effect on GovernmentalInterests. A comprehensive approach would
include a similar evaluation of the government's countervailing interests. First, does the government have independent reasons for
regulating the protest? Second, even assuming a "legitimate" governmental interest, is it important enough to justify the effect on
free expression?
The Method Used to Accommodate the Conflicting Interests. When litigants demonstrate that state and first amendment interests conflict,
one would expect a court to assess the government's accommodation of the competing interests. The alternatives for protecting the
protestors' freedoms and for accomplishing the governmental goals
appear to be highly relevant considerations.
Other Factors. Scholars have identified other possible considera40
tions, including a regulation's "distortive effect" on public debate,
the "nature" of the government interest, 4 ' "equality" of treatment
among speakers, 4 2 and the "right-privilege" distinction. 4 3 Courts
3)
Justice Harlan suggested this line of analysis in O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388 (Harlan,
J., concurring), but few courts have pursued it.
40 See Stone, Conieut Regulation and the First AmendMent, 25 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 189,
217-227 (1983). The distortive effect is part and parcel of a regulation's total impact. See
infra notes 245-51 and accompanying text.
41
The Supreme Court, for example, seems to disfavor certain types of governmental justifications for regulation. See, e.g., Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 769-70 (1976) (rejectingjustification that citizens
will misunderstand commercial advertising); First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765,
789-92 (1978) (rejecting view that voters will be unable to evaluate commercially supported public speech). Professors Scanlon, Wellington, and Stone suggest that courts
will hesitate to accept any government claim that is based on "paternalism." Scanlon, .1
Theory of Freedom of Expression, 1 PHIL & PuB. AFF. 204. 209 (1972); Stone, supra note 40,
at 212-216, 229-30; Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 YALE L.J. 1105, 1135 (1979).
To the extent paternalism notions are relevant, courts can take them into account in
assessing the government's motive and the importance of the governmental interests.
42
See Karst, supra note 17, at 28. The degree to which a regulation discriminates
among speakers and viewpoints is. of course, one factor contributing to the regulation's
impact on expression.
43 The right-privilege distinction seems to have lost its viability. L. I'RIBE, AMEFRICAN CONsTrrT-rONAt. LAW 705 (1978); Van Alstvne, The Demise of the Right-PrivilegeDistinc-
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might, in theory, treat these as distinct and relevant criteria to be
included in any balance. Nevertheless, the broad factors outlined
above seem to encompass the additional considerations. This Article, therefore, will not address them separately.
2.

Use of the Factors by the Courts

The Supreme Court has often discussed the way it must "balance" values in first amendment cases. 44 Interestingly, though,
courts have rarely considered and assigned weights to all the criteria
discussed above. In each category of political protest, the courts
have adopted legal tests that focus on one or several of the factors,
45
but downplay or ignore the others.
Judicial use of the motive factor, for example, has been inconsistent. In United States v. O'Brien4 6 the Supreme Court disavowed
any reliance on motive. It refused even to inquire into an alleged
congressional intent to single out "hippies" and draft protestors for
punishment. 4 7 In contrast, in the draft reclassification cases, courts
have considered legislative motive to be the controlling element in
their decisions. 48 The whistleblower context reveals a third approach: the courts place some, but only a limited emphasis on
49
motive.
Similar cacophony appears with respect to the "impact on free
expression" factor. Particular confusion exists regarding "chilling
effects." In the examples that involve criminal prosecutions-the
lion in ConslitutionalLaw, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1439 (1968). To the extent the distinction is
revived, courts could consider it in assessing a regulation's impact on first amendment
values.
44 See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 50-51 (1961) (first amendment
cases "necessarily involve[ ] . . . weighing . . . governmental interest[s]"); Dennis v.
United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("societal value of speech must, on occasion, be
subordinated to other values").
45 Judges may, of course, espouse a nonbalancing approach while tacitly considering unmentioned factors. See infra notes 73, 112-15 and accompanying text. However,
the costs ofjudicial dishonesty are legion: future litigants cannot order their conduct,
judicial and other legal resources become misdirected, mistrust of the judiciary grows,
and judges themselves probably lose sight of their prudential responsibilities. This Article thus adopts the view that if courts balance, they should do so openly and according
to set guidelines and parameters.
46 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
47
Id. at 383.
48 In Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 306 (1970), the Court decided that
the legislature did not intend to authorize local boards to treat all violators of the Selective Service law as delinquent. See also National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d
1103, 1120 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (Congress did not authorize selective service deferment
policy that penalized protestors).
49 See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 286-87
(1977) (placing burden of persuasion on plaintiff to show that exercise of his constitutional rights was "motivating factor" in employer's decision not to rehire); see also Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 149-51 (1983).
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tax protestor, O'Brien, and Wayte situations-judges have acted singularly unconcerned with the effect of prosecution on societal free
- The existence of a chill,
speech values. 50
however, seems to be the
prime consideration in the loyalty oath context. 5 1 But even the loyalty oath cases place little emphasis on the significance of the chilling
52
effect; that is, the degree to which the regulation deters speech.
Courts that have reached the point of assessing the government's accommodation of state interests have also failed to balance
fully. They have focused exclusively on either the degree to which a
regulation furthers the governmental interest 53 or the degree to
which it affects first amendment rights. 54 Rarely have the courts
55
considered the factors in combination.
Figure B depicts graphically the courts' inconsistent theoretical
focus. 5 6 On one axis, Figure B categorizes a variety of protest
cases. 5 7 On the other, it lists the factors a comprehensive decision
50

O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77 (1968); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611

(1985).
51
See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967); Elfbrandt v.
Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 18-19 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510
(1964).
52
See, e.g., Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1, 2-4 (1971); Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S.
513, 528-29 (1958).
-5
See, e.g., O'Bien, 391 U.S. at 376-82; Anderson v. Sills, 56 NJ. 210, 227, 265 A.2d
678, 687 (1970) ("If a properly drawn measure is within the power of government, it is
no objection that the exercise of speech or association is thereby 'chilled.' ").
54
Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 602-03; United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 268 (1967);
Eblbrandi, 384 U.S. at 18-19; Aptheker, 378 U.S. at 514.
55 On rare occasions, courts have attempted a refined analysis of the conflicting
interests. See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 22-26 (1971) (recognizing governmental interest, individual interest, and society's interest); American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 399-400 (1950) (same).
56 I do not mean to suggest that it is impossible to reconcile any of the seemingly
inconsistent cases. Comity or proof considerations explain some of the motive illustrations. In addition, courts may treat chilling effect considerations differently depending
on the "direct" or "incidental" nature of a regulation's impact on speech. Nevertheless,
it is fair to conclude that the erratic pattern of the decisions does not stem from any
principled, overall theory.
57
For the sake of convenience, cases cited in Figure B are not footnoted individually. Instead, a list of citations follows (in the order of appearance on Figure B):
I. Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
II. National Gay Task Force v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984),
aff'd per curiam by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S. 903 (1985).
III. Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S.
563 (1968); Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977).
IV. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Keyishian v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589 (1967); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11 (1966); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Law Students Civil Rights Research Council v. Wadmond.
401 U.S. 154 (1971). In Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971), the Court adopted reasoning similar to that in Robel and Keyishian, but did not reach the question of tie government's accomodation of first amendment rights.
The cases selected for the loyalty oath category reflect the most typical judicial approaches. Individual courts have, on occasion, attempted other methods of disposition.
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should include.5 8 The resulting overview illustrates a startling contrast in the courts' approaches to the different contexts. Figure B
demonstrates that comprehensive balancing of all factors has not
been the norm. The following section of this Article explains why
the confusion in the law has occurred.
III
THE MEANING OF BALANCING IN FIRST AMENDMENT CASES

A.

Do Courts Balance? 5 9

Constitutional law teachers traditionally expose students to Jus60
tice Black's view that first amendment rights are "absolute":
My belief is that we must have freedom of speech, press and religion for all or we may eventually have it for none. I further believe that the First Amendment grants an absolute right to believe
in any governmental system, discuss all governmental affairs, and
argue for desired changes in the existing order. This freedom is
too dangerous for bad, tyrannical governments to permit. But
those who wrote and adopted our First Amendment weighed
those dangers against the dangers of censorship and deliberately
In Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958), for example, the Court considered four of
the listed factors: the direct/indirect nature of the regulation, id. at 523-24, 527, subjective motivation, id. at 519, 527, the impact on general first amendment values, id. at 528,
and the importance of the governmental interest. Id. In its aberrational decision in
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950), the Court touched on
even more factors. See infra note 138. It explicitly balanced the existence of a chilling
effect, its degree, the importance of the governmental interests, and the accomodation
of first amendment rights. 339 U.S. at 400. In addition, the Court mentioned, but did
not rely upon, the direct/indirect nature of the expression. Id.
V. United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864 (8th Cir. 1978); United States v. Ojala,
544 F.2d 940 (8th Cir. 1976); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 436 U.S. 919 (1978); United States v. Tibbetts, 646 F.2d 193 (5th Cir. 1981);
United States v. Falk, 479 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1973).
VI. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538 (Ist Cir. 1967), vacated, 391 U.S. 367
(1968).
VII. Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970); National Student Ass'n v.
Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
VIII. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678 (1970); Alliance to End Repression v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044 (N.D. Ill. 1985).
58 (1) Objective motive-does the regulation on its face limit speech directly or
incidentally? (2) Subjective motive-what did the regulators really intend? (3) Impact
on the targets' first amendment rights-does the regulation restrict the target pool's
expression and how much? (4) Impact on first amendment values in general-is free
expression throughout society affected and how much? (5) Effect on governmental interests-how important is the (legitimate) governmental interest asserted? and (6) Accomodation of first amendment rights-how well has the government protected the
right to speak?
59 For an excellent general discussion of balancing, a definition of the term, and a
description of the various forms balancing has taken, see Aleinikoff, ConstitutionalLaw in
the Age of Balancing, 96 YALE LJ. 943, 945-48 (1987).
60 That is, immune from any regulation.
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chose the First Amendment's unequivocal command that freedom
of assembly, petition, speech and press shall not be abridged~1i
Gradually, students learn that even Justice Black limited his extreme
position. 62 By the time students come to contrast Justice Black's
"absolutist" stance with Justice Harlan's countervailing view in Konigsberg v. State Bar,63 they recognize that courts have little choice but
4
to "balance values" in deciding first amendment claims."

It is one thing, however, to recognize a need for some form of
balancing, another to implement the need. The Supreme Court has
adopted many different rules. In O'Brien, for example, the Court
held that a regulation is valid
if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; if the
governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of
65
that interest.

The O'Brien test focuses upon the governmental interest at stake. Its
refusal to assess the interest in terms of the regulation's actual impact on free expression represents a formula that the modem Court
66
has used in many contexts.
61 Carlson v. Landon, 342 U.S. 524, 555 (1952) (Black, J., dissenting); see also Communist Party of the United States v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 164
(1961) ("doctrine of 'balancing' " is dangerous). See generally Kalven, 'bpon Rereading rlh.
Justice Black on the First Amendment, 14 UCLA L. REv. 428 (1967).
62
See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 143 (1943) (Justice Black "weigh[ed] the
conflicting interests" in a door-to-door canvassing ordinance against "the interest of the
community" in "peace, good order, and comfort"). In addition, Justice Black dissented
in some of the great speach-protective cases of the 1960's on the basis that public picketing, sit-ins, and other types of demonstrations are not "speech" and thus are not
subordinate to the government's rights to regulate. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (BlackJ., dissenting); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165 (1966) (Black J., dissenting); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
581 (1965) (BlackJ., dissenting); Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, 325 (1964) (BlackJ.,
dissenting).
63
366 U.S. 36, 49-51 (1961). Harlan wrote, "Whenever ... [first amendment] protections are asserted against the exercise of valid governmental powers a reconciliation
must be effected, and that perforce requires an appropriate weighing of the respective
interests involved." Id. at 51.
64 This conclusion holds true both within and without the political protest context.
Cf. M. REDISH, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION: A CRITICAL. ANALYSis 7-8 (1984) ("[absolute]
approaches are either practicably unworkable or effectively amount to little more than
disguised forms of balancing").
In a recent article about balancing throughout constitutional law, Professor
Aleinikoff disputes that balancing is unavoidable. Aleinikoff, supra note 59, at 977-1002.
He posits that "balancing is uncontroversial today because of its resonance with current
conceptions of law and notions of rational decisionmaking." Id. at 914; see also id. at 95263 (describing changes in courts' and commentators' jurisprudential orientations).
(5
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
66 Justice Powell, for example, has implemented this analysis in such divergent con-
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Other balancing "tests," however, compare governmental and
first amendment interests more directly. In American Communications
Association v. Douds,6 7 for example, the Court held:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order, and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial
abridgement of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine
which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented. 68
The traditional strict first amendment test recasts the focus in more
speech-protective terms:
Where a government restricts the speech of a private person, the
state action may be sustained only if the government can show
that the regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a com69
pelling state interest.
On rare occasions, as in Brandenburgv. Ohio, 70 the Court has adopted
formulas that encompass some balancing but are so speech-protective that they verge on Justice Black's initial refusal to balance at
all.

71

The bottom line is this: Among the Court's varying tests, some
resemble the absolutist model, others clearly weigh countervailing
state and first amendment interests, and yet others focus primarily
on the governmental interest. But they all "balance" to one degree
or another. 72 Nevertheless, the Court has steadfastly refused to admit that it balances or to recognize a comprehensive approach which
73
would weigh all the relevant factors.
texts as commercial speech cases, see Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv.
Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980), and the selective prosecution situation presented in
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
67 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
68 Id. at 399 (1950).
69
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540 (1980); see
also First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 786 (1978).
70
395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (per curiam) (state may not forbid advocacy of the use
of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action).
71
The Court has, for example, been highly protective of speech in libel cases. See
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (adopting "actual malice"
standard for libel actions involving public officials); see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984) (requiring appellate judges to
review evidence of malice); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967)
(plurality opinion) ("public figures" who are not public officials must meet libel standard
established in Sullivan).
72
See Shiffrin, Defamatoiy Non-Media Speech and FirstAmendment Methodology, 25 UCLA
L. REV. 915, 946 (1978) ("If the Court should ever attempt to put [the] cases side by
side, it would have to admit that it employs an elaborate general balancing technique to
determine whether speech shall enjoy first amendment protection.") (footnote omitted);
see also id. at 955-58.
73 Arguably, courts balance whenever they choose to use one test rather than an-
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Attempts to Explain the Schizophrenic Decisionmaking on
the Basis of Rules

Judges and commentators have offered numerous theoretical
frameworks in an attempt to rationalize the Court's inconsistent approaches.74 They have tried to show that the Court has notjust balanced ad hoc. In the end, however, none of the "rule-oriented"
approaches succeeds in explaining the outcomes of the first amendment cases. Inevitably, each of the theories runs up against the reality that a judicial desire to weigh conflicting interests has fueled the
decisions.
Perhaps the most persuasive of the analyses is Professor Tribe's
attempt to sort regulations into two groups. 7 - "Track one," encompassing "government actions aimed at [the] communicative impact"
of speech,76 is subject to the absolute approach of cases like Brandenburg.7 7 In contrast, balancing rules may justify "track two" actions,
those "aimed at the non-communicative impact" of speech or conduct.7 8 As Professor Tribe himself suggested, however, the cases do
not uniformly follow his categorizations. 79 Moreover, the two-track
other. Often, the more significant an infringement on first amendment interests, the
stricter the test a court will choose. See Stone, supra note 40, at 197-98.
Yet the possibility that courts balance "implicitly" does not eliminate the need to
develop a comprehensive method for explicit balancing. Failure of judges to express
their true reasons has costs. See supra note 45; cf. Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95 YALE
L.J. 698, 752 (1985) (courts should express factors they consider). This Article's model
provides a framework that enables judges to decide cases honestly and reveal their true
rationales for appellate and scholarly critique.
74 The theories here discussed are the ones that have attracted the most attention.
There are, of course, others. See generally T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF
THE FIRST AMENDMENT (1966); Schlag, An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedoi of
Speech, 30 UCLA L. REv. 671 (1983); sources cited in id. at 671-72 n.1.
75 L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 580-84. Dean Ely suggests a similar approach in J.
ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 111-14 (1980) (issue is whether evil state is seeking to
avert is one that is independent of message being regulated).
76
L. TRIBE, sitpra note 43, at 581.
77 Id. at 582.
78

Id.

Id. at 591-94. By refusing to consider motive in United States v.O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968), for example, the Supreme Court avoided determining the actual "aim"
of the draft-card statute. Id. at 383. The Court's decision to balance away the target's
choice of expression therefore does not fit neatly into Professor Tribe's two-track analysis. Similarly, where the government conditions benefits, such as employment, upon the
taking of a loyalty oath, the regulation clearly aims at "communicative" aspects of the
target's behavior; absent proof of disloyal actions, the statute punishes the target solely
for his political beliefs and associations. Se, e.g., Law Students Civil Rights Research
Council, Inc. v.Wadmond, 401 U.S. 154 (1971) (loyalty oath for admission to New York
bar); Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (membership in a subversive organization renders individual ineligible for public school employment). On the whole, however, the Court has adopted a balancing, rather than an absolutist, approach to such
oaths. United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); American Communications Ass'n v.
Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950).
79
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theory does not take into account a vast array of regulations clearly
aimed at communicative aspects of speech-such as perjury and extortion statutes-which the courts would not even consider striking
down." Professor Tribe's analysis, although useful in providing a
general theory for how the first amendment might operate in the
future, thus provides neither ajustification nor a full explanation for
8
the prior decisions. '
Justice Powell implemented a similar approach in Wayte. In the
past, Justice Powell had firmly supported a compelling state interest
test in cases involving a "direct" regulation of speech.8 2 But in
JWayte, he adopted the weaker balancing approach of O'Brien8 3 because, like Professor Tribe, he viewed the prosecution as affecting
'8 4
speech values only "indirectly.
Logically, however, Justice Powell should not have been able to
determine whether the Wayte regulation affected speech "directly"
or only "incidentally" 8 5 without first evaluating why the government
chose to prosecute primarily vocal nonregistrants. If by "indirect"
regulation Justice Powell meant to permit judicial balancing whenever the government can hypothesize a nonspeech-related justification for a regulation post hoc-regardless of the government's actual
motive-then the decision is inconsistent with his own prior first
amendment opinions.8 6 Justice Powell's approach, in short, also
80
Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment: A Play in Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REv.
265, 279 (1981).
81 See M. REDISH, supra note 64, at 90-116; Emerson, FirstAmendmnent Doctrine and the
Burger Court, 68 CALIF. L. REV. 422, 472-74 (1980) (listing six criticisms of Professor
Tribe's approach); Farber, Content Regulation and the FirstAmendment: A Revisionist View, 68
CEO. L.J. 727, 743-47 (1980) (criticizing Professor Tribe's approach in O'Brien context).
Professor Tribe himself has recently suggested that the Court may have simultaneously
used its "speech/conduct" distinction, see infra notes 91-93 and accompanying text, as a
surrogate for Tribe's two-track analysis and "a mask for discrimination against the methods of communications favored by the relatively powerless groups in society." L. TRIBE,
CONSTITUTIONAL CHOICES 199-200 (1985).
82
See, e.g., Consolidated Edison v. Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530
(1980).
83
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985).
84
Id.; see L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 685-86 (discussing O'Brien).
85
470 U.S. at 611 (quoting United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968)).
86
In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976) (plurality opinion), for example, Justice Powell joined Justice Stevens in balancing the government's
zoning interests against the first amendment rights of exhibitors of erotic movies, on the
sole basis that the net effect on speech values was minimal.
The inquiry for First Amendment purposes ...looks only to the effect of
this ordinance upon freedom of expression. This prompts essentially two
inquiries: (i) Does the ordinance impose any content limitation on the
creators of adult movies or their ability to make them available to whom
they desire, and (ii) does it restrict in any significant way the viewing of
these movies by those who desire to see them? On the record in this
case, these inquiries must be answered in the negative.
427 U.S. at 50, 78 (Powell, J., concurring) (emphasis added). In Consolidated Edison
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fails to explain the case law.
An alternative interpretation of Justice Powell's opinion is that
he was merely following the now common distinction between "content-based" and "content-neutral" speech restrictions.8 7 Like Professor Tribe's "two track" theory, the content distinction makes
sense in many contexts. It underscores a valid fear that the government may regulate expression on the basis of speakers' views.8 8 Yet
content analysis often honors form over substance. 89 And in practice, courts have subjected even content-based restrictions to a
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), Justice Powell refused to implement
the O'Brien balance he used in Young (and Wayte) not because of the lack of an independent justification for the regulation at issue, but rather because the regulation had a measurable effect on the speaker's rights. Indeed, the government in Consolidated Edison
asserted a strong independent interest for its regulation: protecting the privacy of public utility customers who did not wish to receive political messages joined with invoices
they could not avoid. 447 U.S. at 540-41. Had Justice Powell in Wayte drawn the impact/no impact distinction that he drew in Young and Consolidated Edison, he could not
have resorted to the O'Brien balancing approach.
The "direct/indirect" distinction is superficially appealing. It seems to differentiate
between cases like Wayte and O'Brien, on the one hand, and explicitly content-based regulations, as in Young and ConsolidatedEdison, on the other. The different results Justice
Powell reached in Young and ConsolidatedEdison, however, highlight the difficulty in distinguishing which regulations "directly" regulate speech. When combined with the
Court's apparent refusal to consider motive, which invites pretextual assertions of independent government interests in a particular regulation, the direct/indirect test
verges on the meaningless.
87 Under the content distinction, regulations that do not explicitly mention speech
content are subject to "balancing" standards, while rules that identify targets by their
message are strictly scrutinized. See, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455 (1980) (striking
down statute that permitted peaceful residential picketing based on nature of message
conveyed); Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (striking down drive-in
movie theater ordinance based solely on content of movies shown). See generally Stephan, The First Anwndment and Content Discrimination,68 VA. L. REV. 203 (1982). Proponents of the distinction can read Justice Powell's Wayte opinion as applying a balancing
approach because the regulation did not specifically mention speech content.
The content distinction is closely akin to Professor Tribe's two-track analysis. Tribe
would, however, take a less formalistic approach and look somewhat beyond the mere
terms of a regulation. See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 592-98. Other scholars have attempted to bridge the gap between the two theories by proposing (or assuming) greater
flexibility in the use of content analysis. See Farber, supra note 81.
88 Professor Stone has distilled and analyzed the content doctrine's concerns. See
Stone, supra note 40; see also infra note 285. He rightly concludes that the concerns are
not always significant even in situations where the doctrine treats the content-based or
content-neutral nature of a regulation as controlling. The theory of this Article's model
shares the sentiment underlying content analysis. But the model tries to avoid the
problems that a singular emphasis on content creates. In cases where a prejudice
against content-based regulations is justified, the model takes the relevant concerns into
account. By acknowledging other equally important factors, however, the model avoids
many of the bizarre results occasioned by strict reliance on the content distinction.
89 Content analysis may, as in O'Brien, legitimate regulations that seem invidiously
motivated and that substantially restrict expression. Conversely, it may also operate to
invalidate perfectly viewpoint-neutral rules that have no effect on freedom of expression. See generally Stone, supra note 40; Stone, Restrictions of Speech Because of its Content:
The PeculiarCase of Subject-Matter Restrictions, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 81 (1978).

1987]

FIRST AMEADMENT9

955

range of first amendment balancing tests. 90 The overall content doctrine is thus too narrow in focus to justify the outcome of prior decisions or to provide a unitary framework for the vast variety of first
amendment conflicts.
The final attempt to offer an overall theoretical framework is
Justice Black's. In reconciling his absolutist position with regulations of disruptive symbolic expression that became prevalent in the
protest movements of the 1960's,9I Justice Black drew a strict, clear
line between speech and conduct.9 2 Black concluded that the state
could not regulate "pure speech," but that the Court should enforce
countervailing state interests in regulating conduct, or "speech
plus." 93 In the end, however, Black's speech/conduct distinction,
94
too, proved unworkable.
All communication ...

involves conduct .... [I]f the expression

involves talk, it may be noisy; if written, it may become litter. So
too, much conduct is expressive, a fact the Court has had no
90

See Stone, supra note 40, at 194-97.
For example, the sit-ins, demonstrations, and flag-burnings of the civil rights
movement and Vietnam protests. See Kalven, supra note 61, at 448; see also Tinker v. Des
Moines Indep. School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 517 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (wearing
black armbands); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966) (civil rights protest demonstration in front of a jail); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 165-66 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting) (sit-in).
92 See, e.g., Amalgamated Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza,
Inc., 391 U.S. 308, 333 (1968) (Black,J., dissenting) ("picketing, that is patrolling, is not
free speech"); Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 481 (1966) (Black,J., dissenting)
(distinguishing censorship over views from regulation of conduct); Cameron v.Johnson,
381 U.S. 741, 750 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting) (recognizing state's right to forbid picketing and street demonstrations).
93
See, e.g., Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576, 609-10 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting)
(state can prohibit burning of American flag but not mere act of making derogatory
statements); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 576-79 (1965) (Black,J., dissenting) (state's
interests may be sufficient to regulate conduct but not pure speech). See also Cox, 379
U.S. at 563 (Goldberg, J.) (implementing speech/conduct distinction); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 464-65 (1963) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (same); Hughes v.Superior
Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950) (Frankfurter,J.) (same). One could, in fact, citeJustice
Black's opinions for the proposition that government may not regulate speech but may
regulate "speech plus" without regard to first amendment values. See, e.g., Cox, 379 U.S.
at 581 (Black, J., dissenting) ("I have no doubt about the general power of Louisiana to
bar all picketing on its streets"). OtherJustices have, however, tempered that approach.
They have adopted the position that a balancing standard is appropriate for regulation
that covers conduct together with speech, but that a more "absolute" standard applies
where only speech is involved. See id. at 564 (Goldberg, J.) (rejecting an absolute test
because "[w]e deal in this case not with free speech alone, but with expression mixed
with particular conduct").
94 Numerous commentators have demonstrated flaws inherent in the
91

speech/conduct distinction. See T. EMERSON, TiE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION

80 (1970); L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 198-203; Henkin, The Supreme Court, 1967 TermnForeword: On DrawingLines, 82 HARV.L. REV. 63, 79-82 (1968); Nimmer, The ,leaning of
S ymbolic Speech Under the First .lmendment, 21 UCLA L. REv. 29, 30-38 (1973). This Article
does not attempt to duplicate their work.

956

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:936

trouble recognizing in a wide variety of circumstances. Expression and conduct, message and medium, are thus inextricably tied
together in all communicative behavior. .... 95

As Professor Tribe has concluded, the distinction "may be taken at
most as shorthand for an inquiry into the aim of the government's
96
regulation."
A strict rule-oriented approach for deciding when, if ever,
courts can weigh governmental interests against free expression
may yet win the day. This Article does not take a position on
whether the Supreme Court should, for example, adopt Professor
Tribe's view. The Court has, however, clearly not yet done so. Instead, a variety of often unidentified ingredients have crept into the
overwhelming majority of its first amendment decisions. The total
picture is confused and unclear.
In response, much of the recent literature has shifted in focus
from "may the court balance" to the more practical issue of how
balancing is to occur. 9 7 The Supreme Court has not fully adopted
any one balancing theory, though it has leaned toward a categorization approach. 98 The Court has never articulated a meaningful ex95
L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 599 (footnotes omitted); see also L. TRIBE, supra note
81, at 199 ("It is impossible to imagine speech unaccompanied by a 'verbal act.' "). Nevertheless, some courts continue to rely on the speech/conduct distinction. See, e.g., City
of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986).
96 L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 601. Professor Emerson redefines Justice Black's
"speech/conduct" distinction into an "action/expression" distinction in a valiant attempt to prove that the distinction is capable of being applied. See T. EMERSON, supra
note 74, at 479. But see L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 599-600 ("expressive behavior is
100% action and 100% expression.") (quoting Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the
Roles of Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REV. 1482,
1495-96 (1975)); Baker, Scope of the First Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REV.
964, 1009-12 (1978) (discussing the "Inadequate Expression-Action Dichotomy"); Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 959-60 (Emerson rule-oriented approach is balancing in fact).
97
Some courts and commentators argue that courts should balance ad hoc; that is,
weigh first amendment interests against governmental interests on a case-by-case basis.
See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405
(1974); see also Farber, supra note 81, at 747; Shiffrin, supra note 72, at 916-17. The
"categorization" approach also allows courts to compare conflicting interests, but first
attempts to define categories of speech. A few categories may not be abridged, while
others may be regulated to a greater or lesser extent. See generally Ely, supra note 96, at
1496-1502 (1975); Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categoriesof Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 519 (1979); Schauer, supra note 80; Note, Politics and the ,on-Civil Service Public Employee: A CategoricalApproach to FirstAmendment Protection, 85 COLUM. L. REv. 558 (1985).
98 Professor Schlag defines categorization as "an approach which (1) defines a class
or classes of speech protected by the first amendment and (2) accords or denies protection (to whatever degree) to the class or the classes of speech in a categorical manner,
i.e. by operation of an unconditional rule." Schlag, supra note 74, at 672 n.3. The Court
has excluded speech from first amendment protection in such areas as obscenity, see
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), and "fighting words," see Chaplinsky v. New
Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942). The Court has accorded lesser protection to other
categories such as commerical speech. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public
Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
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planation for why it uses different balancing tests for different
categories of speech. Nor has the Court ever been willing to adopt
an across-the-board approach to first amendment cases that would
weigh all the relevant factors. 99 Figure B illustrates' 00 this hesitation and the overall judicial inconsistency in cases in which the government threatens political protest.
C.

Reasons for the Hesitation to Balance Comprehensively

This Section focuses on political protest examples and outlines
the reasons why the Court historically may have avoided balancing.
It concludes that practical fears account for both the traditional hesitation to balance comprehensively and the current judicial preference for a categorical approach. Subsequent sections consider
whether means exist to eliminate or lessen these practical concerns.
The theoretical key to the antibalancing view is the notion that
balancing degrades first amendment values. 10 1 Balancing treats free
expression as an ordinary interest to be weighed like any other. 102
It tends to focus exclusively on the value of free speech to private
individuals. 10 3 Balancing ignores society's interest in safeguarding a
political system where protest serves as a valuable outlet for peace99 See supra notes 36-43 and accompanying text. Indeed, Professor Tribe suggests
that recent cases "represent a dangerous trend [in which] the Court cuts off its constitutional analysis before assessing the particular interests involved." L. TRIBE, supra note
89, at 209.
100
See the discussion of Figure B at text accompanying notes 56-58 supra.
101
Courts and commentators have long debated the propriety of balancing in the
first amendment context. The debate has been fueled by the diverging opinions of such
justices as Black, see supra notes 61-62, Harlan, see supra note 63, and Frankfurter, see, e.g.,
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517, 525 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
generally Tushnet, Anti-Formalism in Recent Constitutional Theoly, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1502,
1508-1519 (1985); authorities cited id. at 1508 n.17.
A quarter century ago, Professor Karst squarely presented the proposition that
courts do balance, should balance, and are capable of making the factual determinations
critical to an all-encompassing balancing approach. Karst, supra note 9. Many others
have urged that proposition since. See, e.g., the Frantz-Mendelson debates: Frantz, The
First Amendment in the Balance, 71 YALE LJ. 1426 (1962) [hereinafter Frantz, Balance];
Mendelson, On the Meaningof the First Amendment: Absolutes in the Balance, 50 CALIF. L. REV.
821 (1962) [hereinafter Mendelson, Meaning]; Frantz, Is the First Amendment Lauw?-A Reply to Professor Mendelson, 51 CALIF. L. REV. 729 (1963) [hereinafter Frantz, A Reply]; Mendelson, The First Amendment and TheJudicial Process: A Reply to Vr. Frantz, 17 VAND. L. REV.
479 (1964); see also A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 84-99 (1962); P. KAUPER,
CIVIL LIBERTIES AND THE CONSTITUTION 111-26 (1962); Aleinikoff, supra note 59, at 97273; Emerson, Toward a General Theor. of the First Amendment, 72 YALE LJ. 877 (1963);
Fried, Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76
HARV. L. REV. 755 (1963); Kalven, supra note 61, at 441-44.
102 See Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1441 ("There is a fundamental logical and
legal objection to 'weighing' a governmental objective... against a constitutional statement that the government may not employ a certain means for the attainment of any of
its objectives.").
103
See id. at 1438 ("[I]t will not do to treat freedom of speech as though it were a
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The Justices who have

opposed first amendment balancing most vociferously have argued
that it contradicts the preferred position'0 t the framers accorded
free speech.107
A related objection focuses on the judicial role. In United States
v. Robel,' 08 for example, the Court rejected a balancing approach,
deeming it "inappropriate for this Court to label one [interest] as
being more important or more substantial than the other."' 0 9 In
ChiefJustice Warren's majority view, only Congress had the power
to evaluate policies and weigh countervailing interests."10 The
Court would have exceeded its adjudicatory "function""' by balancing on its own.
Although the Robel Court renounced the balancing label, it
nonetheless used an interest-weighing formula: "[W]hen legitimate
legislative concerns are expressed in a statute which imposes a substantial burden on protected First Amendment activities, Congress
must achieve its goal by means which have a 'less drastic' impact on
the continued vitality of First Amendment freedoms." ' "l 2 The
Court's hesitation to confess the true nature of its actions" 3 obmere private interest of the individual before the court.") (citing Barenblatt v. United
States. 360 U.S. 109, 126, 134 (1959)).
104
See A. MASON, THE SUPREME COURT: PALLADIUM OF FREEDOM 40-41 (1962).
105
See, e.g., Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 337-38 (1920) (BrandeisJ., dissenting) ("harmony in national life [results from] the struggle between contending forces");
see also P. KAUPER, slpra note 101, at 120 (first amendment freedoms assume a "paramount importance" for peaceful change).

United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938); see also P.
101, at 119-20; Cahn, The Firstness of the First Amendment, 65 YALE LJ.
464, 479 (1956); Frantz, Balance, slpra note 101, at 1441.
107
The Constitution's terms, of course, strictly emphasize the importance of first
amendment values: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of speech."
U.S. CONST. amend. 1. On the other hand, supporters of balancing justify the position
that expression can be limited by interpreting the phrases "freedom of speech" and
106

KAUPER, supra note

"abridging." See, e.g., Mendelson, Meaning, supra note 101. at 821.
108 389 U.S. 258 (1967).
109 Id. at 268 n.20. In Robel, the Court considered several provisions of the Subver-

sive Activities Control Act of 1950, Pub. L.No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), which, in
eflect, prohibited Communist Party members from working in defense facilities. The
Court struck down the statute on overbreadth grounds, holding that less drastic means
were available to meet the government's ends. 389 U.S. at 265-66.
11o
d.
I1 Id. at 267; see also P. KAUPER, Supra note 101, at 124 ("It is understandable, however, that a majority of the Court, mindful of the ultimate responsibility of Congress for
determining national policy and enacting appropriate measures for the national security,
should be reluctant to engage in a head-on collision with Congress ....").
112 389 U.S. at 268 (emphasis added). The Court's formula was vague and provided
little guidance for its future implementation. See Gunther, Reflections on Robel: Its Aot
W'hat the Court Did But the 1 'ay That It Did It, 20 STAN. L. REV. 1140, 1147 (1968).
113 Numerous commentators have criticized Chief Justice Warren's reasoning in
Robel. See, e.g., Gunther, supra note 112.
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scured the reality that
the first amendment could neither be deemed
"absolute" in fact" 14 nor relegated to a category of unenforceable
ideals. '15
Professor Black explained the Court's hesitation to admit to
balancing on the basis of the symbolic, hortatory effect of a statement of absolutes." 16
[I]f the judges tell themselves and the world that the constitutional language... does define absolutes, even if not 'in imagined
chemical purity' but in the practical sense in which chemicals labelled 'chemically pure' are 'pure', the tendency of their judgments and those of their posterity will be affected thereby. There
will be a tendency, for example, to let more speech be heard more
freely in more circumstances if the First Amendment is thought of
as a literal absolute than if it is conceded that the amendment is
7
merely an invitation to contemporary judgment.' 1
Professor Black argued that the practical dangers inherent in balancing far outweigh any theoretical drawbacks to absolutism. A review of those dangers highlights the reasons why the Court has, in
the end, always shied from an all-encompassing balancing approach.
At one extreme, some scholars regard it as "nearly inevitable
that a court which clings to [a] balancing test will sooner or later
adopt a corollary that the balance struck by [a legislature] is not only
presumed correct, but is to be accorded extreme, almost total, judicial deference." ' 18 The fear is not idle. The first vocal proponent of
balancing, Justice Frankfurter, openly espoused the principle that:
Free-speech cases are not an exception to the principle that we are
not legislators, that direct policy-making is not our province.
How best to reconcile competing interests is the business of legislatures, and the balance they strike is a judgment not to be displaced by ours, but to be respected unless outside the pale of fair
judgment.119
Several of the balancing tests that the Court has adopted over the
0
years do, indeed, incorporate a significantly deferential attitude.12
114 See supra notes 59-64 and accompanying text.
115 Professor Karst believes that Chief Justice Warren in Robel, like "the latter-day
absolutists risk[ed] the independence of the judiciary by denying [the Court's] basic judicial responsibility, which is to exercise judgment." Karst, supra note 9, at 80.
116 Black, AI,: Justice Black, the Supreme Courtaud the Bill of Rights, HARPER'S, Feb. 1961,
at 63, reprinted iu C. BLACK, THE OCCASIONS OFJUSTICE (1963).
117 A. BICKEL, supra note 101, at 93 (discussing Professor Black's view).
118
Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1444.
119 Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 539-40 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,
concurring).
120
In an early loyalty oath case, for example, the Court purported to "weigh" state
interests against "the probable effects of the statute upon the free exercise of the right
of speech and assembly." American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400
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The theoretical objections to balancing' 2' assume added significance when a court combines its willingness to balance with a willingness to defer. 122 A policy of judicial deference encourages
judges to decide cases as if the first amendment requires no special
consideration. 12 3 In any particular case, a legislature or executive
may decide that administrative, political, or other practical concerns
outweigh constitutionally guaranteed speech freedoms.' 2 4 If courts
routinely accept these judgments, they minimize the first amendment's protective role.
At the other extreme lies the concern that judges can tailor balancing to produce pre-determined results. The danger that a judge
will "convert balancing into something that ... merely give[s] him
back whatever answer he feeds into it"125 is omnipresent.' 26 Be(1950). The Court upheld the statute in deference to "the congressional determination
that political strikes are evils of conduct which cause substantial harm to interstate commerce and that Communists and others identified by [the statute] pose continuing
threats to that public interest when in positions of union leadership." Id.; accordDennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951) (plurality opinion) (Vinson, CJ.) (political
advocacy context).
Similarly, in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the Court adopted a
balancing approach that expressly avoided any inquiry into the importance of a superficially "substantial" government purpose. The court of appeals in O'Brien had found the
draft card mutilation statute to be redundant and wholly unnecessary to accomplish any
legitimate governmental objective. O'Brien v. United States, 376 F.2d 538, 540-41 (1st
Cir. 1967), rev'd, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). The Supreme Court reversed, deferring not only
to Congress's assertion of the reasons for the law, but also to its assessment of the need
for it. See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text. In applying O'Brien to the selective
prosecution context in I1ayte, 470 U.S. 598 (1985), the Court again deferred to the government's assessment that deterrence was an adequate justification for punishing only
vocal nonregistrants. Id. at 611-14.
In the tax protestor cases, the federal courts of appeals have not even questioned
the government's conclusion that prosecution served a deterrence function and therefore justified the selection of defendants for punishment. See, e.g., United States v. Tibbetts, 646 F.2d 193, 195 (5th Cir. 1981); United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d 864, 868 (8th
Cir. 1978); United States v. Gillings, 568 F.2d 1307, 1309 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S.
919 (1978).
121
See supra notes 101-I1 and accompanying text.
122
See Clark, LegislativeMotivation and FundamentalRights in ConstiutionalLaw, 15 SAN
DIEGO L. REv. 953, 979-80 (1978) (When courts defer to legislative judgment in ad hoc
balancing, the "test gives no real meaning to constitutional provisions but states only
that legislatures may restrict protected rights whenever it is reasonable for them to do
so."); see also supra note 37.
123
See Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1443 (deference to Congress that inevitably
follows use of balancing tests nullifies first amendment protection of speech).
124
See, e.g., Frantz, A Reply, supra note 101, at 747 (discussing the various concerns
that might have prompted the government's actions in Barenblatt v. United States, 360
U.S. 109 (1959)). In theory, Congress might police itself. See, e.g., L. HAND, TIM BILL OF
RIGcITs 27-30 (1958). But as the history of commerce clause litigation suggests, asjudicial deference increases, the constitutional limits tend to disappear. See Brest, The Conscientious Legislator's Guide to ConstitutionalIntepretation,27 STAN. L. REv. 585, 591-92 (1975).
125
Frantz, .4Reply, supra note 101, at 748. Several scholars have examined the results of cases involving compelled disclosures from organizations when such disclosures
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cause any comparison of conflicting values is, by definition, subjective, 127judges can easily define relevant interests to favor one result
over another.' 2 8 A balancing process might thus eliminate all constraints on a court's discretion to whittle away or overemphasize first
29
amendment rights.
threaten the expressional and associational rights of members. The commentators have
concluded that, as a rule, courts have used balancing tests to require disclosures from
communist-related organizations but not from civil rights groups. See, e.g., P. KAUPER,
snpra note 101, at 108; Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1429; see also H. KALVEN, TIE
NEGRO AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT 65-121 (1965).
126
Today this danger is most apparent in the whistleblower cases. The Court first
adopted a balancing rule designed to protect whistleblowers from unwarranted discharge in Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). Subsequently, a series of
cases arose requiring the Court to refine the test. See, e.g., Mt. Healthy City School Dist.
Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 284-87 (1977); Givhan v. Western Line Consol.
School Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 414-17 (1979). By 1977, the Court had established a multistep balancing process for evaluating a whistleblower's first amendment claims:
Initially, in this case, the burden was properly placed upon respondent to show that his conduct was constitutionally protected, and that this
conduct was a "substantial factor"-or, to put it in other words, that it
was a 'motivating factor' in the Board's decision not to rehire him. Respondent having carried that burden, however, the District Court should
have gone on to determine whether the Board had shown by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have reached the same decision as
to respondent's reemployment even in the absence of the protected
conduct.
Do'yle, 429 U.S. at 287 (footnote omitted). In Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983),
however, the Court's test lost its clarity: "Whether an employee's speech addresses a
matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a
given statement .... Id. at 147-48. "[T]he State's burden in justifying a particular
discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." Id. at 150.
The Court once again invited individual Justices to implement their personal views of
the importance of first amendment interests in any given case:
[W]e do not see the necessity for an employer to allow events to unfold to
the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction of working
relationships is manifest before taking action. We caution that a stronger
showing may be necessary if the employee's speech more substantially
involved matters of public concern.
Id. at 152 (footnote omitted). In a final break with precedent, the Court announced that
it, not the lower federal courts, would make factual determinations relating to first
amendment discharge decisions. Id. at 150 n.10.
127
Karst, supra note 9,at 80. As one commentator has noted, first amendment and
governmental interests "can no more be compared quantitatively than sheep can be subtracted from goats." Frantz, A Reply, supra note 101, at 749.
128
See, e.g., P. KAUPER, supra note 101, at 116-17; Frantz, .1 Reply, supra note 101. at
747-49; see also hfra note 129 and accompanying text.
129 The early political advocacy cases illustrate this danger. In 1919, the Supreme
Court enunciated a clear and present danger test which on the surface appeared speechprotective but in fact upheld limits on expression wherever speech "tended" to produce
an undesirable end. Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919); Frohwerk v.United
States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v.United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919). The following
half-century produced a series of cases that implemented and developed the balancing
test haphazardly, particularly in cases involving the Communist Party. For the most
part, conservative Jtstices approved governmental restrictions on communist advocacy
on the basis that the governmental interests outweighed the private interests. E.g.
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Balancing is thus "a slippery and ambiguous enterprise for the
judiciary."' 130 The danger of abuse breeds a fear, on the one hand,
that the Court will act as a super-legislature in first amendment
cases 13' or, on the other, that it will use balancing to legitimate governmental limits on free expression. 32 Either result breeds disre133
spect for the judiciary.
Finally, balancing itself discourages expression. By referring to
the absolute nature or the preferred position of first amendment
values, the Court signals that society must tolerate political dissidence. 1 34 If, on the other hand, the Court adopts a case-by-case balancing approach, it cautions protestors to beware.13 5 They can
never be sure they are safe.' 3 6 Failure to provide rules and guidelines for the lower courts and potential litigants 37 chills free
speech. 138
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618-19 (1919) (Clarke, J.); Gitlow v. New York,
268 U.S. 652, 668-70 (1925) (Sanford, J.); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 371-72
(1927) (Sanford,J.); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 508-11 (1951) (Vinson, C.J.).
Liberal Justices, on the other hand, applied the same rules to enforce their personal
preferences for speech. E.g., Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J.,
dissenting); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Dejonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (Hughes, J.), Yates v. United States, 354 U.S.
298 (1957) (Harlan,J.). OtherJustices, less certain of how to balance, looked to policies
extraneous to the substantive merits for guidance, such as separation-of-powers notions.
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 517, 525-26 (1951) (Frankfurter, J.,concurring).
It is fair to conclude that, until Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam),
tightened the reins, balancing served as a cover for the expression of individual Justices'
political leanings.
130 H. KALVEN, supra note 125, at 121.
131
This fear may account for the Court's insistence that it was not balancing in
United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967), when it clearly was. See supra notes 112-15
and accompanying text.
132
See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL
REVIEW 89 (1966) ("Since the legislature is the primary balancer, any balance they
achieve, so long as it is not totally unjustifiable, is constitutional."); Frantz, Balance, supra
note 101, at 1441-42, 1449 (balancing becomes a "mechanism for rationalizing and validating the kinds of governmental action intended to be prohibited [by the first amendment]"). But see Gunther, Ih Search ofJudicial Qualitv on a ChangingCourt: The Case ofJustice
Powell, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1001, 1006 (1972) (Justice Harlan's balancing "typically entailed
a fair and careful evaluation of the asserted state justifications for impinging upon first
amendment interests").
133 See, e.g., Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1442 ("It is difficult to see how the
impartiality of ... judgments can be assured . . .unless the Justices abandon ad hoc
balancing and undertake to state a rule.. . by which the rights of all can be measured.").
134
See supra notes 101-07 and accompanying text; see also A. BICKEL, supra note 101,
at 94 (discussing first amendment's symbolic importance).
135 See, e.g., Frantz, Balance, supra note 101, at 1443 (ad hoc balancing fails to assure
that there is no danger in speaking out).
136
137

Id.

See Gunther, supra note 132, at 1026 (case-by-case balancing fails to "provide the
maximum possible guidance for lower courts and litigants").
138
American Comuunnications.Ass 'u v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382 (1950) provides a prime example. A union challenged a statute that withheld National Labor Relations Board
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In sum, fear of the consequences may well be the reason for the
Court's refusal to balance fully and honestly.' 39 It may also explain
and to some extent justify "categorization." By excluding certain
categories of speech from first amendment protection 40 and by attempting to define rules to govern different types of speech, 141 the
Court ties its own hands; it sets artificial limits on its discretion to
42
balance.'
(NLRB) services from unions whose officers were affiliated with the Communist Party.
The Court decided the first amendment issues using perhaps the most all-encompassing
balancing test it has ever employed:
When particular conduct is regulated in the interest of public order,
and the regulation results in an indirect, conditional, partial abridgement
of speech, the duty of the courts is to determine which of these two conflicting interests demands the greater protection under the particular circumstances presented.
Id. at 399. The Court upheld the statute, finding that it substantially furthered the government's interest in preventing political strikes that interfere with commerce, that only
a few union leaders fit within the regulated category, and that free speech rights were
affected only minimally. Id. at 400-06.
Douds illustrates why the Court generally has hesitated to balance. Assuming that
the Court's factual findings were correct, the decision seems unobjectionable. The
Court simply held that the minimally affected rights of the few had to give way to the
interests of the nation. But consider the effect of the Court's approach on the union and
on the few union leaders within the regulated category. Congress enacted the statute in
question in 1947 as an amendment to the National Labor Relations Act. Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Court issued its
decision on May 8, 1950. In the interim, the union was faced with a Hobson's choice:
lose all rights to pursue claims through the NLRB or demote a portion of its leadership.
Had the union anticipated that the Court would balance, how should the union have
proceeded? It was not in a position to know how many union leaders the regulation
affected nationwide. Nor could the union have assessed, with any degree of certainty,
the importance the Court would attribute to the governmental interest at stake. Absent
a rule of law or fixed criteria establishing a presumption in first amendment cases, the
union had no realistic method for evaluating how the Court would strike the balance.
All the pressures on the union would have encouraged it to decide based solely on practical factors: could it best do without a segment of its leadership or without the NLRB's
facilities? The apparent guarantees of the first amendment would thus have lost all
force.
139 Even if initially implemented to protect first amendment values, balancing may
ultimately legitimate governmental restrictions and discourage free expression. Spence
v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974), provides an interesting example of this phenomenon. In Spence, the Court struck down the conviction of a symbolic protestor under a
flag desecration statute. The majority relied on the balancing approach Justice Harlan
adopted in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), and Street v. New York, 394 U.S.
576 (1969). 418 U.S. at 412. The dissenters used essentially the same approach tojustify the conviction. Id. at 416 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
140 See Van Alstyne, 4 Graphic Review of the Free Speech Clause, 70 CA.IF. L. REv'. 107,
113-18 (1982) (discussing aspects of speech not within freedom of speech absolutely
protected by first amendment").
141
See iM. at 139-142 (discussing gradations of protection for gradations of speech);
Farber, supra note 89, at 749-62 (discussing class of first amendment cases involving
"offensive speech").
142 See Schauer, supra note 80, at 298-99 (discussing relationship between choice of
balancing approach and degree of judicial "flexibility"); see also Schauer, Codifying ihe
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Summary

Balancing and categorization both encompass risks. This Article does not try to prove the superiority of either approach. 43 Its
goal is simply to illustrate that means exist to alleviate some of the
balancing concerns.
Before courts can even begin to resolve the categorization/case-by-case balancing debate, they must view each approach
in its best light. Although many scholars have written in support of
categorization, 1 44 no one has yet shown how courts can balance
comprehensively in a systematic and principled way. 145 The following pages attempt to fill that void.
In the abstract, comprehensive balancing is a plausible and reasonable procedure for courts to pursue. Although the words of the
precedents disavow it, elements of balancing have made their way
into most of the significant first amendment cases. Moreover, comprehensive balancing is principled; unlike categorization,1 4 6 it
neither totally excludes any variety of speech from first amendment
protection nor requires courts to constantly redefine the words of
the amendment itself.147 In theory, if courts could learn to balance
comprehensively without falling into the inherent traps, 148 that approach would probably be the fairest way of deciding first amendment claims. Parts IV and V thus take a close look at the factors
upon which an all-encompassing balancing approach might rely.
Drawing on the lessons taught by all the various schools of thought,
including the categorization school, these sections consider whether
a structured balancing process can minimize the courts' practical
concerns.
First Amendment: New York v. Ferber, 1982 Sup. CT. REV. 285, 313-14 [hereinafter
Codifyi,,g].
143
I have therefore neither catalogued nor described the many criticisms of categorization that scholars have expressed. See, e.g., M. REDISH, supra note 64, at 173-255;
Schlag, supra note 74, at 731-39.
144
See supra note 97.
145
Professor Shiffrin and others have alluded to such an approach. See, e.g., Shiffrin,
supra note 72, at 955.
146
Professor Schlag points out two respects in which categorization fails to achieve
principled results. First, drawing lines for classes of speech that are to receive differing
protection necessarily becomes arbitrary in cases at the margins. Schlag, supra note 74,
at 694-96, 732. Second, classifying groups of speech fails to accord individual expression the dignity it (and the speaker) deserve and which the first amendment is designed
to protect. Id. at 676, 697-98, 737.
147
See generally Van Alstyne, supra note 140, at 113-28 (discussing meaning of "the
freedom of speech"); Schauer, supra note 80, at 268-70, 273 (discussing possible ways to
define "speech"); Schauer, Speech and "Speech -- Obscenity and "Obscenity " An Exercise in
the hilepretation of ConstitutionalLanguage, 67 GEo.L.J. 899 (1979) (discussing obscenity
as nonspeech).
148
See supra notes 10 1-38 and accompanying text.
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IV
THE COMPREHENSIVE BALANCING MODEL

The factors courts might consider in a comprehensive balancing approach are not themselves dangerous. Figure B shows that
courts have, at one time or another, relied on them all. The risk of
unsatisfactory first amendment reasoning occurs only when the
courts apply the factors without rules, criteria, or standards to guide
them. 14 9 Balancing then becomes an ad hoc, subjective assessment
easily employed to further the political philosophy of individual
judges.
This section outlines a form of analysis through which courts
could consider all the relevant first amendment criteria 150 while still
avoiding the current helter-skelter reasoning of the federal
courts.' 5 1 The Article's model isolates and prescribes the use of
common denominators relevant to all protest cases. For clarity's
sake, it displays the proposed analysis in pictorial form. Figures C
through F contain four flow charts that illustrate the possible paths,
or mental processes, courts should follow. 15 2 Figure G summarizes

all four stages of the decisionmaking framework; it illustrates graphically how the model attempts to point the bevy of current first
amendment tests in a single, consistent direction.
As Professor Schauer has noted, some categorization is unavoidable.t'3 In focusing only on political protest cases, for example,
the model adopts a limited categorical approach. Similarly, the
model does delineate different ways of looking at different sets of
cases and of "predetermin[ing] the outcome that flows from easily
determinable facts."' 54 By instructing courts on how to weigh the
various factors, the model implicitly creates "tests" that will apply to
different categories of speech.
Yet the model diverges from categorization in several significant respects. First, within the political protest context, the model
149 See M. REDISH, supra note 64, at 3 (arguing that courts "must seek general guidelines of interpretation" rather than rigid distinctions or "total, unguided chaos").
150 There will be instances where one factor so clearly favors one of the parties that
the court will be able to resolve the case without lengthy consideration of the countervailing interests. If, for example, the governmental interest in regulating is minimal, the

court need not fully evaluate the importance of the individual's speech. Some assessment may, however, be in order, if only to establish that some first amendment interest
exists.
151
See supra notes 44-58 and accompanying text. As Figures A and B illustrate, the
various first amendment "tests" currently in effect do not address uniform
considerations.
152 Full explanations of Figures C through G appear infra in the text as the charts are
introduced.
153 Schauer, supra note 80, at 282.
154 Id. at 300; see also id. at 271, 276.
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maintains as a premise that courts should subject all cases to the
same analytic approach; it neither subcategorizes the field' 5 5 nor es6 Second, rather than
tablishes an absolutist rule. 11
justifying regulation by excluding entire categories of speech from first amendment
protection, the model allows courts to uphold regulation by specifically gauging the importance of the speech and the countervailing
governmental interests. Third, the model directly addresses the issue of how judges should balance and decide particular cases. It
does not avoid that topic by refocusing on whether judges should
57
balance at all.1
In the end, the goal of the model is similar to that of the categorization approach. It attempts to guidejudicial discretion. 58 Under
the model, courts must continue to make some subjective quantitative judgments: Are the governmental interests important? Does
the regulation chill expression? This model, however, confines the
subjective assessments. Each factual determination triggers predetermined rules that define the next step in a court's analysis. Only
in limited circumstances does the model put a court in the position
of balancing ad hoc; that is, deciding which values-governmental
concerns or private first amendment interests-deserve more protection. The model, although not avoiding all possibility of judicial
manipulation, 15 9 thus limits the fears that motivate both the antibalancing and categorization schools.
A.

Stage I-The Motive Analysis
1. Principles of Mlotive Analysis 160
Existing first amendment standards implicitly recognize that

155 See Schauer, Codif'ing, supra note 142, at 314-15 ("Although it requires a bit of an
act of faith, it is possible to create new categories within the First Amendment without
entirely eating away the principles of free speech"); see also L. TRIBE, supra note 81. at

218 ("This sort of pigeonholing endangers the pigeon. If one parses First Amendment
doctrine too fine, one may soon discover that little protection for expression remains")
(footnote omitted).
156
Cf Schlag, supra note 74, at 673 ("Not all categorical theories ... are absolute:
some define subcategories of protected speech but attach diflerent levels of protection
to each.").
157 See Schauer, sipra note 80, at 296.
158 See id. at 300 (categorization advocates "leaving little if any discretion to the
judge in the particular case.").
151) No legal principle, theory, or model always prevents judicial manipulation. Even
rules specifically designed to limit judicial discretion are often circumvented. Cf. e.g..

Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509-10 (1951) (Vinson, CJ.) ("We ...reject the
contention that . . . probability of success is the criterion" for the "present danger"
prong of the clear and present danger test.). Yet the miore a model limits the contexts in
which judges have room to maneuever, and the more it makes clear that those contexts
are prone to improper manipulation, the more effectively it will produce principled and
well-reasoned results.
I o This Article considers the advantages and disadvantages of motive analysis. But
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motive is relevant in evaluating governmental action. If a regulation's effects alone counted, it would make no sense to encourage
regulators to ban whole categories of speech rather than smaller,
more specific subcategories. Yet that is the mandate of the current
legal tests. 1 6' Only the fear of improper discrimination among
types of speakers and expression explains the cases.' 6 2 Ordinarily,
however, judges have been unwilling to admit the connection between motive and first amendment decisionmaking. 6 3
Judges who have considered the reasons for particular regulations have treated motive as a threshold issue. As a rule, the
Supreme Court has considered only "objective motive"; 64 that is,
whether the terms of a regulation, its accompanying documentation, 165 and its undisputable effects' 6 6 show that the regulation is
a full discussion of the various theories of motive and their use throughout
constitutional law is beyond the Article's scope. Several excellent works on the subject
already exist. See, e.g., Brest, Palmer v.Thompson: An Approach to the Problem of
Unconstitutional Legislative Motive, 1971 Sup. CT. REV. 95; Clark, supra note 122;
Eisenberg, DisproportionateImpact and Illicit Motive: Theories of ConstitutionalAdjudication, 52
N.Y.U. L. REV. 36 (1977); Ely, Legislative andAdministrativeMotivation in ConstitutionalLaw,
79 YALE L.J. 1205 (1970); Perry, The DisproportionateImpact Theory of Racial Discrimination,
125 U. PA. L. REV. 540 (1977); Simon, Racially Prudiced Governmental Actions: A
Motivation Theoiy of the ConstitutionalBan Against Racial Discrimination, 15 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 1041 (1978).

161 For example, time, place, and manner analysis permits "reasonable" regulation
of speech provided the government does not select or discriminate among potential
speakers. See, e.g., Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 554 (1965) (a regulation "designed to
promote the public convenience ... and not susceptible to abuses of discriminatory
application, cannot be disregarded"); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 576 (1941)
(legitimate time, place, and manner regulation "must be exercised with 'uniformity...
free from improper or inappropriate considerations and from unfair discrimination' ");
see also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 3172, 3177 (1986) (court tests neutral
legislation directed at public health nuisances generally by looser standards than it
would test legislation directed at bookstores presenting a public health nuisance).
162
Clark, supra note 122, at 992. See generally Karst, supra note 17.
163
See infra note 169. As discussed below, practical proof problems probably account for the judicial hesitance to consider motivation. See Clark, supra note 122, at 954;
Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 114 and authorities cited therein.
164 Judges have often treated all the different aspects of motive as one. See Clark,
supra note 122, at 955-63 (discussing use of the terms "purpose" and "motivation");
Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 106-07 n.321 (there exists little distinction between "motive" and "purpose"). To avoid similar confusion, this Article coins two distinguishing
terms: "objective motive" and "subjective motive."
165 "Documentation" refers to legislative or administrative materials that can be
considered part of the law. These may include statutory preambles and, on occasion,
undisputed committee reports that define the statutory scope. See Dworkin, How to Read
the Civil Rights Ac, N.Y. REV. OF Booxs, Dec. 20, 1979, at 37-39.
166
The line distinguishing between objective and subjective motive, like all lines, is
sometimes blurred. Ordinarily, the effects of a law are relevant only to subjective motive. Occasionally, however, the effect of a regulaLion may be so dramatic that the underlying intent is unambiguous. See, e.g., Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 340-41
(1960) (redistricting of Tuskeegee's borders into an "uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure" with virtually no remaining black residents explicable only on the basis of racial
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patently designed to restrict speech content. 167 An affirmative answer has led the Court to evaluate the regulation according to a
strict test of constitutionality that is usually fatal in practice.'118 In
the absence of an initial finding of an "objective" intention to stifle
particular speech, however, the Court has ordinarily declined to inquire further into the actual "subjective" motives of the relevant
governmental actors. 69 It has instead applied constitutional standards that deemphasize the importance of first amendment
70
interests.,
Where the Court has considered "subjective" motive-the true
purposes underlying a regulation-it has also done so on a threshold basis. The first issue addressed in whistleblower cases, for example, is whether the exercise of free expression was "a substantial
factor" in the government's decision to act against the
whistleblower.' 7 t An affirmative answer does not mean the
whistleblower automatically wins.' 72 It merely creates a presumpmotives). See, e.g., Perry, supra note 160, at 547 (discussing Gomillion); Simon, supra note
160, at 1116 (same). When a regulation's impact so clearly illustrates its true purpose,
courts should be able to treat the law as if the purpose were objectively contained in its
terms. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
266 (1977) (discussing Gomillion and Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886)).
167
"Objective motive" is quite similar to Professor Dworkin's concept of "institutionalized intention." In Dworkin's view, policies or principles that are "in some way
enacted so that [they] become part . . . of the legislation by express legislative decision"
possess sufficient legitimacy to be judicially considered. Dworkin, supra note 165, at 38.
In contrast, the legislature's "collective understanding" is ordinarily far more ambiguous and susceptible to judicial misinterpretation or manipulation. Id. at 39.
As noted below, this Article's model does not go so far as to require courts to determine the single "collective understanding" of an entire legislative or administrative
body. Rather, it merely calls for the simpler-though admittedly not simple-inquiry
into whether improper motivations played "a substantial part" in the government's decision to regulate. The model thus avoids many of the problems Professor Dworkin's
distinction envisions.
168 See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comn'n, 447 U.S. 530, 540
(1980) ("[Tjhe state action may be sustained only if the government can show that the
regulation is a precisely drawn means of serving a compelling state interest.").
169
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986)
(reaffirming O'Brien); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 382-86 (1968) (refusing to
consider argument that statute is unconstitutional because of improper legislative intent); Wilkinson v. United States 365 U.S. 399, 412 (1961) ("it is not for us to speculate
as to the [motivation]"); Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 132-33 (1959) (refusing to consider whether legislative subpoena is unconstitutional because of improper
legislative intent).
170
The O'Brien test, [or example, looks to how well the regulation serves the governmental interest, and how necessary the regulation is to serve that interest. O'Brien, 391
U.S. at 381-82. The nature or importance of the restricted expression does not enter
into the calculus. See also Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598. 611-13 (1985).
171
Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274. 287 (1977); see
also Leonard v. City of Columbus, 705 F.2d 1299, 1303 (11 th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 468
U.S. 1204 (1984); Rosado v. Santiago, 562 F.2d 114, 118 (1st Cir. 1977).
172
The Court has resisted placing the person who speaks out in a better position
than a discharged employee who has been silent. JR. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 285; see also
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tion of unconstitutionality, shifting the burden to the government to
show "by a preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision as to respondent's [re]employment even
in the absence of the protected conduct."1 7 3 If the government car174
ries its burden, the motive analysis ends.
Treating motive as a threshold issue makes good sense. Motive
is relevant primarily because it bears on the good faith of the government's independent justifications for restricting free speech. Yet
regulations may stem from a desire to restrict free expression, while
at the same time may serve important state functions.175 An initially
improperly motivated regulation may, in hindsight, be so necessary
as to render malicious motivation of secondary concern. 176
Although a court may fairly assume that a statute intended to suppress particular views will be "successful"-that is, will have a sub177
stantial impact on those who wish to express the targeted views the court cannot foreclose the possibility that the regulation should
ultimately be sustained. Proof of a constitutionally forbidden goal
thus justifies courts in shifting the burden of persuasion while still
178
retaining the option of upholding the law.
These considerations highlight two defects in the logic of the
Adamian v. Lombardi, 608 F.2d 1224 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 446 U.S. 938 (1980)
(protestor properly dismissed because his action interfered with employer's functions).
173 M. Healthy, 429 U.S. at 287; see also Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701 (D.C.
Cir. 1977) (government may show by preponderance of the evidence that it would have
reached the same decision had the protected conduct never occurred).
174 See, e.g., Nicholson v. Board of Educ., 682 F.2d 858 (9th Cir. 1982); Childers v.
Dallas Police Dep't, 513 F. Supp. 134 (N.D. Tex. 1981). Presumably, however, a regulation might still be deemed unconstitutional on independent first amendment grounds
because of its effect on free speech values. See, e.g., National Gay Task Force v. Board of
Educ., 729 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1984), aff'dpercuriam by an equally divided Court, 470 U.S.
903 (1985) (teacher dismissal struck down because of statute's overbreadth).
175 In Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), for example, Ohio law enforcement officials undoubtedly had mixed motives. On the one hand, the Ku Klux Klan
speaker probably expressed views distasteful to the officials. On the other hand, the
speaker's call for "revengence" may truly have made them fear that violence would result from the speech. It would not be appropriate for a court to foreclose all options to
prevent such violence solely because the speaker can introduce evidence of personal
animosity.
176 See Ely, supra note 160, at 1339.
177
Three interrelated intuitive assumptions underlie this conclusion. First, a government regulator is unlikely to adopt an ineffective regulation. Second, the government will rarely crank up its legislative or administrative machinery for the purpose of
silencing a single protestor. Third, protestors who share the target's views will inevitably perceive that a government that has acted once against protest activity may act again.
The model thus concludes as a general matter that overt, official sanctions against protest activity will have a speech-deterrent effect.
178
See Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 150-51. Professor Brest, in contrast, argues that
courts should treat improper motivation alone as a conclusive reason to invalidate a law.
Brest, supra note 164, at 116-18, 131; see also Clark, supra note 122, at 954; Simon, supra
note 160, at 1047.
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existing "objective motive" cases. In one sense, the courts have attributed too much significance to a finding of an objective intent to
regulate speech "directly." The distinction between direct and indirect regulation of speech content is subtle, often bordering on the
meaningless. 179 Yet courts have applied an exceedingly strict constitutional test in cases that fall on one side of the "direct regulation" 80 line while upholding almost any type of so-called indirect
regulation.' 8 ' This artificial approach fails to accommodate governmental and first amendment interests in a realistic or practical
fashion.
At the same time, courts that refuse to consider the subjective
82
reasons for a regulation underestimate the significance of motive.'
If improper purpose is relevant at all, it is illogical for a court to
suspect a regulation where the government openly expresses its
goal to regulate speech content, yet decline even to consider the
183
government's hidden agenda in other cases.
To define the appropriate degree of judicial deference to the
regulators, judges must examine both the overt and secret motives
for which a law is adopted. A court that learns that illicit considerations came into play should hesitate to rely on the interest that the
government asserts. On the other hand, pure motives may call for
See supra notes 84-86 and accompanying text.
180 In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980), for
example, the Court applied a strict first amendment test because the regulation was, in a
technical sense, content-based. The Court used a strict test even though the regulation
did not aim at any particular view and numerous alternative means of expression were
available.
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986)
181
(zoning ordinance "justified without reference" to speech content held constitutional
despite potential impact on speech) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens
Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 771 (1976)); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367 (1968) (indirect restriction of speech justified even if speech important).
182
See, e.g., Clark, supra note 122, at 978-83 (summarizing beneficial effects of motivational analysis in all cases involving "fundamental rights"); Eisenberg, supra note 160,
at 101 (arguing that "rights of equality," including first amendment rights, "often cannot be protected unless a court is willing to examine motive or purpose").
183
The Court's hypertechnical approach to motive may lead to peculiar judicial reasoning. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), for example, the "no-motivation" approach enabled the Supreme Court to ignore the court of appeals' compelling
conclusion that the only possible purpose of the draft-card mutilation statute was to
stifle protest. In the opposite direction, the Supreme Court has frequently found itself
unable to justify regulations on the basis that the government's intent is benign. In
Consolidated Edison, the Court was forced to strike down a totally viewpoint neutral statute. In Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 73-84 (1976),Justice Powell concurred in applying a weak first amendment standard to a zoning ordinance
because it had no effect on speech. Id. at 73-84. However, Justice Powell found himself
in the anomalous position of supporting a strict, nearly absolutist test for parallel situations in which an' impact on speech is evident, even if the purposes underlying the statute and the governmental interests at stake remain the same.
179
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greater deference to the lawmakers' exercise of discretion.8 4 Using
motive analysis to set presumptions, or parameters, to guide the balancing process thus responds logically to the legitimate fears of the
85
absolutist school.'
From this discussion, three principles emerge for the balancing
model:
(1) Any inquiry into motive should occur at the threshold. A
finding of improper motive warrants only a change in the parties'
burdens. It may justify a more jaundiced view of the regulation
and an assumption that the regulation substantially affects the
targets' expression. Proof of improper motive alone, however,
cannot determine a regulation's constitutionality.
(2) Objective motive, distilled from the terms of the regulation,
should not be the sole inquiry. While a court should scrutinize all
express restrictions of speech, it should not allow the government
to immunize improperly motivated and equally dangerous restrictions by framing them in indirect terms.
(3) A court should apply the same presumptions to cases
in which improper motive has been proven objectively or
186

subjectively.

2.

The Model

Figure C illustrates the first stage of the comprehensive balancing approach.' 8 7 Motive analysis is the threshold inquiry. First,
does the regulation, by its terms, restrict particular expression (i.e.,
speech content)? If so, then the target has established an objective
motive to restrict first amendment rights and is entitled to a pre184

See Clark, supra note 122, at 983 ("explicit discussion of the existence of animus

or prejudice properly forces the Court to consider when the social contract has been
broken and consequently when judicial intervention is warranted under the Constitution"); see also id. at 988.
185 Cf supra notes 108-11 & 121-24 and accompanying text.
186 This Article recommends close scrutiny of regulation born out of improper subjective motive. Arguably, proof of an illicit hidden intent might give rise to an even
stronger presumption of unconstitutionality. If the government refuses even to reveal
its true intentions and weigh openly the pros and cons of regulation, a court might logically conclude that the secret reasons are unlikely to be legitimate or sufficient to support the regulation.
187
Figures C through G contain large and small rectangles, diamonds, circles, and
ovals. Each geometric figure has a meaning. The rectangles tell the reader where the
court is in its analysis. The large rectangle describes the general "stage," or type of
analysis to be pursued. The smaller rectangles specify the precise analysis the court
must pursue next. Diamonds summarize the question the court has to answer. Circles
represent a roadmap of sorts; they tell the reader where the results of the previous analysis direct the court. Finally, ovals represent end results; that is, how the court should

decide.
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FIGURE C
Stage I: Motive Anal.,sis

NO

sumption of unconstitutionality.' 8 8 The burden shifts to the gov188 In theory, the model could consider motive as one factor for a court to weigh in
the balance of a regulation's constitutionality. Such an approach, however, gives too
much substantive weight to a finding of improper motive. Improper motive is relevant
only insofar as it casts suspicion on the government's independent reasons for a regulation. If the government can nonetheless substantiate those independent justifications,
the individual regulator's motive should not bar implementation of a legitimate law.
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emnment to establish either that it would have taken the same action
in the absence of the target's expression, or that it can justify the
regulation even if the court finds a significant speech-deterrent
89
effect. 1
If the target cannot establish an objective motive, the target
may then attempt to prove subjective intent to restrict the expression. The practical proof impediments will necessarily be substantial.' 9 0 But, if successful, the litigant should benefit from the same
presumption of unconstitutionality as in the "objective motive" scenario; again, the burden will shift to the government to justify its
action. If, on the other hand, the target fails to establish motive
either objectively or subjectively, the court will not set guidelines for
the ultimate decision at this stage. The court instead proceeds to
Stage II of the balancing process: there, it assesses the impact of the
regulation, in anticipation of weighing the private against the governmental interests.
An example best demonstrates the novelty of the model's approach. Consider regulations of demonstrations in a public place,
like those that confronted the Nazi demonstrators in Skokie, Illinois,
in the late 1970's.'19 Assume that a particular regulation is contentneutral on its face, uniformly applied (at least in the short run), and
serves some marginally legitimate governmental interest. Under
current case law, a court would apply a time, place, and manner
analysis. It would sustain the regulation as long as it does not foreclose all reasonable alternative means for the demonstrators to express their views.' 9 2 Time, place, and manner analysis does not take
into account such variables as (1) whether the regulation is aimed
Rather than accord motive substantive weight, courts should thus treat it as a threshold
factor that establishes a rebuttable presumption. See supra notes 175-78 and accompanying text.
189
In such a case, proof of objective or subjective motive would require a court to
proceed to Stage III(C) of the balancing process.
190 See infra notes 195-98 and accompanying text. Courts, for example, will allow
whistleblower plaintiffs to engage in discovery provided they can establish a prinafacie
case. See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287. Litigants who cannot carry that initial burden lose, regardless of whether their claims in fact
have merit. This result, although harsh, is consistent both with the general presumption
that statutes and government actions are constitutional, see, e.g., Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288, 341, 348 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and with the
overall principles of discovery in civil litigation. See, e.g., Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S.
495 (1947).
191 See, e.g., Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 916
(1978).
192
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 930-32 (1986)
(ordinance leaving 520 acres of land open to use as adult theater sites satisfies reasonable alternative requirement); Heffron v. International Soc. for Krishna Consciousness,
Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654-55 (1981) (regulation restricting distribution of merchandise at
state fair to licensed booths provides adequate means for dissemination of products and
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particularly at Nazis; (2) whether it chills free expression; (3) how
important the regulation is; and (4) whether alternatives exist for
the government to accomplish its ostensibly legitimate aim.
The model's approach is more flexible. Where the predicates
for time, place, and manner analysis are not met, the current legal
standards coincide with the model's guidelines. 93 The model may,
however, treat a superficially content-neutral statute more strictly if
the target can prove subjective motive. The Nazi demonstrators, for
example, would benefit from a presumption of unconstitutionality
by establishing that a newly promulgated regulation is directed specifically at their activities.
Even if no proof of improper motive exists, a uniform, contentneutral time, place, and manner regulation does not automatically
pass muster under the model. Instead, a court must engage in a
careful analysis of various relevant factors. It must weigh in the balance the types of people and expression the antidemonstration regulation affects, the relative importance of the governmental interest
in the regulation, and the degree to which the municipality has ac94
commodated potential demonstrators' first amendment interests.'
views); Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 575 (1941) (Jehovah's Witnesses' ability
to communicate orally or in writing not suppressed by parade license law).
193
For example, a finding that the regulation is content-based is approximately
equivalent to a finding of objective or subjective motive. Tradition would have us analyze the regulation under the strict "compelling state interest test." The model would
assume a substantial chilling effect, which would in turn lead to a similar presumption of
unconstitutionality. If the governmental interest justifying the regulation is not "very
important," a court will strike it down. Even a "very important" interest will not save a
regulation that fails to accomodate the countervailing speech interests nearly perfectly.
Where the governmental interest is very important and the accommodation perfect, the
court must determine if the interest is sufficiently compelling to outweigh the target's
interest in free expression.
194
Under current law, courts often use the O'Brie "indirect speech" analysis as an
alternative to the time, place, and manner approach. The model's differences from "indirect speech" analysis parallel its differences from the time, place, and manner approach.
In O'Brien itself" for example, the Court upheld the draft card mutilation statute on
the basis that it was the least restrictive means-or at a minimum the least restrictive of
the equally cost-effective means-for accomplishing an important state interest. United
States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367, 381 (1968). The Court did not consider (I) whether
Congress had a specific intent to punish draft protestors or, more generally, "hippies";
(2) whether the protest was important; or (3) whether the regulation chilled free expression.

The model's approach is, again, more flexible. Even though the regulation may on
the surface appear to affect speech only "indirectly," the protestors have an opportunity
to establish that the regulation is in design and effect a means of restricting expression.
Moreover, if no proof of improper motivation exists, a court need not validate the regulation merely because it serves somie governmental purpose. Instead, the court must balance such considerations as the effect of the regulation on the free speech values and the
relative importance of the governmental interests.
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3.

Problems of Proving Motive

Proving motive can be difficult. 19 5 Several governmental actors
with potentially differing goals may have participated in adopting a
particular regulation. 196 Furthermore, regulators may hide their
motive.' 9 7 They may have sole possession of documentary and testimonial proof. 9 8 Even where evidence is available, the ultimate answer to the question "why did they regulate" may remain
ambiguous. 199
The extent of potential proof problems necessarily depends on
how courts assign the burden of showing improper motive. The nature of the burden in turn depends on the significance courts attach
to a finding that the government intended to suppress the target's
speech.
The Standard of Proof. A court prepared to strike down an improperly motivated regulation as per se unconstitutional is justified in
imposing strict proof requirements on the target. In the Nazi demonstration example, the ordinance addresses a potentially dangerous situation which the government has a real interest in diffusing.
A court thus would properly hesitate to strike down the regulation
merely because the regulators initially acted due to dislike of the
20 0
Nazi position.
On the other hand, if a finding of improper motive merely shifts
195

Practical considerations played a role in the O'Brien Court's decision to avoid the

issue of subjective motivation. 391 U.S. at 383-84. See generally Schwemm, From Washington to Arlington Heights and Beyond: Discriminatoiy Purpose in Equal Protection Litigation,
1977 U. ILL. L.F. 961 (discussing difficulty of proving discriminatory intent in race
cases); Note, ProvingIntentionalDiscriminationin Equal Protection Cases: The GrowingBurden
of Proof in the Supreme Court, 10 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 435, 435-36 (1980-81)
("[Tihe Court has placed an extraordinary burden on plaintiffs by focusing on purpose
rather than effect."); Note, Making the Violation Fit the Remedy: The Intent Standard and
EqualProtection Law, 92 YALE LJ.328, 351 (1982) ("[T]he intent standard comes close to
establishing a right for which there can be no remedy.").
196
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971) ("[I]t is extremely difficult for
a court to ascertain the motivation, or collection of different motivations, that lie behind
a legislative enactment."); see also Clark, supra note 122, at 974 (executive signing act into
law and individual legislators may have different motives for enacting legislation).
197
See Binion, "Intent"andEqualProtection: A Reconsideration, 1983 Sup. CT. REV. 397,
441-42 ("Plaintiffs may succeed only by demonstrating the pervasiveness of a 'secret'
agenda. Because it must be shown that the decisionmakers were motivated by that
which they deny, the plaintiffs must prove them to be liars."); Brest, supra note 160, at
123 n.137.
198 See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252,
268 (1977).
199 See Palmer, 403 U.S. at 224-25 (evidence supports finding of both proper and
improper motive); see also Ely, supra note 160, at 1213-14 (discussing possibility of motives "intertwined in the minds of most legislators").
200
A more sympathetic illustration is the tax protestor hypothetical. See supra note
30 and accompanying text. From society's point of view, it would be counterproductive
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the burden to the government to justify its regulation, a court can
more readily accept evidence short of proof of bad faith. A determination that suppression of the target's message played a "substantial" role may not be enough to invalidate a regulation, but it
certainly seems sufficient to require the government to explain.
Under the balancing model outlined above, the government
can overcome objective or subjective proof of improper motive by
showing it would have acted similarly regardless of the target's prohibited speech. Even where the government fails to lift the presumption of unconstitutionality, the presumption's sole effect is to
relieve the target of establishing the regulation's impact on free expression. 20 1 A limited standard of proof that shifts the burden to the
20 2
government is thus appropriate.
Difficulty of Proof. Still, one cannot overlook the difficulty of
proving motive. Individual administrators invariably offer every
20 3
available innocent explanation for implementing a regulation.
Courts may find it hard even to determine which administrator is
responsible for a particular decision to regulate. 20 4 In the case of a
statute, different legislators with potentially differing intentions
for a court to prevent future bonafide tax evasion prosecutions merely because the Internal Revenue Service has targeted a protest group for investigation.
201
Thus, in the Nazi demonstration and tax protestor examples, see supra note 200
and accompanying text, the government could still justify its regulation or prosecutions
by carrying its burdens under Stages III(C) and IV(D) of the model. The government
would have to establish both that its method of proceeding served a very important
governmental interest and that it fully accommodated the protestors' first amendment
interests. In general, however, proof of the government's intent to restrict expression
supports an assumption that the regulation will have a restrictive effect. See supra note
177 and accompanying text.
202
See Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 287 (1977)
(applying substantial factor test in whistleblower context); cf NLRB v. Transportation
Management Corp., 462 U.S. 393, 403 (1983) (in the labor context, an employer who
has acted in violation of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-69 (1982),
is "a wrongdoer ....It is fair that he bear the risk that the influence of legal and illegal
motives cannot be separated, because he knowingly created the risk and because the risk
was created not by innocent activity but by his own wrongdoing"); see also Ely, supra note
160, at 1208 (arguing that proof of motive should shift to the government the burden of
'justify[ing] the [law] under attack by relating it to a permissible governmental goal").
203
Because evidence of motive often lies exclusively in the hands of government
employees, first amendment claimants will inevitably demand discovery on the issue.
Equally predictable is the government's defense to discovery that answering interrogatories and providing documents and depositions are burdensome and disruptive of government operations.
204 The Supreme Court's opinion in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598 (1985),
for example, identifies numerous officials who participated in the prosecution decision.
Initially, the Selective Service adopted a passive enforcement approach. The Department ofJustice then became involved at several levels, including the central bureau in
Washington, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and local United States Attorneys.
Various members of the Department's Criminal Division then attempted to set prosecution policy, but individual United States Attorneys and local assistants ultimately carried
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voted for the legislation. 20 5 Individual representatives may also
20 6
have had more than one goal in mind.
Courts have coped with problems of determining the motives of
government administrators in contexts beyond the first amendment.2 0 7 It is the task of judges to infer intent from extrinsic circumstances, corroborating documentary evidence, and the
demeanor of the witnesses. 20 8 Particularly in cases involving imporout the decisions to prosecute. WaYte, 470 U.S. at 601-03. In the end, the Court could
not determine who was responsible for charging Mr. Wayte.
205
See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968) ("What motivates one
legislator to make a speech about a statute is not necessarily what motivates scores of
others to enact it."); see also Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 115 (courts must enforce law
despite difficulties of ascertaining a collective body's motive). As Professor Simon suggests, whether to place legislators' motives on trial should logically depend on a calculus
including such factors as the evidentiary value of having legislators testify, the added
time and expense of trials, and the negative institutional ramifications of requiring testimony. It should not turn "on any mysticisms concerning the difference between institutional and individual motivation." Simon, supra note 160, at 1106.
206
See Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971) (addressing difficulty of
ascertaining the "dominant" motivation behind the statute); Brest, supra note 160, at
119 (when several motives influenced decisionmaker, complainant must prove illicit motive affected result). See generally Dworkin, supra note 165, at 39-40 (discussing problems
of identifying collective motivation).
207
See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 115, 117 (discussing various situations in
which courts inquire into the motives of corporations, unions, or other government
branches); Raveson, Lnimaskingthe Motives of Government Decisioinakers: A Subpoenafor I our
Thoughts?, 62 N.C.L. REV. 879, 965-67 (1985) (describing methods courts use to prove
institutional motives); cf. Schnapper, Perpetuation of Past Discrimination, 96 HARV. L. REV.
828, 858-61 (1983) (arguing that difficult questions concerning past racial discrimination and its motivation and effects are not "inherently unanswerable" as an evidentiary
matter).
Parties routinely seek discovery relating to motivation in discrimination litigation,
selective prosecution motions in criminal cases, and many other contexts. See, e.g..
I['alte, 470 U.S. at 604-05 n.5 (selective prosecution); Villiage of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 270 n.20 (1977) (housing discrimination).
Courts ordinarily require the party with the burden to make a primafacie showing of
improper motivation before allowing discovery. See United States v. Catlett, 584 F.2d
864, 867 (8th Cir. 1978) (mere allegation of government's selective prosecution without
some evidence of elements of improper motive does not support discovery request)United States v. Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2nd Cir. 1974) (party must present evidence "tending to show the existence of the essential elements of [improper motivation]
... and that the documents in the government's possession would indeed be probative
of these elements."). The disruption resulting from discovery has, however, not been so
burdensome as to prompt courts to establish an across-the-board, process-based rule
eliminating claimants' opportunity to prove their allegations. The administrative burden of discovery in the first amendment context would be no greater. See supra note 190.
208
Numerous courts and commentators have discussed the types of evidence that
might serve to prove or disprove motivation. See. e.g., Arlington Heights. 429 U.S. at 26670 (listing types of evidence); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976) (discriiinatory purpose "may often be inferred from the totality of the relevant facts" including
disproportionate impact evidence); see also Simon, supra note 160, at 1098 (discussing
types of institutional behavior that can serve as circumstantial evidence of motivation);
Note, The Role of CircumstantialEvidence in Proving Discriminatoly Intent: Developments Since
Washington v. Davis, 19 B.C.L. REv. 795, 797-800 (1978); Note, Proofof Racially Discriin-
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tant constitutional rights, courts abdicate their adjudicatory function
if they avoid the inquiry simply because of its complexity. 20 9

The legislative context, however, presents a more difficult problem.

2 10

For reasons of comity, courts justifiably hesitate to require

legislators to testify as to their motive 2 1 even when the relevant legnatoy Purpose Under the Equal Protection Clause: Washington v. Davis, Arlington Heights,
Mt. Healthy, and Williamsburgh, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 725, 740-45 (1977) (analyzing impact ofArlington Heights on types of evidence probative of discriminatory purpose).
In both first and fourteenth amendment litigation, comity considerations and fear of
disrupting executive operations cause courts to hesitate to allow "targets" to subpoena
high level government officials. See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 593 n.9 ("[I]mpugning
the integrity of a coordinate branch . . . is to be avoided if possible."). Courts have,
however, on occasion required and relied on official testimony. See, e.g., Arlington Heights,
429 U.S. at 268-70 (questioning village board members during discovery and at trial.);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547 (1972) (questioning welfare officials); see also
Simon, supra note 160, at 1105-06 (mistake to infer broad testimonial privilege for government officials). Only experience can determine whether courts can develop workable
rules and rationales for distinguishing this type of discovery.
209 See Karst, supra note 9, at 95-98 (constitutional litigation demands adequate information about the facts of the challenged action; see also Eisenberg, supra note 160, at
104-05, 114 (problems of ascertainability, futility, disutility, and impropriety justifyjudicial caution, but not abstention from examining motive). Making such determinations is
the function of trial courts. See, e.g., United States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412
U.S. 580, 593 (1973) ("[T]he inevitable incompleteness presented by all legislation
means that interstitial federal lawmaking is a basic responsibility of the federal courts.");
Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 549 (1924) (facts are best ascertained and
weighed at the local level); see also H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC
PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 164, 396-97 (tent. ed. 1958) (discussing fact-finding capabilities of trial courts); Chayes, The Role of theJudge in Public Law
Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1281, 1307-09 (1976) (discussing suitability of trial courts
for making fact-sensitive decisions in public law litigation).
210
See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 592-93 ("the Court has been more reluctant to find
legislative purposes illicit than to criticize administrative purposes"). The Court's decisions on whether to investigate the motives of legislators for the purpose of evaluating
the constitutionality of statutes have been inconsistent. The Court has engaged in motivational analysis where race discrimination is at issue. See Rogers v. Lodge, 458 U.S. 613
(1982); Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 265; Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242-44
(1976). The Court has also relied upon motive in establishment clause cases. See, e.g.,
Wallace v.Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 56 (1985) ("[A] statute must be invalidated if it is entirely
motivated by a purpose to advance religion."). In the first amendment context, some
Justices have been willing to inquire into the motives of legislative committee members
who conduct congressional hearings and investigations that threaten to chill free political associations. See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 153-62 (1959)
(Black, J., dissenting); see also Ely, supra note 160, at 1310-12 (the Court should determine if Committee members intend to expose a witness's beliefs and associations merely
for the sake of exposure). But see Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957)
("[A] solution ... is not to be found in testing the motives of committee members...
.11).

211
See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-26 (1971) (illustrating difficulty
and futility ofjudicial attempt to strike down legislation solely because of supporters'
bad motives); United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (the judiciary cannot
restrain otherwise lawful use of legislative power merely because a wrongful motive
might have prompted the legislation); see also Brest, supra note 160, at 129 (legislators
should not be subject to subpoena to explain their motives).
The term "comity" refers to the notion ofjudicial respect for the legislature's sover-
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islators are available as witnesses. 21 2 Nevertheless, courts do evalu21 3
ate legislative intent for the purpose of construing statutes
without the benefit of direct testimony. 21 4 Judicial hesitation to test
the constitutionality of statutes by similar means-15 appears to stem
not from the difficulties of assessing the legislative goals, but rather
from a reluctance to blame individual legislators for conduct requir2 6
ing nullification of a statute. '
This Article's balancing model disavows the peculiar distinction
between constitutional and statutory cases. A first amendment
eignty that may cause a court to defer to the legislative action. Separation-of-powers
concerns may also contribute to judicial hesitation to inquire into actual legislative motivation. It is, in a sense, unseemly for courts to call members of a coordinate and coequal
branch of government as witnesses, evaluate their credibility, and ultimately decide
whether they have acted improperly. Courts therefore are willing to do so only in exceptional cases. See Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 268 & n.18 (legislative or executive decisionmakers called to stand to testify only in "extraordinary instances"); cf City of
Memphis v. Greene, 451 U.S. 100, 114-17 nn.22-27 (1981) (relying on extra-judicial
statements by officials and in court testimony of witness who had spoken with an official); Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535, 547 (1972) (relying on depositions of state
officials).
212
Practical impediments may, of course, prevent courts from selecting or subpoenaing the "relevant" legislators. It would be cumbersome to call all 535 federal Senators and Representatives to the stand in any one case. But without such a procedure it
may be impossible to identify the "key" legislators. Even if identification were simple,
the relevant legislators may be unavailable to participate in court proceedings due to
death, location outside the court's jurisdiction, or other valid reasons.
213
See Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading of Statutes, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527,
538-44 (1947). But cf. Clark, supra note 122, at 975 (distinguishing interpretation of
statutory intent derived from effects of statute from interpretations of intent derived
from legislative history).
214
Where the evidence of intent is ambiguous, courts have simply declined to rely
on motive as a controlling factor and have relied on more general rules of statutory
construction. See 2A N. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 48.01, at

278 n.12 (4th ed. 1972) ("where legislative history is ambiguous a court must look to
intrinsic aids"); Eisenberg, supra note 164, at 115 ("When courts are not sure that they
know a legislature's motives, they can simply decline to invalidate on the basis of motive."); see also United States v. Moore, 423 U.S. 122, 145 (1975) ("The canon in favor of
strict construction.., is satisfied if the words are given their fair meaning in accord with
the manifest intent of the lawmakers.") (citing United States v. Brown, 333 U.S. 18, 2526 (1948)); Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 591-93 (1961) (rejecting defendant's congressional intent argument because the legislative history was ambiguous).
215 It may, for purposes of this model, be significant to compare the first and fourteenth amendment contexts. Initially, courts refused to inquire into legislative motive in
both areas. See Palner,; 403 U.S. 217 (fourteenth amendment); O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(first amendment). The first amendment rule has remained constant. See City of Renton
v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 929 (1986) (relying on O'Brien's rejection of a
motivation analysis). But in racial discrimination cases, the Court has found it necessary
to open the door to all available evidence of the intent underlying an allegedly discrimiinatory act or rule. See Arlington Heighls, 429 U.S. at 265-68. The shift I propose in this
Article is thus neither radical nor unrealistic. But see Perry, supra note 160, at 555-56
(arguing that first amendment is source of affirmative obligations and negative restrictions upon government, while equal protection is only a negative restriction).
216
See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 593 n.9 (Supreme Court will avoid ascribing illicit
motives to coordinate branches of government if possible).

980

CORNELL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 72:936

claimant deserves the same judicial protection as one who argues
that a statute does not apply to him. Considerations of comity ordi21 7
narily have less force in the first amendment context, not more.
Moreover, the role motive analysis plays under the model
should, to some extent, minimize the comity concerns.2 18 Proof of
intent to restrict speech merely requires a court to take a closer look
at alternative justifications for the law. 21 9 A court that finds improper motive thus need not hold individual legislators who voted
for the law directly accountable for its invalidation. Because the
model does not require the court to determine the sole or predominant legislative motive, 220 its finding does not cast as much of an
aspersion on the legislators in question. The finding simply reflects
the court's conclusion that some legislators were influenced by the
statute's potential effect on speech. The court can leave open the
possibility that even those legislators were ultimately persuaded to
vote for the statute because of other, more fitting considerations.
Employing a "substantial factor" rather than "predominant
motive" standard also minimizes other practical problems in assessing legislative intent. Under a "substantial factor" test, ambiguities
in the legislative record no longer preclude a court from relying on
217
See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965) (federal injunction of a state prosecution justified when prosecution impairs defendant's freedom of expression); see also
Bailey, Enjoining State CriminalProsecutions Which Abridge FirstAmendment Freedoms, 3 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (1967) (arguing that Dombrowski did not go far enough).
218
That is not to say the model eliminates comity concerns, or even reduces the
comity conflicts that are evident under prevailing standards. Whenever a court begins
to evaluate a politician's goals, the danger increases that the court will overstep its own
bounds, enter the political arena, or show disrespect for the workings of the coordinate
branch.
Nevertheless, these concerns pale in comparison to the alternative: a balancing approach in which courts wholly defer to the legislature's assertions of what it is doing and
why. See supra notes 118-24 and accompanying text; see also Brest, supra note 160, at 130
(the Court should invalidate a governmental act when claimant has proved illicit motivation). Moreover, it is difficult to understand why theoretical comity concerns should be
less significant when a court decides cases with reference to hypothetical "legislative
purposes" it conjures up. SeeJ. ELy, supra note 75, at 125-26. Allowing courts to investigate true legislative motives may, in addition, produce side benefits, such as increased
legislative and administrative accountability. Id. at 125-34. The Court has implicitly recognized as much by agreeing to consider legislative motive in the fourteenth amendment context. Arlington Heights, 429 U.S. at 266-68; see also Eisenberg, Reflections on a
Unified Theoy of Motive, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1147, 1148-49 (1978) ("important classes
of cases [exist] in which analysis of motive yields important dividends" that may outweigh comity concerns).
2 19 See supra text accompanying note 193; see also Bice, MotivationalAnalysis as a Complete Explanation of the.Justification Process, 15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1131, 1139 (1978) (court
might logically use motive analysis to identify covert suppression of speech); Simon,
supra note 160, at 1108, 1127 (evidence of racial purpose should lead court to "demand
of the government a more credible, non-prejudiced explanation").
220
The model only requires a finding that motive to restrict speech was a "substantial factor." See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
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motive. 221 The court need not determine whether all or most of the
legislators who voted for the bill shared in the improper motive. It
must find only that a substantial number considered the speech element as a valid rationale. 22 2 Nor must the court select among mixed
legislative motives, except to identify which goals were significant
factors in the vote. 2 23 The limited effect that a finding of improper
motive has under the balancing model and the concomitant limited
burden of the target thus render the otherwise enormous problems
224
of proving actual intent somewhat more manageable.
Motive as an UnimportantFactor. Of course, motive may not be an
important element of every case. The reasons for a regulation are
often clear. Alternatively, motive may be insignificant when compared with other concerns. 2 25 It may thus seem counterproductive
See Ely, supra note 160, at 1267, 1278-79.
See id. at 1267; cf Bennett, Reflections on the Role of Motivation Under the EqualProtection Clause, 79 Nw. U.L. REV. 1009 (1985) (suggesting that in the equal protection area
Court no longer sees any "problem of 'summing' individual motivations to come up
with a unitary motivation").
223
SeeJ. ELY, supra note 75, at 138 (question of motive should be "whether an unconstitutional motivation appears materially to have influenced the choice").
224
The O'Brien court noted two additional justifications for its decision not to consider legislative intent. First, the Court believed motive analysis might be counterproductive because it could lead the Court to strike down "good" laws on the basis of
extraneous and essentially irrelevant considerations. Second, the Court suggested that
invalidating a statute for improper motivation would be "futile" because the legislature
could merely reenact the statute without referring to the expression they wish to suppress. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383-84 (1986); see also Brest, supra note
160, at 125-28 (acknowledging these problems but justifying the analysis nonetheless).
The balancing model takes both of these considerations into account. It leaves a
court room to uphold a statute so "good" that a legislature would have passed it anyway.
But see Ely, supra note 160, at 1215-16 (O'Brien Court may have been misguided in attempting to characterize some laws as "good" and deserving of enactment). The burden of convincing a court that it should not strike a statute down, however,
appropriately lies with the regulators whose motivation a claimant has shown to be suspect.
In theory, if a court holds a statute unconstitutional the legislature can simply reenact it. That possibility does not, however, render the court's decision futile or meaningless. The judicial opinion will educate the legislators on the statute's implications for
free expression. It may change the minds of some legislators who previously voted in
favor of the bill. See, e.g., Bickel & Wellington, Legislative Pinpose and the Judicial Process:
The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957) (arguing that it is proper for courts to
"remand" legislation to Congress to reconsider delegation of power to federal courts).
Some legislators may, after all, be willing to support a law that restricts free expression
so long as they believe the government has the right to limit that speech content. Once
advised that such regulation oversteps first amendment bounds, the legislators may be
unwilling to use a subterfuge to accomplish the same end. See Eisenberg, supra note 160,
at 116 ("it is absurd to assume that all legislators would completely ignore a court holding that the legislature used constitutionally impermissible criteria in initially passing a
statute").
225
For example, the impact of a regulation on speech interests may be so great and
221

222
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to ask courts to undertake the difficult motive determination at the
initial stage.
Under the model, courts retain the option of deferring their
consideration of intent. 22" Yet in the vast majority of cases, reasons

exist for treating motive on a threshold basis, even where it does not
appear to be a controlling concern. In particular, a court's motive
analysis may well bring other issues into focus and orient the court's
overall approach.
The reason for this phenomenon is that motive and "governmental interests" are interconnected concepts. 22 7 In focusing on
the motives underlying a regulation, a court cannot help but identify
the governmental purposes or "interests" against which it will subsequently measure the laws constitutionality. Even if the court finds
no "illicit" motive, it may still conclude that the true interest supporting the regulation is a weak one. 228 That determination, in
turn, will influence the court's treatment of the remaining issues. 2 2 )
Wayte provides a good example. Assume for purposes of analysis that only two possible reasons could support the selective prosecution of vocal nonregistrants for the draft: 230 first, that selective
prosecution is the most efficient method of prosecuting nonregistrants; and second, that the government wishes to reduce public dissatisfaction with the draft. If a court finds that the second, protestmuting interest prompted the prosecutions, it may be able to strike
the countervailing governmental interests so weak that a court would be foolish to waste

its efforts evaluating the motive issue.
226 See supra note 150; see also Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 100-01 (existence of
nonmotive-based doctrines may "relax the pressure to inquire into actual government
motives"); Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 1148, 1152 (relevance of motivational analysis
may vary).
227 See Clark, supra note 122, at 990 ("By considering legislative motivation, the
Court can begin to define both the impermissible and permissible goals [particular legislation] may serve.").
228 Eliminating all consideration of motive makes it difficult for courts to test and
weigh the governmental interests at stake. If courts do not consider motive, they must
either hypothesize every conceivable justification for a law or eliminate some possible
rationales based on speculation that they' do not reflect the law's true thrust. Compare
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 378-79 (hypothesizing that draft cards may further interests of verifying classification of delinquents, facilitating communication between registrants and
draft boards, demonstrating availability for induction in case of emergency, and reminding registrants to notify local boards of changes in status) with Erznoznik v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 214-15 (1975) (rejecting traffic-related justification for ordinance on grounds that record failed to indicate law was in fact "aimed at traffic regulation"). As in the equal protection sphere, either decisional mode can lead to a strained
evaluation of the facts. See Bennett, supra note 222, at 1017-18 (discussing equal protection cases).
22)
See infra notes 314-20 and accompanying text.
23)
In fact, several possible reasons exist. See infra notes 381-84 and accompanying
text.
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them down as inconsistent with first amendment principles. 231 On
the other hand, it is not altogether clear that the government is forbidden to seek a reduction in public dissatisfaction with the draft.
The Constitution clearly permits the government to recruit, to forbid interference with the draft, 23 2 and to engage in some public relations activities designed to enhance citizens' opinions of
registration. Ultimately, a court might conclude that a governmen23
tal motive to reduce dissatisfaction is not illicit, in and of itself.

3

Under Stage I of the model, that conclusion would lead a court
to deny the challenging party the benefits of a favorable presumption. Nevertheless, the process of engaging in the threshold motive
analysis produces a useful by-product. For in the course of testing
motive, the court will have identified the true justification for the
2 34
law. This renders its task at Stage III of the model far easier.
When the court later evaluates the governmental interests at Stage
III, it no longer must consider all interests that hypothetically might
have supported the prosecutions.2 35 The "reducing dissatisfaction"
interest, while conceivably legitimate, is very weak; only under extraordinary circumstances 23 6 would any serious balancing procedure allow it to justify selective regulation of nonregistrants. This
example thus illustrates that treating motive as a threshold issue can
231
See, e.g., Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295, 307-08 (1970)
("[R]egulations, when written, would be subject to the customary inquiries as to infirmities on their face or in their application, including the question whether they were used
to penalize or punish the free exercise of constitutional rights.").
232
See, e.g., § 3 of the Espionage Act of 1917, 18 U.S.C. § 2388 (1982), upheld in
the clear and present danger trilogy. See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47 (1919);
Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204 (1919); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211
(1919).
233
See Bice, supra note 219, at 1139 ("Of course, a finding that the desire to suppress
speech caused the government's action would not necessarily lead to invalidation .. ");
Eisenberg, supra note 218, at 1152 (arguing that relevance of motive may change in
different categories of cases); cf. Clark, supra note 122, at 963-73 (discussing when and
why motives may be "invidious").
234 See Clark, supra note 122, at 985 ("A balancing approach not considering legislative purpose thus involves several difficulties. First, it is difficult to know what interests
to weigh on each side of the balance."); Eisenberg, supra note 160, at 152-53 (motivational analysis may help the court choose from a "wide range of plausible purposes" in
order to test a law).
235
Motive analysis provides a middle ground for the current judicial dilemma over
how to assess governmental interests. See supra note 230. When the analysis uncovers
the true purpose of a law, courts can avoid speculating about otherjustifications. Where
the underlying reasons remain unclear, courts are no worse off than before. They must
then choose among the options of giving the government the benefit of all possible
justifications, selecting only reasonably likely justifications, or attempting to guess the
true single justification for a rule.
236
Such circumstances might arise under aspects of Stages IV(B) and IV(D) of the
model. See infra notes 336-37 & 340-47 and accompanying text.
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prove efficient even where motive does not appear to be the most
significant issue in the case.
B.

Stage II-Assessment of the Effect on Speech

"3 7

Stage II considers the degree to which a regulation restricts,
deters, or chills free expression. This "impact" in turn determines
the manner in which a court analyzes the remaining factors -38 in
Stages III and IV of the balancing process. 239 Stage II focuses on
first amendment values in general, rather than on a target's particu240
lar words.
237
Upon completing a threshold motive analysis, a court might address the other
factors in any order. For example, it might first consider the importance of the
governmental interest and the accommodation of first amendment rights, and only then
undertake an analysis of the regulation's impact.
238 I.e., the governmental interests and the government's accommodation of first
amendment rights.
239 On the surface, the model seems to allow a court to skip consideration of impact
when the target establishes improper motive. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
In fact, the court still weighs impact in the balance. It merely takes as a given that the
impact is great and enters the Stage III process as if it had reached that determination
independently.
240 At the outset it is important to note one inquiry not required by the model: how
important is the content of the expression? Some current Supreme CourtJustices have
expressed the view that courts should accord varying degrees of protection depending
upon the importance of the types of expression at issue. See, e.g., F.C.C. v. Pacifica
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 746-48 (1978) (plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.). These Justices
have, however, not yet convinced a majority of the Court to adopt such a dramatic
change in traditional first amendment principles. Justice Powell, frequently a swing vote
in the cases, has steadfastly maintained a refusal to
subscribe to the theory that the Justices of [the] Court are free generally
to decide on the basis of its content which speech protected by the First
Amendment is most "valuable" and hence deserving of the most protection, and which is less 'valuable' and hence deserving of less protection.
Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. at 761 (Powell, J., concurring). But see Clarke, Freedom of Speech

and the Problem of the Laufid Harmfid Public Reactiou: Adult Use Cases of Renton and Mini

187, 195 (1986) (asserting that five justices "would assign
Theatres, 20 AKRON L. Ri':v.
nonobscene erotic speech a low status for the purpose of constitutional protection.").
Under any general theory of the first amendment espoused to date, the political
expression the balancing model addresses is of the highest order of importance. Set,
Quadres, Conte-.Veutdral Public Formin Regulations: The Rise of the Aesthetic State hiterest. The
Fall ofjudicial Scrutiuy, 37 HASTINGS LJ. 439, 441-42 (1986) (noting different treatment
of political and nonpolitical speech). See generally Bork, .eutral P'inciples and Some First
.Imemhent Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 20-35 (1971) ("Constitutional protection should be

The First
accorded only to speech that is explicitly political.- Id. at 20.); Meiklejohl.
is an A.bsoltte, 1961 Stu,. Cr. Rt-x. 245. The model thus need not take a posi..
Amendment
tion on the "two tier" theory of the modernJustices. See G.GUNTIER, CONS-rrIurriONAI.
I..\W 1109-1128 (11 th ed. 1985) (discussing Justice Stevens's approach); I.. TRINE, supra
note 43, at 672-74 (same).
Of course, a court could in theory draw distinctions within the category or political
expression. Some commentators suggest that on occasion the Supreme Court has in
practice disfavored "communist speech" where in the same circumstances it would have
protected "civil rights speech." See. e.g., P. K.um'ER, supra note 101. at 108; Frantz. Balane, supra note 101, at 1429, 1441-42. The Court has, however, expressly rejected any
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The impact on free expression consists of both "immediate"
and "secondary" effects. A regulation challenged on first amendment grounds usually restricts speech by the targets and similarly
situated persons. 24 ' But its enforcement can also have a ripple effect. Persons only technically subject to prosecution and other,
wholly unrelated persons may become unwilling to make their views
public. Stage II considers a regulation's full effect on expression in
society as a whole.
1. The Immediate Impact on Free Expression
A regulation's terms together with its first applications ordinarily define the target pool and, concomitantly, the set of persons
who will bear the regulation's immediate impact. Ordinarily, the
Supreme Court has expressed little interest in "how much" speech a
regulation eliminates or restricts. 24 2 Yet on occasion, the Court has
looked at a regulation's impact on the free expression of the target
pool. The Court has upheld a few regulations because of their de
minimis effect. 24 3 Recently, the Court has seemed ready to undertake a more in-depth evaluation of a regulation's immediate
24 4
consequences.
Such an inquiry, of course, is not a simple matter of determining how many targets exist. An easily satisfied permit requirement
may, for example, apply to many persons without noticeably affecting their ability to express their views. Factors such as the availabildifferential treatment from within similar categories of political speech on the grounds
that a free society must, where possible, tolerate a variety of views. See, e.g., Cohen v.
California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (1971); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375-77 (1927)
(Brandeis, J., concurring).
241
Any first amendment regulation by definition restricts the individual target's
speech. Beyond this, a regulation's impact will vary, and cannot be measured simply by
labeling the regulation. For example, content-neutral restrictions may not deter the expression of other persons with the target's views. But a content-based regulation that
clearly focuses on only one type of illegal expression may also have little chilling effect.
A regulation specifying that "no one may use the word 'communist' in public" would
not necessarily deter legal speech that society wishes to foster. Speakers can use all
other words and methods of expression to propound their views. Under these facts, a
court should have to address the direct first amendment issue: does the government
have a sufficient interest in banning public use of the word "communist" to justify the
regulation? Stages III and IV of the balancing process would pose that question.
242
See, e.g., Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980)
(content-based regulation subject to strict scrutiny regardless of its impact on speech);
Ernoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209 (1975) (same).
243
See, e.g., Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976)
(plurality opinion) (Stevens, J.) (city zoning ordinances regulating only location of adult
theaters held constitutional); id. at 73, 78 (Powell, J., concurring).
244
See, e.g., City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S.Ct. 925, 932 (1986)
(significant impact on expression does not necessarily invalidate zoning ordinance);
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 71-72 (1981) (Court distinguishes
between ordinances with "substantial" and "minimal" burden on protected speech).
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ity of alternative means of communication and the degree of
inconvenience imposed on the targets can mitigate or enhance a
regulation's immediate impact.
A regulation's effect is also determined by more than the
number of times it actually prevents expression. Government intervention may change the nature and value of expression even if it
does not ban it outright. 24 5 For example, a content- and target-neutral rule that restricts the location of demonstrations may reduce or
change a speaker's audience. 2 46 A superficially reasonable curfew
may, by limiting the speaker's time, affect the content of the
speech. 247 A regulation that causes a speaker to shift his medium of
expression 24 8 may also alter his message, 24 9 his audience, and the
relative ability of other citizens to express themselves. 2 50 Courts
must measure a regulation's full impact not only by its effect on the
targets' right to speak, but also by its influence on what the targets
say.
2.

The Secondary Impact on Free Expression

Regulations often have "secondary" effects on nontargets. Persons potentially subject to the regulation may avoid speaking out to
avoid its application to them. Others technically not subject to the
regulation may infer from its existence that they should refrain from
expressing their views. Similarly, a regulation may intimidate into
Professor Stone explains many recent first amendment cases by looking at the
245
"distortion of public debate" caused by the regulation. See Stone, supra note 40, at 21727.
246
See, e.g., Playtime Theatres, 106 S. Ct. at 933, 937-38 (Brennan,J., dissenting) (zoning ordinance effectively prevents exhibitions of adult movies within city); Heffron v.
International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 656, 660 (1981)
(Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (ordinance limiting distribution
of literature to fairground booth limits the distributor's audience); see also Greer v.
Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976) (regulation bans political speeches to military audience on
military base); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141, 145-46 (1943) (discussing importance of door-to-door canvassing for reaching wide audience).
247
Restrictions on the timing of speech may vary dramatically in their "distortive"
effect on expression. See Stone, supra note 40, at 224-25.
248
See Perry Educ. Ass'n. v. Perry Local Educators' Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983) (regulation restricting access to teacher mailboxes and interschool mail system); Consolidated
Edison, Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530 (1980) (rule restricting inclusion of
political statement in utilities bills).
See generally M. MCLUHAN, UNDERSTANDING MEDIA: THE EXTENSIONS OF MAN
249
(1964); M. McLUHAN & Q. FIORE, THE MEDIUM IS THE MASSAGE (1964).
250 See L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 683; see also Mlartin, 319 U.S. at 146 (1943) ("Door
to door distribution of circulars is essential to the poorly financed causes of little people."); Kalven, The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1,
29-30 (discussing equal protection and censorship). Professor Karst has suggested that
courts should determine a regulation's constitutionality in light of the degree to which it
discriminates among different speakers and messages. See generally Karst, supra note 17.
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silence subsets of existing and potential target pools in contexts beyond those the regulation contemplates.
In common usage, all of these groups consist of citizens whose
free expression has been "chilled." The case law, however, reserves
the term "chilling effect" for persons whom the government is likely
to regulate directly under the regulation's terms.2 5 1 This Article
therefore labels the impact on the remaining persons' freedom of
expression as "societal speech deterrence." A regulation's "chilling
effect" and "societal speech deterrence" together compose its "secondary impact."
The ChilingEffect Concept. A regulation may have a chilling effect
in two different ways. First, by defining imprecisely what speakers
may say, it deters speakers from risking potentially punishable expression. 2 52 Second, by identifying a particular type of expression
or category of speaker appropriate for regulation, it brings governmental and sometimes societal opprobrium to bear upon those who
might share the speaker's views. 253 It thus chills their tendency to
2 54
speak out.
Despite the obvious relationship between chilling effect and
first amendment values, 2 55 the Supreme Court has not always recognized chill as a factor relevant to substantive first amendment decisionmaking. 25 6 Rather, it has tended to subsume the chilling effect
251
The Supreme Court first referred to the notion of a "chilling effect" in Wieman
v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (loyalty oath as condition of employment "has an
unmistakable tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to cultivate and practice").
252 See, e.g., Gooding v.Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 521 (1972) (prohibition of"opprobrious words or abusive language" invalid because vague and overbroad); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367-68 (1964) (loyalty oath held invalid because vague, overbroad and
therefore likely to deter lawful activities).
253 See, e.g., United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967) (Subversive Activities
Control Act, Pub. L. No. 81-831, 64 Stat. 987 (1950), directed at communists held unconstitutional in part because it establishes "guilt by association"); Gibson v. Florida
Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546 (1963) (legislative investigation of
allegedly subversive branch of NAACP enjoined because of intrusion on right of political association); see also Ely, stpra note 160, at 1310-l1 ("If... a committee is engaging
in exposure 'for the sake of exposure' .. . there is nothing on the 'benefit to society' side
which can conceivably outweigh [the speech and associational interestsl.").
254
See, e.g., Brown v. Socialist Workers '74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87,
9 1-101 (1982) ("The First Amendment prohibits a state fron compelling disclosures by
a minor party that will subject those persons identified to the reasonable probability of
threats, harassment, or reprisals."); American Communications Ass'n v.Douds, 339 U.S.
382, 392-93 (1950) (upholding NLRA requirement that labor organization officials file
"non-communist" affidavits upheld although it "undeniably discourages the right to
"elect[ I communists to office").
255 See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
256 See, e.g., Eastland v. United States Serviceman's Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975)
(rejecting chilling effect argument); cf. Anderson v. Sills, 56 N.J. 210, 226, 265 A.2d 678,
687 (1970) (existence of chill not "pivotal" factor).
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2 57 ripeness, 25 8
notion within procedural doctrines such as standing,
9
25
and abstention.
The Court's few substantive references to chilling effect notions
appear most frequently in cases involving overbroad or vague legislation. 2 60 The Court has struck down laws that "sweep unnecessa257
When a party can demonstrate a chill, the Court is more likely to hear the case.
See Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 344-45 (1967) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(To give first amendment "freedoms the necessary 'breathing space to survive,'. . . the
Court has modified traditional rules of standing and prematurity."). In Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-89 (1965), for example, the Court used chilling effect notions
to grant a litigant standing even though his own activity was not necessarily constitutionally protected. See also id. at 501 (Harlan, J., dissenting). The Court has frequently allowed organizations to assert the rights of their members because failure to do so would
have threatened the associational rights of the entire class. See, e.g. NAACP v. Alabama,
357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958) (NAACP); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974) (union);
cf.Note, The Chilling Effect in ConstitutionalLaw, 69 COLUM. L. REv. 808, 820 (1969) ("The
door-opening effect of chilling has worked to relax normal standing requirements and to
give first amendment freedoms 'breathing space' ").
258 Courts have relaxed the requirement that a threatened injury be "clear and imminent" for injunctive relief to issue where the litigant can establish potential injury and
present chill. See, e.g., Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 487-89.
259 When a regulation creates a chilling effect, the Court has proven more ready to
interfere with ongoing state proceedings. See generally Bailey, supra note 217. It has created exceptions not only to abstention, but also to exhaustion of state remedies principles. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459, 475 (1974) (declaratory relief
proper because potential prosecution "deters the [target's] exercise of his constitutional
rights"); Dombrowski, 380 U.S. at 486, 489-90 (abstention is inappropriate where "statutes are justifiably attacked on their face as abridging free expression, or as applied for
the purpose of discouraging protected activities").
Recent decisions, however, have limited the circumstances in which the courts deem
chill even procedurally relevant. The Court has limited Dombrowski's approval of federal
court interference in state criminal proceedings to situations where the prosecution was
undertaken in "bad faith" or the underlying statute is patently unconstitutional. See
Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 53 (1971); Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971); see
also Fiss, Dombrowski, 86 YALE L.J. 1103, 1120 n.48 (1977) (discussing narrowness of
bad faith exception). The Court has similarly limited the chilling effect exception to the
exhaustion of state remedies doctrine, see, e.g., O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502-03
(1974), and curtailed litigants' ability to use chill to establish "ripeness." Laird v. Tatum,
408 U.S. 1, 11 (1972) (chilling effect is relevant to ripeness only where the "exercise of
governmental power is regulatory, proscriptive, or compulsory in nature"). The Court
has also cut back the right of organizations to assert the rights of their members. See,
e.g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 373 (1976).
Even where litigants have succeeded in circumventing threshold procedural bars by
demonstrating a chilling effect, courts have found other ways to disregard the chill.
Under current doctrine, litigants must still prove the merits of their first amendment
claims by relying on factors other than speech deterrence. See, e.g., Socialist Workers
Party v. Attorney Gen., 419 U.S. 1314, 1319 (1974) (chilling effect established standing
and ripeness, but injunction denied on the merits); Laird v. Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 10-14
(1972) (chilling effect may establish ripeness, but case nonjusticiable on the merits).
260 The Court has placed substantive reliance on a regulation's chilling effect in a
few contexts other than overbreadth. For example, if a state institutes criminal prosecutions in bad faith, to harass the defendant or others who share his views, the Court may
entertain a first amendment claim and may consider the degree of chill in balancing the
countervailing interests. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 47-48 (1971);
Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225 (1972); Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). But
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rily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected [first
amendment] freedoms" 26 1 or that are "so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at [their] meaning." 2 62
Overall, however, the Justices have treated the chilling effect factor
haphazardly, even sloppily.
At one level, the Court has merely identified a chill and labelled
it relevant without illustrating how to consider it: "In essence, the
problem is one of weighing the probable effects . . . upon the free
exercise of the right of speech and assembly against the... [identified] harm." 26 3 On occasion, the Court has purported to consider a
regulation's impact, yet has adopted legal standards that have not
included chill as a factor.2 64
At another level, the Court has advanced beyond the threshold
inquiry of whether a chilling effect exists to an evaluation of the substantiality of the chill. Recent overbreadth cases require a finding of
degree. The Court will not strike down a regulation unless it is
"substantially overbroad"; 2 65 that is, unless it has a significant chilling effect. 2 66 Yet the relatively in-depth evaluation of chill in the
see Carmichael v. Allen, 267 F. Supp. 985, 997 (N.D. Ga. 1966) ("plaintiffs assume an
extremely heavy burden [of proof] if they hope to prevail"). Similarly, on rare occasions, the Supreme Court has considered whether legislative committee investigations
were designed to further legitimate legislative goals or to expose and chill the associational rights of the investigations' targets. See, e.g., DeGregory v. Attorney Gen., 383
U.S. 825 (1966); Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539
(1963). A handful of lower and state courts have applied a similar analysis to police
investigations and surveillance of political activists. See, e.g., Alliance to End Repression
v. City of Chicago, 627 F. Supp. 1044, 1051 (N.D. Ill. 1985). But see Anderson v. Sills, 56
N.J. 210, 265 A.2d 678, 689 (1970) (chilling effect insufficient to establish constitutional
violations).
261
NAACP v. Alabama ix rel Flowers, 377 U.S. 288, 307 (1964); see also Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 611-13 (1973) (discussing facial overbreadth); NAACP v. Alabama cc rel Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 463-64 (1958).
262
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 367 (1964). The justification for these decisions
is that overbroad and vague statutes deter citizens from expressing themselves in any
way that might subject them to a penalty under the regulations. See, e.g., Secretary of
State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947, 956-57 (1984); Speiser v. Randall, 357
U.S. 513, 526 (1958).
263
American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 400 (1950); see also
Brown v. Hartlage, 456 U.S. 45, 61 (1982); cf. Communist Party of the United States v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1, 91 (1961) (finding a chilling effect "is to
establish the condition for, not to arrive at the conclusion of, constitutional decision").
264
See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 546
(1963).
265
See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973) (overturning statute
seriously limiting political activity of state employees as substantially overbroad and unconstitutional on its face); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 159 (1974) (refusing to
strike down statute as unconstitutional on its face when longstanding principles of interpretation limit its application).
266
It remains unclear whether the Court's evaluation of the chill's significance turns
on the number of people affected, the amount of speech deterred, or the importance of
the expression chilled. See, e.g., New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 773 (1982) (obscenity
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recent overbreadth cases is also unfocused. The Court's only inquiry
is whether the chill is substantial. 2 6 7 Under current law, a negative
conclusion requires a court to reject the target's first amendment
claim.2 68 Courts are not authorized to balance a real but lesser chill
26 9
against the governmental interest at all.

One can, again, distill several principles from this experience:
(1) Courts should acknowledge the substantive importance of
the degree to which a regulation deters free expression.
(2) In considering a regulation's chilling effect, a court should
be willing to assess the effect.
(3) Courts should not hesitate to find that some chilling effect
exists. They should treat the factor as simply one element in the
first amendment balancing process.
Societal Speech Deterrence. Although societal speech deterrence is
akin to a chilling effect, judges have not recognized it.270 The concept contrasts sharply with the limited view of speech deterrence
that the courts apply in the overbreadth context.
Under the overbreadth doctrine, a chilling effect may enable a
litigant whose own speech is regulable to attack a law that deters
unregulable speech of others. A court will not rely on such a "chill"
unless it can identify particular potential targets of the regulation
who could themselves successfully challenge the law on constitu271
tional grounds.
A court prepared to balance speech against governmental interstatute not substantially overbroad because it sweeps only a "tiny fraction" of protected
materials within its scope); Secretary of State v. Joseph H. Munson Co., 467 U.S. 947
(1984) (25% limit on percentage of charitable funds that fundraiser may apply to expenses is substantially overbroad).
267
Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (1973), seemed to limit the "substantiality" inquiry to
cases involving conduct or "symbolic" conduct that expresses views. Subsequent cases,
Ferbel; 458 U.S. at 747 (1982) (applyhowever, have, obliterated that limitation. See, e.g.,
ing substantial overbreadth concept to pornography statute).
268
See Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 650-52 (1984); see also Ferber, 458 U.S. at
770-71; Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 760-61 (1974); Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 615 (1973).
269
See Ferber, 458 U.S. at 773 (the "arguably impermissible applications of the statute amount to [no] more than a tiny fraction of the materials within the statute's reach");
see also Regan, 468 U.S. at 680 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
270
As Professor Schauer has noted, "[tihe very essence of a chilling effect is an act
of deterrence." Schauer, Fear; Risk and the First Amendment: U'nraveling the "Chilling Effect",

58 B.U.L. REV. 685, 689 (1978). Professor Schauer appears to be the first commentator
to attempt to consider all types of speech deterrence. See id. at 689-94.
271
Overbreadth doctrine postulates that a regulation may create such barriers to
expression or impose such costs and burdens on speaking that lawful speakers will remain silent rather than challenge the regulation. The courts thus allow a substitute
champion to represent the potential speakers' interests. See Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 612
("Litigants ...are permitted to challenge a statute not because their own rights of free
expression are violated but because of a judicial prediction or assumption that the statute's very existence may cause others not before the Court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression.").
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ests directly ordinarily cannot, at the outset, assess the likelihood
that a third-party claim will succeed. In Professor Schauer's terms,
the court cannot at that point tell if a regulation has a "benign" 2 72
or "invidious" 2 73 impact on free expression. That is because the
degree of deterrence itself contributes to the decision of whether
the regulation can stand.
If one considers modern reactions to the McCarthy era2 74 one
can identify a broad concern over speech deterrence which the overbreadth doctrine's limited chilling effect concept fails to acknowledge. McCarthy's investigations and accusations frightened citizens
into hiding communist affiliations. Modem society disavows that
period, but not because the targets' practice of communism should
have been considered a constitutionally protected activity under
prevailing legal standards. 275 Rather, in historical retrospect, one
can perceive secondary consequences of regulating communism.
The process of stifling speech adversely affected expression in society as a whole, not only the targets' expression. The perception of
these regulatory side effects has taught modern society to encourage
speech, even where particular expression does not serve its current
tastes. 27 6 For these reasons courts seem to have struck down modem McCarthy-type investigations because of their secondary
speech-deterrent effect throughout society, without ascertaining
whether their effect on individual targets is invidious or benign. 27 7
This Article's model explicitly considers the entire secondary
impact of regulations. It looks not only to potentially "unconstitutional" applications of a rule, as in the overbreadth context, but also
to the number of persons and types of expression that enforcement,
272
A "benign" regulation deters speech in only a constitutional way. Schauer, supra
note 270, at 690.
273 Id. 690-91.
274
See generally C. POTrER, DAYS OF SHAME 7-9 (1965); A. WATKINS, ENOUGH ROPE ixxii, 198-201 (1969).
275 Indeed, cases in the 1950's seemed to uphold the government's right to regulate
communism and speech that furthered it. See, e.g., Communist Party v. Subversive Activities Control Bd., 367 U.S. 1 (1961) (requiring Communist Party to register with government); Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951) (defendants convicted of conspiring
to organize Communist Party with intent to teach and advocate overthrow of U.S. government). No court ever directly considered the constitutionality of the Communist
Control Act of 1954, 83 Pub. L. No. 637, 68 Stat. 775 (1954), which expressly outlawed
communism. See generally Note, The Cominist Control Act of 1954, 64 YALE LJ. 712
(1955). But cf. Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753 (1972) (sustaining statute prohibiting foreign communists to obtain visas).
276 See Schauer, supra note 270, at 691.
277 See, e.g., Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 556-57
(1963) (legislature not permitted to investigate organization without a compelling interest because ofpotential chilling effect on expression and association); Shelton v. Tucker,
364 U.S. 479 (1960) (invalidating law requiring teachers to disclose all organizational
affiliations).
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and the accompanying fear of penalty, deter. 278 In the ordinary
case, the immediate targets 27 '9 will present the strongest claim for
relief.28 0 A court charged with balancing first amendment and governmental interests, however, should be able at least to consider the
281
effects of a law on individuals not directly implicated in the case.
The regulation's aggregate impact on their speech may be sufficient
to tip the overall balance.
Thus, under the model:
(1) A court may take into account the effect of a regulation on
free expression in society as a whole.
(2) Governmental interests that would justify a regulation if balanced only against the target pool's speech interests may be insufficient when weighed against the aggregate first amendment
2 82
interests of all speakers the regulation deters.
3.

The Model

The balancing model both incorporates and goes beyond the
case law. It rejects the current haphazard approach to chilling effect
notions and requires courts to consider the total restrictive and deterrent impact on free expression. In so doing, the model incorporates the best aspects of the traditional distinction between contentbased and content-neutral regulations. 28 3 The model, however,
avoids content theory's two major flaws: its exclusive focus on a regulation's phrasing and its failure to recognize other, equally rele284
vant, factors.
278
See Schauer, supra note 270, at 694-701 (discussing the first amendment implications of speech regulation that engenders "fear, risk, and uncertainty").
279 The term "immediate targets" encompasses persons similarly situated to those
involved in the litigation. In the example of the congressional committee investigating
communism, this would include individuals the commission subpoenaed or would be
likely to subpoena in the future.
280
As under current standards, courts would limit the repercussions of regulation
on societal speech by giving the target's speech a high degree of protection.
281
For example, persons who did forego communist affiliations in the 1950's because of the obvious governmental opprobrium signalled by the Senate investigations.
282
The mere existence of some speech deterrence will, of course, not automatically
invalidate a law. See iy'ia text accompanying notes 290-91. All regulation of speech
deters to some extent. See Schauer, supra note 270, at 700 ("there will always be a chilling effect") (emphasis in original).
283
See generally Stephan, supra note 87. Content theory stems from the fear that the
government may use its influence to structure opinions and public debate in society.
Professor Stone suggests that, even within the "content-based" and "content-neutral"
categories, the Court's analyses have varied with the different impacts that the regulations have on free expression. Stone, supra note 40, at 217-27. By allowing courts to
take full account of all types of impact, including the "distortion of public debate," id.
217-27, and the discriminatory effects, id. 201-07, the model addresses content theory's
central concerns.
284
Criticism of the content distinction abounds in the literature and will not be repeated here. E.g., Redish, The Content Distinction in FirstAmendnent Analysis, 34 STAN. L.
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Where the impact on a target pool is either de minimis or substantial, the model's results comport with current standards. If the
targets can prove no significant interference with their expression,
they lose. 28 5 On the other hand, courts must apply strict scrutiny
28 6
when a regulation substantially restricts the targets' expression.
The model's novelty comes in the middle ground, where the
regulation affects the target pool's freedom of expression, but not
substantially. 2 8 7 Unlike under current standards, the model allows a
court to consider not only the regulation's impact on the targets'
speech, but also the impact on free expression in society as a whole.
The model requires that the court factor into the balance all immediate and secondary effects.
The flow chart in Figure D illustrates how a court can react to
the five possible conclusions regarding "impact" which the model
allows; that is, that the regulation in question has (1) a minimal immediate impact; (2) a substantial immediate impact on the targets;
(3) a total impact that includes a real, but not substantial, immediate
impact and no secondary impact; (4) a total impact that includes
both immediate and secondary impacts, but does not rise to the substantial level; and (5) a substantial total impact.
Categories (1) and (2) correspond to the threshold impact inquiry. A court first looks at the immediate impact on the targets. A
finding of a de minimis effect allows the court to terminate the lawsuit. 2 88 The existence of a substantial immediate impact also obviates the need to evaluate the secondary impact; the immediate
impact alone is enough to create a presumption that the regulation
113 (1981); Stephan, supra note 87; cf. Farber, supra note 81 (positing change in
traditional content doctrine). In short, the distinction's singular focus is in many ways
too inflexible and its willingness to uphold content-neutral regulation may be misguided. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
285
See Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 71 n.35 (1976) (ordinance constitutional because it does not have "the effect of suppressing, or greatly restricting access to lawful speech").
286
See Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 69 n.7, 72-73 (1981).
287
Here, the targets clearly have standing to challenge the regulation. See Lamont v.
Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 307-09 (1965) (Brennan, J., concurring). See generally
Zacharias, Standing of PublicInterest Litigatihg Groups to Sue on Behalf of Their Mlembers, 39 U.
Prrr. L. REV. 453, 466-67 (1978) (reviewing NAACP cases).
288
This result is appropriate even if the regulation has a secondary impact. Under
any view of standing requirements, a target who suffers no real injury is not a suitable
representative of the affected class. The doctrines allowing one part) to litigate the
claims of other "chilled" persons only overlook the general requirement that a statute in
question apply unconstitutionally to the litigant. See supra notes 270-7 1. The cases do not
authorize unaffected litigants to rely upon the rights of others.
Where it appears likely at the outset that the regulation has an insignificant immediate impact, a court may wish to evaluate impact before considering motive. See supra
note 226 and accompanying text. Judicial economy suggests that a court should undertake any inquiry that may terminate the litigation at its earliest opportunity.
REV.
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FIGURE D
Stage II: Assessment of Impact
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is unconstitutional. This presumption moves the court's analysis to
Stage III(C), where the court must weigh all the relevant factors
28 9
with a speech-protective bent.
The situations in categories (3) through (5) are more difficult to
resolve. If a court finds some immediate impact, but not enough to
justify a strong presumption of unconstitutionality, it must look to
the regulation's secondary impact for further guidance. The court
initially decides whether any "chill" or "societal-deterrent effect"
exists at all. A negative answer does not automatically validate the
regulation because, even without deterring other potential speakers,
the regulation still restricts the targets' right to express themselves
freely. The absence of a substantial immediate impact or any regulatory side effect, however, offers the court more leeway to emphasize the societal interests in the regulation. The model directs the
court to a Stage III(A) balance that allows the court to sustain the
regulation on much the same basis as traditional time, place, and
manner analysis of content-neutral statutes.
A court concluding that a regulation does indeed deter freedom
of expression in society must consider the extent of the regulation's
total impact. The burden on the government to justify the regulation shifts, in varying degrees, depending on the court's findings.
Where the immediate impact, the chill, and the societal-deterrent
effect together result in a substantial impact on expression, the
court must enter the balancing process with a special view to vindicating the first amendment rights. 2 90 On the other hand, if the regulation, despite its immediate and secondary effects, does not
substantially limit expression in society, the model directs courts to
be more receptive to countervailing values upon which the govern29
ment relies. '
The example of the ordinance that prohibits public demonstrations in a town park illustrates the distinctions courts must make in
the category (3) through (5) cases. In the abstract, the ordinance
appears to fit within category (3). It has some immediate effect on
targets because it restricts the ability of some persons to demonstrate. But it should have few, if any, secondary effects. The ordinance is clear, unthreatening, does not choose among speakers, and
is content-neutral.
Suppose, however, that the town adopts the ordinance shortly
after the Nazi party announces plans for a demonstration. Whether
or not the Nazis can prove improper motive, the ordinance in this
289) At Stages III(C) and IV, a court will assess the justifications for the regulation
and the government's method of accommodating free expression.
290
This occurs at Stage III(G). See infa notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
291

This occurs at Stage III(B). See i

'a notes 320-24 and accompanying text.
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scenario may send a signal that the town disapproves of Nazi
speech. It thus encompasses some secondary deterrent effect on
persons (whether or not within the target pool) who might identify
themselves with the demonstrators. Yet because the statute is limited in scope, the total impact is not substantial. In the final analysis, the regulation imposes no restrictions on anyone who wishes to
join with the party in a nondemonstration setting. The ordinance's
impact fits within category (4).
If the hypothetical ordinance is changed from a flat prohibition
against demonstrations in the park to a somewhat more vague rule
forbidding "unruly demonstrations," the impact will change as well.
On the one hand, the restrictive effect on targets may decrease, because the demonstrators' alternatives expand. The immediate impact, however, remains more than de minimis. In addition, the nature
of the statute, its vagueness, and the timing of its enactment all enhance its secondary effect. A significant number of potential demonstrators and sympathetic onlookers may reasonably expect police
to single out Nazi demonstrators as "unruly." Depending on the
evidence, the total impact may, in this scenario, rise to the "substantial" category (5) level.
4.

Problems of Proving Impact

Because ascertaining the degree of a regulation's impact necessarily involves an imprecise inquiry, a court must make certain predictions. Specifically, the court must estimate how many third
parties the regulation affects, how they have reacted and will react to
the speech-restrictive rules, and what kinds of expression or association the regulation deters.
The model accounts for the practical problems of evaluating a
regulation's chill. It does not require a court to determine precisely
how much speech the regulation deters, but only whether the impact is minimal, substantial, or somewhere between. 2 92 The model
assumes that the constitutional preference for speech 293 requires
courts to exercise a maximum tolerance for free expression when292
In this respect, the model adopts the Mt. Healthy City School Dist. v. Doyle, 429
U.S. 274 (1977), "substantiality" inquiry. Mt. Healthy represents a middle-of-the-road
approach. On one hand, it avoids placing an impossible burden of establishing first
amendment violations on plaintiffs, while on the other it attempts to prevent putting
plaintiffs "in a better position as a result of the exercise of constitutionally protected
conduct than he would have occupied had he done nothing." Id. at 285.
293
See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) (state
may only restrict freedom of speech to "prevent grave and immediate danger"); Palko v.
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 326 (1937) (freedom of speech is one of those rights absorbed in fourteenth amendment without which "neither liberty nor justice would
exist").
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ever a regulation seriously threatens political dissent. 29 4
This standard places a manageable factfinding burden on the
judiciary. To identify whether a substantial immediate or secondary
impact exists, a court may need to conduct hearings or examine documentary evidence on the following issues: 2 95 (1) does the regula296
tion aim at a viewpoint held by a significant number of people;
(2) does the regulation penalize the viewpoint or merely the manner
of expressing it;297 (3) do alternative, effective means exist, at no
added costs, to express the viewpoint; 298 (4) does the regulation encourage any societal2 99 or peer 30 0 opprobrium toward persons sharing the viewpoint; and (5) will the regulation's restriction or its
penalty have any collateral effects upon the targets? 30 ' Although
294
See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 314 (1972)
("private dissent, no less than open public discourse, is essential to our free society"); id.
at 324, 332 (Douglas,J., concurring) (discussing role of speech in a free society); Cohen
v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 25 (1971) ("one man's vulgarity is another's lyric").
295
See generally Karst, supra note 9, at 99-109 (discussing manner in which courts can
make a record establishing the facts necessary to reach constitutional decisions).
296 Where a regulation aims at the membership of an existing public organization, as
in the Smith Act cases, a court can easily obtain data about the target pool. In other
circumstances, such as whistleblower cases in which other employees may share a
whistleblower's criticism of his employer, the potential targets are more difficult to identify. The Court must then evaluate objective indicators, such as the truth of the
whistleblowers accusations, in order to predict whether others are likely to share his
views.
297
The Supreme Court ordinarily has not required speakers to choose among different means of expression. See Schneider v. State (Town of Irvington), 308 U.S. 147,
163 (1939) ("one is not to have the exercise of his liberty of expression in appropriate
places abridged on the plea that it may be exercised in some other place"). See also
Schad v. Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61, 75 n.17 (1981) (rejecting argument
that substitutes for prohibited conduct exist). This consideration is, however, logically
relevant to an assessment of a regulation's speech-deterrent impact.
In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), the statute would have permitted
O'Brien to burn a xerox copy of his draft card rather than the original. In this way.
O'Brien could have made his point equally effectively, while still allowing the government to pursue the legitimate objective the statute served. Id. at 389 (Harlan,J., concurring); see L. TRIBE, supra note 43, at 686 (Court might reasonably have considered the
alternatives in accommodating the speech and governmental interests).
298
See, e.g., O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388-89 (Harlan,J., concurring) (validity of draft card
mutilation statute depends, in part, on alternative available means of communication).
A neutrally applied permit requirement, for example, would not necessarily suggest to
potential speakers that they should keep silent. When, however, such requirements are
clearly directed at a particular group, such as the Nazi demonstrators in Skokie, Illinois,
the deterrent impact may increase.
299
For example, when a legislative committee investigates with the intent to "expose" a group of targets as dangerous. See supra note 253 and accompanying text.
300
An employer that disciplines an employee who speaks out sends a signal to other
employees that the whistleblower is harming the organization which provides their livelihoods. This may in turn cause them to ostracize or criticize the whistleblower.
301
A person denied a demonstration permit will, for example, suffer little or no
adverse collateral consequences. But, when a protestor is convicted of even a minor
crime, he may lose his employment or be disqualified from receiving governmental benefits. In the McCarthy period, those identified as communist sympathizers were ostra-
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the impact of a regulation may be difficult to predict mathematically,
a court can ordinarily answer these questions in general "substanti3 °2
ality" terms. 0
Concern over the difficulty of proof also lessens because of the
effect Stage I's motive inquiry may have on the impact inquiry.
Where the objective or subjective motive underlying a regulation is
to suppress particular expression, the need to quantify the regulation's impact disappears. Upon proof of an improper motive, the
model presumes a substantial effect and automatically skips to a
strict, Stage III(C) scrutiny. 30 3 Judges will thus ordinarily have to
engage in the complex impact inquiry only with respect to contentand target-neutral regulations.
C.

Stage III-Assessment of the Governmental Interest
1. Background

Before undertaking any serious first amendment inquiry, a
court must conclude that the governmental interest in a regulation
is legitimate. In traditional analysis, a court would strike down a
regulation based on illegitimate concerns as a matter of due process. 30 4 This Article's model would also invalidate such a regulation
through the model's motive analysis. 30 5
Judges have characterized the strength of governmental interests with a variety of labels; for example, "substantial," 30 6 "important, '"307 and "compelling." 30 8 Implementation of the labels has
occasionally, but rarely, provided guidance on which interests fall
cized by many portions of society. Thus, the scope of the regulation's deterrent effect
depends on the type of regulation and the context in which it applies.
302
Other questions may be relevant. For example, do other pressures exist in society which endanger the particular type of expression in question? Are numerous,
equally respected citizens currently expressing similar viewpoints without threat of
punishment?
303
See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
304
See, e.g., City of Cleburne v.Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985)
(negative attitudes toward and fear of mentally retarded in neighborhood is not legitimate concern for zoning ordinance against group home); United States Dep't of Agric.
v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973) ("a bare congressional desire to harm a politically
unpopular group cannot constitute a legitimate governmental interest") (emphasis in
original).
"305 See supra notes 187-94 and accompanying text.
306 Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490. 507-08 (1981); Schad v.
Borough of Mount Ephraim, 452 U.S. 61. 69 (1981); Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 461
(1980).
307
Nixon v. Administrator of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 467-68 (1977); Linmark
Assocs., Inc. v.Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 95 (1977); United States v.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
3t18
Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 611 (1985); Minneapolis Star & Tribune
Co. v. Minnesota Comm'r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 585 (1983); First Nat'l Bank v.
Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 795 (1978).
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within each category. A few judges have attempted to analyze and
explain why particular values rise to a certain level. 30 9 For the most
part, however, the selection and categorization have been subjec3 10
tive, ad hoc, and poorly defined.
The courts' analyses have often fallen short in another way as
well. Proper evaluation of the importance of an interest necessarily
entails a two-fold assessment. First, a court must decide whether an
interest is, as a general matter, substantial. Second, the court must
evaluate whether society has a significant stake in how a particular
regulation addresses the interest.3 1' Courts have, however, often
ignored the second step of the analysis and relied instead on broadbrush characterizations of society's stake in the regulation at
issue.3 1 2
These, then, are the principles that emerge for the model:
(1) Initially, at least, courts should attempt to avoid having to
place governmental interests in narrow, hard-to-differentiate
categories.
(2) Any analysis of governmental interest must focus on the particular context in which the regulation appears.
2.

The Model

Consistent with these principles, Stage III of the model adjusts
the traditional evaluation of governmental interests3 1 3 in two significant respects. First, the model only requires a court to determine
whether an interest is "very important."'3 4 Second, based on a
See generally Gunther, supra note 132.
See Erznoznik v. City ofJacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 220 (1975) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (noting majority's analysis of governmental interests takes "rigidly simplistic
approach").
311
Courts should, in other words, assess the general societal interest in the specific
case. The government's interest in national security may, for example, be great. New
York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 727-29 (1971) (Stewart, J., concurring).
Its interest in a domestic wiretapping law that allegedly enhances national security may,
however, not be equally compelling. United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407
U.S. 297, 314-18, 322 (1972); id. at 324, 329-32 (Douglas, J., concurring); see also Xe\w,
York Tines Co., 403 U.S. at 724 (Brennan, J., concurring) (comparing instances when
prior restraint may be justified because of specific threat to national security). A proper
balancing process requires a fair evaluation of both aspects of the governmental interest.
Compare Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 511 (1951) (plurality opinion) (Vinson,
CJ.) (relying on general, future danger of communism to national security) with id. at
524-25 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (discussing current danger of Communist Party to
United States) and id. at 581, 582 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (arguing lack of evidence that
defendants present any specific threat).
312
See Fried, supra note 101, at 763-65; Tushnet, supra note 101, at 1512-16.
313
By governmental interest, I refer to a combination of the general and specific
societal stake in the regulation. See supra note 311 and accompanying text.
314
To avoid confusion, I use the term "very important" rather than the standard
current terminology. I intend "very important" to cover the many levels of "impor309
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combination of the Stage II and Stage III conclusions, the model
directs the court to employ a variable approach in assessing the government's accommodation of private and state interests. As the flow
chart in Figure E illustrates, the model establishes presumptions or
FIGURE E
Stage Ill: Assessment of Governmental Interests
Assessment:
Importance Of
Governmental
Interests (G.I.)

rR~giad-n
'I- nco!wCt'

"preconceptions" for a court to use in accommodating the conflicting interests; the greater the governmental interest and the less the
impact on expression, the easier it becomes for the court to uphold
a regulation. The model's "preconceptions," in turn, alleviate the
need for refined distinctions among governmental interests which
principled courts are ill-suited to make.3 15
tance" which the courts have attributed to particular regulations, including "substantial," "important," and "compelling." Of course, a court may reach several initial
conclusions under the model which will require it to consider the importance of the
governmental interests in greater detail. See infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text.
315 One of the general criticisms of balancing approaches locuses upon notions o1
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The model's "preconceptions" start from the proposition that
- 6
the Constitution mandates judicial protection of free speech. '
However, the reasons to uphold a regulation increase where the immediate restriction of the targets' expression is limited, no secondary impact exists, and the government has a strong interest in
regulating. Under those circumstances, Stage III(A) thus directs a
court to evaluate the government's accommodation of the targets'
first amendment rights with a view to protecting the government's
ability to operate efficiently.3 1 7 On the other hand, Stage III(B) of
the model illustrates that if additional speech deterrent impact exists3 1 8 and the government interest is not "very important," a court
should emphasize first amendment values. 31 9 Stages III(A) and (B)
require courts to keep a more open mind in assessing the government's accommodation of the targets' interests in the intermediate
situations where there is either (1) no secondary impact combined
with no very important (though still legitimate) governmental interest; or (2) some (but not substantial) immediate and secondary im3 20
pact combined with a very important governmental interest.
The model effects a subtle realignment of traditional first
amendment analysis. Aspects of the new direction may trouble civil
libertarians. Other aspects will offend those who believe courts already go too far in protecting first amendment rights.
For example, truly fringe minorities may, in limited circumstances, receive reduced protection under the model.3 2 ' If only a
separation of powers and federalism. The more the courts assess and weigh competing
policy considerations, the more they act like a legislature. See supra notes 108-11 and
accompanying text. Stage III of the model to some extent tempers existing first amendment rules that give rise to these concerns. When courts draw fine distinctions among

governmental interests, they must engage in inquiries, such as an assessment of public
opinion, that are generally within the province and expertise of legislators and legislative committees. See Karst, supra note 9, at 80-81. At Stage III of the model, however,
courts evaluate the governmental interests only at one level. The model abrogates the
current standards that require judges to distinguish among legitimate, substantial, important, very important, and compelling values.
316 U.S. CONST. amend. I; see P. KAUPER, supra note 101, at 119 ("If the balance-of-

interest technique is to be used, however, it must be done in a way that does justice to
constitutional values."); see also supra note 293 and cases cited therein.
317 This occurs at Stage IV(A) of the balancing process. See ifra note 335 and ac-

companying text.
318 Here, the model refers to a secondary impact that is insufficient to render the
total impact on expression "substantial."
3 19 The model thus directs the court to enter Stage IV(D) of the balancing process.
320 As discussed below, the balancing process differs slightly in these two examples.
In the first, the model directs a court to proceed according to Stage IV(B). The second

example calls for a Stage IV(C) evaluation.
It is important not to confuse the "fringe minority" discussed here with so-called
321
"marginal"--perhaps disenfranchised-persons. "Fringe minorities" are identified
solely on the basis of their unusual viewpoints. "Marginal persons" are simply unpopular or distasteful to the larger portion of the population and may need enhanced judicial
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very few people share the fringe minority's views and the regulation
affects only a small variety of speech, a court will be unable to find a
secondary impact- As a result, a strong governmental interest may
justify even a content-based regulation of their speech. In this scenario, then, the model provides a weaker standard than the existing
compelling state interest test; the model's balancing theory admits
the possibility that society's interests may at times outweigh a fringe
3 22
speaker's right to express himself as he wishes, where he wishes.
It is important, however, not to exaggerate either the number
of cases that fit within this category or the apparent contradiction
with traditional first amendment theory. Courts have always been
willing to balance societal interests against speakers' interests in a
variety of situations.3 23 The model merely changes the contexts and
method of balancing, and makes explicit the interest-weighing process. Under no circumstance does the model permit the government
324
to avoid accommodating first amendment rights.
Moreover, rarely will minorities have so little support that restrictions on their speech can truly be said to have no secondary impact. Ordinarily, regulation of even the most unpopular groupslike the Nazis in Skokie-will fall at least within the intermediate
"some secondary impact" category. Consequently, Stages III(B)
and (C) of the model may well provide more protection than existing standards. The extent of that protection will depend upon the
nature of the governmental interest.
Stage III(C) of the model represents those situations in which a
protection to assure common civil rights. See M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE
COURTS, AND HUMAN RIGHTS 146-62 (1982); cf. Clark, supra note 122, at 992 ("the first
amendment is needed primarily to protect against invidiously motivated suppression of
unpopular points of view").
322 In the example of the Nazi demonstration in Skokie, Illinois, the Court's evaluation of the speech regulations should have turned on two factors: the impact on free
speech and the reasons for the regulation. A reasonable fear of violence on the municipality's part should, perhaps, have carried greater weight than the mere desire of residents not to hear the Nazis' views. See Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n,
447 U.S. 530, 542 (1980) (recipients of objectionable mailings can throw them away);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971) (offended targets of speech are free to walk
away). As a practical matter, a municipality should not have to risk danger to its citizens
in order to protect the speech of an unsupported individual-for example, a lunatic who
claims to be Satan. On the other hand, as an historical matter important political movements have grown out of the persistence of a small minority. Therefore, when a regulation impacts upon a significant quantity or type of free expression, the first amendment
requires protection. The model's de minimis impact threshold attempts to distinguish
between these two types of cases.
323 See supra notes 60-73 and accompanying text.
324
At Stage IV, the government must at a minimum show that its accommodation of
speech interests is "reasonable." This standard affords no less protection than does the
traditional time, place, and manner analysis.
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court finds a substantial total impact on free speech.3 25 Here, the
model's presumption of unconstitutionality is at its greatest. If a
regulation substantially influences free expression and is not justified by a "very important" societal value, a court can safely invalidate the regulation without considering the government's
accommodation of first amendment interests. In that circumstance,
the harm to free expression so outweighs the possible societal benefit in the regulation that it should not matter how well or how carefully the government implements the regulation. Alternatively, if a
very important governmental interest does support the regulation,
it behooves a court to consider whether that interest justifies the
adverse effect on speech values. The balancing process thus continues at Stage IV(D). The substantiality of the impact, however, requires a court to complete that process with a view to safeguarding
first amendment rights.
Stage III(C) both mirrors and diverges from current standards.
Initially, it treats a "substantiality" finding quite differently. The
prevailing cases do not clearly define whether or how courts should
weigh even substantial chilling effects. 32 6 The model, in contrast,
relies expressly on the presence of secondary impacts. Moreover, in
those instances where courts currently do rely substantially on chilling effect notions, the courts are unwilling to invalidate regulations
based solely on the existence of a substantial chill. Narrowly drawn
regulations survive so long as they further legitimate state interests. 3 2 7 The model gives free expression more protection if the sec3 28
ondary impact is strong.
325 Stage III(C) also includes those cases in which the target has established improper motivation for the regulation. See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
326
The Court has, for example, inconsistently evaluated the constitutionality of legislative investigations that chill associational and speech rights of potential witnesses. In
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 130-32 (1959), the Court disregarded the
existence of a chilling effect and held that Congress's investigatory power was sufficient
to foreclose any first amendment claim. In comparison, in Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963), the Court pursued an analysis similar to the
model's. The existence of a substantial chill and the lack of a "substantial" or "subordinating" state interest led the Court to strike down the legislative action.
427 See Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 758-60 (1974) (court martial regulation upheld
despite obvious deterrence of protected activity).
428 In this respect, the model reflects Justice Harlan's concurring opinion in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Justice Harlan joined in the majority's general
approach of upholding narrowly drawn statutes supported by important government
interests. He acknowledged, however, that at times even narrow regulation is invalid:
I wish to make explicit my understanding that this [approach] does not
foreclose consideration of First Amendment claims in those rare instances when an "incidental" restriction upon expression, imposed by a
regulation which furthers an "important or substantial" governmental interest and satisfies the Court's other criteria, in practice has the effect of
entirely preventing a "speaker" from reaching a significant audience with
whom he could not otherwise lawfully communicate.
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In other categories of cases, however, the model coincides with
the traditional approach. Where, for example, the Supreme Court
has found both a relevant, substantial chill and a substantial governmental interest in a regulation, 32 9 its analysis has been equivalent to
the balancing process that Stage III(C) requires (i.e., in Stage
IV(D)).
D.

Stage IV-The Government's Accommodation of First
Amendment Rights
1. Introduction to the Final BalancingProcess

By this stage in the balancing process, a court has completed
the motive inquiry, ascertained the impact, and assessed the government's interests. Starting with the abstract proposition that the
Constitution requires society to tolerate free expression, a court
must next compare the conflicting values. Under the model, judges
are required to weigh these values, in most cases, by gauging how
well the government has accommodated speech values and by applying presumptions dictated by the already-made assessment of the
competing factors.
Thus far the model has allowed judges to avoid drawing fine
distinctions which are prone to manipulation. With respect to immediate, secondary, and total impacts, a court need only assess
whether they (1) exist, (2) are more than de minimis, or (3) are substantial. 3 30 Similarly, only "very important" governmental interests
have had to be isolated. 33 ' These manageable distinctions are
enough to enable courts to decide most first amendment protest
cases.
As Figure F illustrates, however, there are a few categories of
cases in which these assessments are insufficient.3 3 2 A quandary develops, for example, where the impact is substantial but the governmental interest is very important and the government has made
every effort to accommodate free expression. Which must give way,
the right to speak or the government's need to achieve important
societal objectives? These cases may draw courts into further analysis of the degree of impact and the importance of the governmental
interests. Courts that opt for a general balancing approach 33 3 canId. at 388-89 (Harlan, J., concurring).
329
See, e.g., American Communications Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382,411-12 (1950)
(governmental interests more significant than rights of persons potentially affected by
statute).
3:40 See supra notes 285-91 and accompanying text.
331
See supra note 314 and accompanying text.
332
For a detailed discussion of these categories, see infra notes 348-55 and accompanying text.
333
A court does have alternatives. At any subdivision of Stage IV, a court could
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FIGURE F
Stage IV: Assessment of Government's Accommodation
of First Amendment Rights

not altogether avoid such an analysis manipulable though it may
be. 3 34 The advantage of the model is that it confines the categories
of cases in which ad hoc balancing must occur.
depart from the balancing approach or define additional fixed rules to govern the balancing. Within the square conflict cases, courts might, for process reasons, choose to
adopt a presumption; for example, "in cases of clear conflict, the citizen wins." Whether
courts should pursue such alternative reasoning is a complex theoretical issue beyond
the scope of this Article. One of the model's benefits is that it significantly limits the
number of cases in which the theoretical debate assumes significance.
334
Under current law, courts might focus on the governmental interests and uphold
the regulation. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 29 (1976) (upholding statutory
limits on campaign contributions because of the "weighty [governmentall interests
served"). In doing so, a court would not consider further how much the regulation
affiects speech values. This process-oriented approach provides a bright-line rule, but
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The Model

Stage IV(A). Upon reaching Stage IV(A), a court has determined
that the challenged regulation has only limited immediate impact,
that a very important governmental interest supports it, and that no
improper motive can be proven. All of these factors favor upholding the regulation.
The regulation, however, has a real effect on the target's constitutional rights. Rather than create a per se rule upholding the regulation, the model thus requires the government to consider the
target's interests. As under current first amendment standards, a
court should uphold the regulation only if it reasonably accommodates the target's first amendment freedoms. 3 35 If the government
has failed to take reasonable steps to preserve the target's rights, the
court is warranted in striking the statute down.
Stage IV(B). The balance of interests is closer at Stage IV(B).
Here, a court has determined that a regulation has little impact on
speech, but that it also serves no particularly strong governmental
interest.3 3 6 The situation is thus in low-level equipoise. The legitimate but limited governmental value counters the isolated effect on
the target's first amendment interests.
The constitutional mandate for free expression requires courts
to scrutinize the government's accommodation of the right. If the
fit is poor-that is, if a regulation either does not serve the legitimate governmental interest or fails to accommodate speech rights
adequately-a court should presume the law unconstitutional. If,
however, the government accommodates the private interests well,
there is no easy resolution. The court finds itself in the gray area of
balancing, where the speech and governmental interests carry
roughly the same weight. Fair balancing requires the court to analyze the countervailing values further in order to decide which inter33 7
est should control.
essentially disregards the constitutional mandate that "Congress shall make no law...
abridging the freedom of speech .... " U.S. CONST. amend. I (emphasis added).
335
See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 106 S. Ct. 925, 930 (1986) (government must "allow ... for reasonable alternative avenues of communication"); Clark v.
Community for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 297 (1984) (regulations valid if
they leave open "ample alternative channels for communication"); Heffron v. International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc., 452 U.S. 640, 654 (1981) ("alternative foruins for the expression of... protected speech [must] exist").
33(6
In addition, the target has failed to establish that the regulation is improperly
motivated.
337
See infra notes 351-55 and accompanying text. Courts currently only rarely analyze the government's accommodation with care. In the Nazi protestor example, a court
should confront the difficult balancing problem which presents itself. A pre-existing,
content-neutral demonstration restriction may have no substantial chilling effect. At the
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Stage IV(C). Stage IV(C) represents another situation in which
the balance of interests is fairly even. Under current standards, a
real, but less than substantial, secondary impact is insignificant; a
court will pursue overbreadth analysis only where a substantial chill
exists. 3 38 Under the model, however, a significant deterrence of
free expression militates against upholding a regulation supported
by a very important societal interest.
As in existing overbreadth analysis, the model focuses upon the
government's accommodation of the rights of the targets and those
whose free exercise of expression is threatened. If the regulation is
narrowly tailored to achieve a very important end and the govern-'
ment has made a substantial effort to minimize the effect on speech
values, the societal interest in the regulation outweighs its limited
impact. If, in contrast, the government has failed to recognize that
its regulation deters speech and has not taken steps to dampen that
effect, the government has disobeyed the first amendment's mandate. A court is then justified in striking down the regulation. Such
a ruling in effect requires the government to rethink its means of
3 39
accomplishing its objectives.
Stage IV(D). Stage IV(D) focuses on two broad categories of
cases. In the first category, a confined total impact competes against
a legitimate but not "very important" governmental objective. In
the second, a very important societal interest supports the regulation, 3 40 but the regulation either substantially deters free expression
or is based on a motive 34 1 to suppress particular types of speech
content. In both categories, courts must adopt a speech-protective
attitude. In the first, only limited justifications exist for upholding a
noticeable restriction on constitutional rights. In the second, free
speech values are at their peak.
Again, the model directs the court to assess the government's
accommodation of free expression. Here, however, the model resame time, the regulation may serve no particularly significant governmental interest.
Nevertheless, under traditional time, place, and manner analysis, proof that the Nazis
have an available alternative for expressing their views would probably dispose of the
issue. See Playtinte Theatres, 106 S. Ct. at 930 (1986). Stage IV(B) of the model requires a
court to scrutinize and weigh the competing "limited interests."
338
See supra note 265 and accompanying text.
339
The government may, of course, subsequently reimplement its regulation in the
more thoughtful manner that should have been the regulation's initial hallmark.
340
Stage III(C) of the model has previously directed the court to strike down regulations in this category which are unsupported by very important societal interests. See
supra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
341
By "based on a motive," I refer to situations in which the target has made a prima
facie showing of a motive to suppress speech content and the government has failed to
show that it would have acted in the absence of the prohibited expression. See supra
notes 187-89 and accompanying text.
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quires a tighter fit. Unless the court can determine that the accommodation is nearly perfect-that is, the least restrictive regulation of
free expression that still enables the government to accomplish its
ends effectively-the court should invalidate the regulation.
On the other hand, if the government has adopted the least restrictive regulation possible, a court once more finds itself in the
gray area. The private and state interests are equally limited or vital. The conflict is square and unavoidable. Either individuals'
rights or the interests of society as a whole must give way.3 4 2 The
balancing process here requires more refined distinctions and, perhaps, a more subjective, ad hoc analysis of the importance of each
factor.
The best example of such an equipoise case is the "limited impact/not very important governmental interest" whistleblower situation evident in Connick v. Myers. 34 3 In Connick, the government
suppressed speech of so little "public" interest 44 that few people
were likely to be restricted or deterred from bonafide whistleblowing.
On the other hand, the government's rationale for Connick's discharge was maintenance of office morale,3 4 5 hardly a compellingjustification. The Supreme Court adopted a balancing approach that
provided no guidance for future courts faced with whistleblower
cases. 34 6 Under the model, the analysis is substantially clearer: the
government has no hope of sustaining its speech regulation unless it
employs means that least restrict free expression. Only where no
accommodation of the conflicting public and private interests is pos3 47
sible may a court decide which interest to prefer.

See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
461 U.S. 138 (1983).
344
Id. at 154.
345 Id. at 150-51.
346
See Parker, Free Expression and the Function of the Juny, 65 B.U.L. REv. 483, 536
(1985) (discussing aftermath of Connick). The Connick Court held that "the State's burden in justifying a particular discharge varies depending upon the nature of the employee's expression." 461 U.S. at 150. The Court provided only very general criteria
for determining the nature of the expression: "Whether an employee's speech addresses a matter of public concern must be determined by the content, form, and context of a given statement, as revealed by the whole record." Id. at 147-48.
347
Courts adopting a "least restrictive alternative" approach must define their
terms. For instance, if cost is no object, there is almost always some less intrusive way
for the government to accomplish its aim. In United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), for example, the Selective Service could have maintained up-to-date registration
records by telephoning registrants on a regular basis. In holding that draft cards were
the "least restrictive alternative" for accomplishing the goal, the Court implicitly defined
"least restrictive alternative" as either the "least restrictive, equally cost-effective alternative" or the "least restrictive alternative at a reasonable cost." This Article's model
anticipates that courts will adopt something similar to the latter definition.
342

343
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The Final Balance-Square Conflicts

In Stages I through IV, the model reduces the categories of
cases in which courts can engage in the practices questioned by the
critics of balancing. 348 Judges with pre-existing philosophical preferences have less leeway to manipulate the model's rough conclu4
sions than the fine distinctions required by ad hoc balancing. Judicial protection of individual rights interferes with legislative activities no more than necessary. State interests receive full and
equal consideration. Courts need not reach more difficult factual or
policy conclusions than in any other constitutional context.
If the model has no other advantage, it serves an important
348 See supra notes 101-42 and accompanying text. I suspect that critics of my model
will argue that I have erected a "straw man"; that is, that the model disposes only of
cases easily resolved under the traditional helter-skelter or categorization approaches,
while leaving the vast majority of cases-the more difficult ones-up in the air. The
criticism is misguided for several reasons.
First, as an empirical matter, I do not believe its factual premise is correct. I cannot
hope, in this Article, to prove mathematically that the model will resolve a large number
of cases. Only time will tell. However, if the reader applies the model to a series of
political protest cases, as I apply it to lVayte and NGTF below, see infra notes 356-417 and
accompanying text, the reader should quickly agree that the model often helps. Only a
limited number of cases will, in fact, reach the "square conflict" stage.
Second, it is important to recall that this Article does not purport to favor comprehensive balancing over, say, categorization. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. It
merely acknowledges that balancing is a plausible approach that many courts have chosen and attempts to assist those courts in improving the way they balance. Any criticism
that challenges balancing as a methodology thus misses my point.
Third, and more to the substantive argument, there are valid reasons to prefer balancing under the model to categorization. This Article's focus is, by definition, already
on a "category" of cases; namely, those that involve political speech. Within this category, the current legal standards provide little guidance for resolving any cases. Courts
have attempted to subcategorize the category and provide a series of inconsistent rules
for different fact patterns; for example, the O'Brien rules, see supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text, the whistleblower ad hoc approach, see supra note 126, and the selective
prosecution standards, see hifra note 365 and accompanying text. As the leading proponent of categorization himself concedes, such continual subcategorization can and often
does lead to bizarre and inconsistent results. See Schauer, supra note 80, at 288-89, 307.
The model's method does not.
Finally, and perhaps most important, the model provides a principled framework
for deciding political speech cases. Even if it were to resolve only the same number of
situations as categorization, its methodology would reflect an improvement. For the
model addresses the true factors of concern to the courts and resolves the litigants'
claims on the merits of the expression, rather than by pigeonholing and attempting to
exclude claims. The model thus accords the first amendment, and persons exercising
first amendment privileges, the judicial respect they deserve.
34-)
Some judges may continue to rely on labels, see supra notes 306-10 and accompanying text, or on generalized characterizations of the importance of first amendment
freedoms. See, e.g., Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366 U.S. 36, 60-62 (1961) (Black, J.. dissenting); see also Gunther, supra note 132, at 1005 (noting thatJustice Harlan's balancing
came under attack from those who preferred more rigid analyses of the first amendment). For these judges, the balancing model's only impact will be to limit the number
of cases in which judges can do so.
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function in isolating those few categories of cases where true, ad hoc
balancing is unavoidable. The model eliminates sloppy decisionmaking in the other categories. More important, it informs courts
when they are truly within the critical "danger zone." This warning
in turn cautions judges to beware of rationalizing personal prefer350
ences as principles of law.
These conclusions, of course, do not help courts decide the remaining "clear conflict" cases. 35 1 As in any decisional process, marginal cases may be difficult. If the problem areas are properly
identified, however, courts can develop rules to guide future decisions. As cases arise, careful courts 3 52 will identify the legally significant elements of particular regulations and speech. 35 3 Over time,
the assessments of the importance of particular governmental interests and the expression they deter will become more refined. These
developments, in turn, may ease future courts' assessments and further reduce the instances in which judges can make subjective
3 54
judgments.
Implementing the balancing model can only improve courts'
current decisional processes. The model allows courts to consider
important and relevant factors they now ignore. It adds principle to
balancing except in those few cases in which a final conflict develops. To the extent the model condones ad hoc balancing within the
remaining gray areas, it merely acknowledges the reality that in limited circumstances balancing is unavoidable. An honest judicial ap350
Cf.Fried, supra note 101, at 763 ("The Court should never cast the controversy
in a form which conceals the conflict to be resolved ....").
351
Clear conflicts occur when: (1) a very well tailored regulation neither deters
speech nor is supported by a very important governmental interest; (2) a nearly perfectly
tailored statute substantially deters speech, but not substantially, and furthers a less than
very important objective; or (3) a nearly perfectly tailored statute is supported by a very
important governmental interest but substantially affects first amendment freedoms.
352 See Gunther, supra note 132, at 1005-06 (Harlan approach of "systematic, critical
scrutiny of asserted governmental interests" and generous perception of first amendment values proved intellectually satisfying and protective of speech).
353
See, e.g., Quadres, supra note 240, at 454-63 (Supreme Court has defined various
aesthetic interests upon which state may rely). I do not attempt to identify criteria or
considerations by which courts should decide the relative importance of private and governmental interests. That endeavor is beyond this Article's scope and is a task that may
be best addressed by courts over time. Over a period of implementing the balancing
model, courts will rely on factors such as precedent, history, and the practical effects of
various rulings. By enunciating their decisions clearly, each court should provide gui-

dance for the future. But see Schauer, Precedent, 39 STAN. L. REV. 571, 576-90 (1987)

(pointing out pitfalls of relying on precedent to constrain future judges).
354
Thus, prior decisions have established the special importance of regulations
designed to protect national security, the privacy of captive audiences, and the morals of
children. See, e.g., United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 319-20
(1972) (national security); F.C.C. v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 748-49 (1978) (privacy of the home; children's morals); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 756-57 (1982)
(children's morals).
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proach to this balancing better prepares courts to cope with their
355
difficult adjudicatory task.
V
WAYTE AND

NGTF UNDER

THE BALANCING MODEL

This Article began by describing the Supreme Court's treatment of Wayte and NGTF as cavalier. The Article concludes by considering how the Court might have decided the cases under the
56
comprehensive balancing model.3

Wayte 35 7

A.
1.

The Facts

The record in Wayte reveals that roughly 674,000 youths (7.5%
of those eligible) failed to register for the draft. 358 The Selective
Service System pursued a passive enforcement system. It made no
active effort to identify nonregistrants. The names of approximately
286 nonregistrants came to its attention fortuitously, either through
355 See M. REDISH, supra note 64, at 262 ("If the judiciary is to be able to develop
workable and effective principles of free speech protection, its balancing of competing
interests must be done openly and candidly, rather than indirectly or surreptitiously.");
Gunther, supra note 113, at 1148-49 (Supreme Court's refusal to acknowledge balancing
when dealing with a clear conflict between governmental and individual interests is
flawed). As Professor Schlag has noted, in proposing a somewhat similar, although far
less defined analytic process for first amendment decisionmaking:
[The] four parameters approach will produce a mode of first amendment
analysis that is richer than categorical approaches, one that allows courts
to speak a language that is more reflective of the culture, a language that
allows the court to gain and disseminate more information about the facts
and how these might be related to values.
By injecting greater clarity in the language of the courts, decisions
that are unnecessary to the values sought to be realized might be avoided
to a greater extent. Furthermore, we have an interest in having courts
make clear what they contribute ...

to the culture.

Schlag, supra note 74, at 738.
356
The balancing model focuses on four factors: motive, effect on first amendment
rights, importance of the governmental interests, and the government's accommodation
of first amendment interests. At various places in Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598
(1985), Justice Powell mentioned three of the four factors: important governmental interests, id. at 611-12; accommodation of first amendment interests, id. at 613; and motive, id. at 610. Because Justice Powell adopted the O'Brien test, he nowhere discussed
the effect of the government's selective prosecution policy on speech values. To the
extent the Court considered motive, it did so only in the context of Wayte's equal protection claim, not the general first amendment issue. It is thus fair to say that the Court
never balanced all the factors that warranted attention.
357
For an excellent, in-depth analysis of the facts and arguments in 1I'ayte, see Shane,
supra note 35 (Addressing Wayte's separate first amendment claims, id. at 377-89, noting
the difficulty in deciding protest cases solely on the basis of the "objective" phrasing of
the regulation, id. at 381, and concluding that the court should accord some measure of
protection to "civil disobedience." Id. at 388.)
358

layte, 470 U.S. at 604.
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reports of third parties or self-reporting by vocal draft protestors
who, like Wayte, informed their draft boards that they would not
3 59
register.
The government gave the 286 targets several opportunities to
avoid prosecution. First, in what the Supreme Court termed "the
beg policy," 36 0 the government wrote the nonregistrants and sent
an FBI agent personally to convince them to register under a grant
of amnesty. Second, after the registration deadline expired, the
President announced an additional grace period. 3 6 1 As a result, 270
of the 286 immunized themselves from prosecution by registering,
fleeing, or demonstrating their immunity from registration requirements.3 62 The remaining sixteen were vocal nonregistrants who
either protested the draft publicly or wrote the government, setting
36 3
forth their philosophical rationale for refusing to obey the law.
The government prosecuted this group.
2. Application of the Balancing Model
Motive. The Court applied "ordinary equal protection standards" to decide Wayte's selective prosecution claim.3 6 4 It placed
the burden on Wayte "to show both that the passive enforcement
system had a discriminatory effect and that it was motivated by a
discriminatory purpose."3 65 The Court ultimately rejected Wayte's
selective prosecution argument because he could not, in light of the
beg policy, prove that "the government prosecuted him because of
his protest activities. '3 6 6 It made no further inquiry into motive in
3 67
considering Wayte's direct first amendment arguments.
Under the proposed balancing model, the Court could not have
rejected Wayte's motive argument so blithely. The model demands
a different order of proof. Wayte would not have had to show that
stifling dissent was the predominant or sole reason for his prosecu3 68
tion, only that it played a substantial role.
359

Id. at 602.

Id. at 602.
Id. at 603.
Id. at 604 n.3.
363
Id. at 605 n.6.
364
Id. at 608.
365
Id. In imposing this burden, the Court followed its traditional method ofanalvzing discriminatory prosecution under the fourteenth amendment. The defendant claiming a right to dismissal bears the burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence
that he was deliberately selected for prosecution "based upon an unjtstifiable standard
such as race, religion, or other arbitrary classification." Oyler v.Boles, 368 U.S. 448,
456 (1962).
366
1i'ayte,
470 U.S. at 610 (emphasis in original).
367
Id. at 611-14.
368
See supra note 221 and accompanying text. l'a ve suggested that it may be sufficient for a defendant to show his prosecution was "inpart 'because of'" his exercise of
360
361
362
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On the one hand, the Court was correct that the government's
willingness to dismiss charges against public protesters who ultimately registered suggested a lack of improper subjective motive.3: 3'
On the other hand, Wayte was able to prove his protest activities
were a but-for cause of his prosecution. Under the balancing
model, that showing would have entitled Wayte to obtain discovery3 70 as to whether Selective Service officials intended to embarrass
or punish protesters, a motive that has been the Service's hallmark
in the past. 3 7 1 In contrast, the Wayte Court decided the factual motive issue without considering whether the district court should have
3 72
allowed more discovery.
Full discovery and judicial consideration of motive might have
resulted in several different conclusions under the model. Wayte
might have been able to establish that his protest activities or the
Service's general desire to stifle antiregistration sentiment played a
substantial role in the prosecution decision. If so, the model would
have shifted the burden to the government to prove it would have
prosecuted Wayte even in the absence of his protected conduct. On
the record before the Supreme Court, the government could not
have carried that burden, for the Selective Service made no effort
whatsoever to prosecute nonregistrants who remained silent. The

speech rights. 470 U.S. at 610 (citing Personnel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279
(1979)). In practice, however, the Court required more. ForJustice Powell, the existence of the beg policy alone foreclosed further inquiry into motivation. Id. at 609
(Wayte "could not have [proven partial motive] given the way the 'beg' policy was carried out").
369 Id. at 609.
370 The district court in 1l'aye, indeed, decided the case on discovery grounds. After
an in camera examination of documents, the court concluded that a nonfrivolous basis
existed for believing Wayte's prosecution was improperly motivated. It therefore ordered the government to make additional disclosures and provide depositions. In order
to obtain appellate review of the district court's interlocutory discovery decree, the government refused to obey. The district court then dismissed the indictment against
Wayte. United States v. Wayte, 549 F. Supp. 1376, 1378-79, 1391 (C.D. Cal. 1982).
The government appealed the dismissal order and obtained a reversal. United States v.
Wayte, 710 F.2d 1385 (9th Cir. 1983), aff'd. 470 U.S. 598 (1985).
371 See Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970) (Selective Service accelerated induction for delinquent registrants); Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Sys. Local Bd.
No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 237 (1968) (ministry student deprived of exemption fiom draft
because of protest activity); National Student Ass'n v. Hershey, 412 F.2d 1103 (D.C. Cir.
1969) (Service threatened loss of draft deferments). See generally Schiesser & Benson,
supra note 32.
372 Justice Powell concluded, over strong dissent by Justices Marshall and Brennan.
that the discovery issue "was neither raised in the petition for certiorari, briefed on the
merits, nor raised at oral argument." 1'avie, 470 U.S. at 605 n.5.Justice Powell's ruling
led to an anomalous result. In effect, the Court approved the court of appeals's decision
to cut off discovery as to motivation, while at the same time relying upon the government's factual assertions that its intent was pure.
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Court would thus have had to proceed to Stage III(C) and evaluate
with suspicion the government's decision to prosecute.
Alternatively, discovery might not have uncovered subjective
evidence of improper prosecutorial motive. Under such circumstances, the model would have required the Court to commence its
first amendment analysis without predisposition for or against the
government. In Wayte, a Stage II analysis of the effect of the prosecution on first amendment values would have then determined the
parties' burdens of persuasion.
Impact on First Amendment Rights. The Wayte Court, in passing,
noted its "doubt that petitioner has demonstrated injury to his First
Amendment rights."3 73 Because it applied the O'Brien test, focusing
exclusively on the governmental interest in the regulation,3 74 the
Court attempted no further assessment of the impact of the prose375
cution of vocal nonregistrants on the exercise of free speech.
Nor did it consider remanding for further factfinding.
The balancing model approaches the issue differently. If a subjective motive to punish or deter speech can be proven, the model
requires the trial court to presume substantial impact. 3 76 If not, the
court must assess the regulation's immediate and secondary effects.
Despite the Wayte Court's "doubts," a trial court would have
had difficulty concluding as a matter of law that prosecution of only
vocal nonregistrants has no immediate, chilling or societal speechdeterrent effect.3 77 Prosecution may deter illegal nonregistration, 3 78 but it also tends to keep nonregistrants from protesting the
registration system in a lawful manner. Potential critics of government policy who have not violated the registration law may also perceive selective prosecution as a sign that the government will
penalize protest.
Ascertaining the actual extent of impact in Wayte is more difficult. In 1982, the target group of nonregistrants potentially de373 Id. at 611 n.12. The Court believed that "[t]he government's 'beg' p6licy removed most, if not all, of any burden passive enforcement placed on free expression.
Because of this policy, nonregistrants could protest registration and still avoid any danger of prosecution." Id.
374 Id. at 611; see also supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
375
AsJustice Harlan's concurring opinion in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367
(1968), makes clear, the O'Brien Court did not foreclose reliance on other factors in
other cases. Id. at 388-89. However, subsequent judges, such as those in the ll'aYte majority, have interpreted O'Brien to achieve precisely that result.
376 See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
377 See Note, AndJusticeForAll: Wayte v. United States and the Defense of Selective Prosecution, 64 N.C.L. REV. 385, 412 (1986).
378
This proposition, though, is questionable. See infra notes 385-86 and accompanying text.
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terred from making public statements numbered 674,000.37' The
immediate impact of the prosecution was, however, more limited,
for not all nonregistrants had a philosophical basis for failing to register or an interest in speaking publicly about their views. It is fair to
conclude that the immediate impact, though more than de ninimis,
did not rise to the "substantial" level.
The government's beg policy also minimized the secondary impact. It limited the number of potential protestors likely to perceive
a government purpose to deter speech. Because the government's
policy was to prosecute only lawbreakers, not simply protestors, potential protestors had less reason to fear.
The latter conclusion, however, holds true only to the extent
that the Selective Service publicized the beg policy. Until Wayte uncovered the policy during litigation, protestors had no knowledge of
its existence. Even thereafter, the government maintained throughout the litigation that it intended to change its prosecution policies,
including the beg policy, to more active enforcement of the registration laws. 38 0 Persons who feared government reaction to protest
thus had no reason to presume the government would continue to
focus on lawbreaking rather than protest activities.
Assessing total impact in the Wayte context is therefore not simple. The model would require an evidentiary inquiry into the
number of persons whose legitimate speech was deterred, the degree to which the government committed itself not to act except
when protestors had broken the law, and the publicity that surrounded the commitment. Under the model, the Wayte courts
would not have had to resolve the inquiry with mathematical precision; they merely would have had to decide whether the total impact
was substantial. This result in turn would have determined whether
to proceed to Stage III(B) or III(C).
The Government Interest. Justice Powell asserted that the government's general interest in the registration statute was to ensure national security. s He did not, however, attempt to show that
national security justified the government's specific interest in selectively prosecuting vocal nonregistrants. Justice Powell instead identified three "important or substantial" governmental interests in the
passive enforcement system:3 8 2 (1) passive enforcement enhances
prosecutorial efficiency by avoiding the need to actively investigate
379 faYIte, 470 U.S. at 604 n.4. Presumably, absent a change in prosecution policies.
the 7.5% nonregistration figure would rcmaim fairly constant. The numbers within each
year's registration pool may vary.
380 Id. at 603-613.
381
Id. at 611-12.
3'82
Id. at 611 (citing O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377).
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violations of the registration law; (2) passive enforcement takes full
advantage of the nonregistrants' vocal refusal to register because it
eliminates the need to prove independently that they intended to
violate the law; and (3) prosecution of vocal nonregistrants pro383
motes deterrence of others considering nonregistration.
Justice Powell's limited assessment of these purported interests
probably stemmed from the low standard to which he held the government. He merely asked prosecutors to show that their interest in
passive enforcement was substantial. The balancing model requires
courts to make the alternative determination of whether any as38 4
serted interest is "very important."
Serious weaknesses undermine each of the government's justifications in Wayte. For example, prosecution of only vocal nonregistrants, particularly when coupled with a beg policy, fails to deter
nonregistration.3 8 5 To the contrary, it signals that the government
will not punish silent nonregistrants. From a deterrence perspective, the effective response to Wayte's flouting of the registration
system would have been to prosecute all or a random sample of violators, perhaps together with the groups identified by passive
means.386
The prosecutorial efficiency rationale is also vulunerable. In essence, it reduces to a financial argument; in other words, passive
enforcement helps prosecutors expend fewer resources in investigating crime. The Court has often rejected fiscal and administrative
3 s7
convenience as excuses for undercutting constitutional values.
Nevertheless, the model leaves open some possibility that a
court could rely on the prosecutorial efficiency rationale. Administrative convenience has always been rejected on the basis that it is
not a "compelling" interest.3 88 Under Stage III of the model, a
court deciding Wayte would have to confront the issue of whether
Id. at 613.
I.e., at Stages III(B) or III(C).
See Note, supra note 377, at 412 ("A much greater deterrent effect could have
been achieved by drawing media attention to the prosecution of a quiet
nonregistrant.").
386 In fairness, the government's justification arguably was the opposite of deterrence. Rather than seeking to prevent nonregistration affirmatively, the government
may simply have been trying to stave off a drastic reduction in registration that would
have occurred upon failure to prosecute vocal nonregistrants. Even this justification,
however, appears convoluted. Publication of the prosecution policy-inevitable once
prosecutions began-served as a virtual guarantee that silent nonregistrants would escape punishment. In the long run, the policy thus assured the disastrous result it purported to prevent.
:387 See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 198 (1976).
388
See L. TRIBE, supra note 81, at 209 (discussing role of"administrative efficiency"
considerations in the first amendment context).
383

384
385
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the government may justify a restriction of constitutional rights on
less-than-compelling money-saving grounds.
The final government interest offered by the Wayte opinion is,
perhaps, closest to a "very important" interest. Vocal nonregistration does alleviate the government's burden of proving specific intent to avoid the draft. Yet it is the nonregistrant's response to a
"beg" rather than his protest which is probative of his state of mind.
The policy would be equally effective in resolving proof difficulties
at trial under an active enforcement system. A court deciding Wayte
under the model could thus not treat the alleged evidentiary benefits as a "very important" interest justifying passive selection of
defendants.
A determination that the government's interests are less than
"very important" would invalidate Wayte's prosecution instantly
under two of the model's three possible scenarios; that is, if the deciding court previously found the prosecution improperly motivated
or the impact on expression substantial. 3 89 The third, Stage 11(B),
scenario 390 would require the court to proceed to a Stage IV(D)
analysis of whether the government's method of prosecution accommodated first amendment values in nearly perfect fashion. A finding that one of the governmental interests is very important and that
the chilling effect was substantial would, in contrast, result in a
Stage IV(C) assessment of the accommodation more favorable to
the government.
Accommodation. In Wayte, Justice Powell concluded that the passive enforcement policy "placed no more limitation on speech than
39
was necessary to ensure registration for the national defense." '
Had Justice Powell considered the policy's chilling effect he could
not have reached that conclusion. Random or active enforcement
would have had at least as much deterrent effect, with no adverse
impact on first amendment freedoms.3 9 2 Thus, even under Justice
Powell's analysis, passive enforcement was logically supportable
only by reference to the three subsidiary objectives he identified in
evaluating'the government's interests.
Justice Powell seemed to recognize as much, for he repeatedly
stated that the Selective Service was not yet capable of carrying out a
comprehensive active enforcement program. 39 3 The opinion asserts
that "[p]assive enforcement was the only effective interim solution
389
390
391

:92

393

See supra note 325 and accompanying text.

I.e., when the court finds no improper motive and no substantial impact.
470U.S. at613.
See supra note 385 and accompanying text.
470 U.S. at 613.
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available to carry out the government's compelling interest. '3 94 Yet
in making this assertion, Justice Powell failed to consider any of the
obvious enforcement alternatives.
As discussed above, application of the comprehensive balancing
model to the Wayte facts might lead to several different types of
Stage IV analysis. If a court were to apply the strict Stage IV(D)
test, it would find the passive enforcement policy's accommodation
of first amendment rights inadequate. The government would have
to show nearly perfect accommodation of first amendment interests.
Since active prosecution would have served the government's deterrence interest as well as the passive enforcement policy and would
have had a lesser effect on free expression, deterrence considerations would not justify the policy. 39 5 Nor could the specific intent
rationale; applying a beg policy to nonregistrants identified by active
enforcement would have served the same interest without the first
39 6
amendment impact.
In the end, it is the cost-saving justification that best supports
the passive enforcement system. Avoiding the need to investigate
and identify violators does preserve prosecutorial resources. A
Court willing to conclude that administrative convenience qualifies
as a very important governmental interest could fairly rule that the
Wayle passive enforcement policy directly served that interest. By
combining passive enforcement with the beg policy, the government
limited the number of persons whose rights were restricted and
minimized the effect on their right of free expression. 39 7 Under
Stage IV(C) of the model, the government's solid attempt 398 to accommodate first amendment freedoms might save the prosecutorial
scheme.
On the other hand, if a court applying the model in the Wayte
context were to require a nearly perfect accommodation of first
amendment rights, as in Stage IV(D), the passive enforcement polId. (emphasis added).
DespiteJustice Powell's insistence that no active enforcement was possible, some
alternatives were obviously available. For example, federal agents could easily have
compared high school or local birth records against local registrations. Although such a
system would have overlooked many nonregistrants, it would have caught far more than
passive enforcement did.
396
Moreover, the government routinely proves specific intent in criminal cases without the assistance of the prophylactic type of enforcement system used in 1l1ye. Given
the unambiguous registration law and widespread publicity of its requirements, proving
specific intent on a case-by-case basis would not be an overwhelming task, even in the
absence of a beg policy. Nondiscriminatory prosecution of nonregistrants would, however, restrict first amendment rights to a far less extent than passive enforcement did.
397 The government thus enabled protestors to keep protesting legally after complying with the registration law.
398
In Justice Powell's mind, the accommodation was excellent. rl'ayte, 470 U.S. at
609-10.
394

395
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icy would fall. The selective prosecutions unnecessarily deterred
the expression of silent nonregistrants. A small-scale active enforcement system designed to uncover a similar number of random
nonregistrants (i.e., thirteen) would not have imposed substantially
on prosecutorial resources and would have avoided the impact on
free expression. The key to Wayte under the comprehensive balancing model is thus the determination of whether Stage IV(C) or
IV(D) analysis should apply.
Summary. The balancing model does not provide an easy solution for the decisionmaker in Wayte. But it does focus and narrow
the issues and enable the decisionmaker to consider all the relevant
factors.
The above analysis suggests that the Supreme Court's decision
in Wayte was probably wrong. The Court should have required further evidentiary proceedings. If, as a result, the record revealed a
governmental motive to deter protest activity or a substantial first
amendment impact, the Court should have applied a very strict
Stage IV(D) analysis to the passive enforcement/selective prosecution policy. The availability of less restrictive alternatives would
then have invalidated the prosecutions. In short, the model suggests that, if preventing nonregistration was important to the government, the government should have been willing to prosecute
widely enough so as to avoid deterring speech.
The model does, however, envision a scenario under which the
Court might have upheld the passive enforcement policy. The government did take significant steps to accommodate free speech.
That opens the door to a Stage IV(C) rather than Stage IV(D) inquiry. Under Stage IV(C), if the Court had supplemented the record and determined that the enforcement policy was properly
motivated, did not have a substantial total impact, and served a very
important cost-saving function, the convictions might properly have
stood.
Justice Powell may have secretly reached precisely that conclusion in his Wayte opinion. His use of the limited O'Brien test, however, enabled him to avoid identifying the values he preferred and
to hide the fact that he gave financial considerations primacy. The
proposed balancing model would take this shield from the courts. It
requires judges facing difficult first amendment issues, like Justice
Powell in Wayte, to state their findings explicitly and expose their
true rationales to critical analysis. That exposure and scrutiny, in
the end, gives first amendment freedoms their greatest protection.
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NGTF
1.

The Facts

The Oklahoma statute at issue in NGTF permitted dismissal of
school teachers for engaging in public homosexual conduct.3 9 9 The
statute defined such conduct as "advocating, soliciting, imposing,
encouraging, or promoting public or private homosexual activity in
a manner that creates a substantial risk that such conduct will come
to the attention of school children or school employees." 40 0 The
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit invalidated the statute on
overbreadth grounds. It incorporated the Brandenburg test,40 1 holding that a state could ban "advocacy" of homosexuality only where
such advocacy is "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action. '40 2 The
court concluded that the Oklahoma law improperly prohibited
40 3
speech that did not fall within this category.
It is impossible to predict how the Supreme Court would have
ruled had it reached the merits of the case. Some of the Justices
may well have voted to grant certiorari in order to change the overbreadth doctrine or abrogate it altogether. 40 4 Had the Supreme
Court continued to apply overbreadth analysis, however, the Court
probably would not have followed the court of appeals in incorporating the Brandenburg test.40 5 As a teacher discharge case, NGTF
should have been considered under the less stringent Con399 1978 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 189, amended by OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, § 6-103.15
(West Supp. 1987).
400 Id.
401
See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
402 NGTF v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447).
403
Id. at 1275.
404
Overbreadth doctrine has come under substantial attack over the past two decades. Justice Brennan, in his dissent in Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973),
characterized the majority's redefinition of the doctrine as "a wholly unjustified retreat
from fundamental and previously well-established First and Fourteenth Amendment
principles." Id. at 621-22 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Subsequent decisions have made
further inroads, over vehement dissents. See, e.g., Arnett v. Kennedy 416 U.S. 134, 229
(1974) (Marshall,J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority decision spells an end to the
overbreadth doctrine); see also Regan v. Time, Inc., 468 U.S. 641, 684-85 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting); H.L. v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 427 n.2 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
405 Strangely, Judge Barrett's dissent in 'GTF fails to point out the error in the
majority's reasoning. Thejudges all seem to have been convinced that the statute's use
of the term "advocacy" automatically required application of the Brandenbing standard.
Brandenbing,however, quite clearly applies to a different type of situation; that is, where
the government forbids a private person from advocating others to engage in illegal
activity. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 449. The Supreme Court has applied a different rule
when action is initiated against government employees because their speech may affect
either their ability to perform theirjobs or the employing agency's ability to carry out its
operations. See supra note 126.
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40 6

Plaintiffs could have satisfied their threshold burden under Connick/Pickering. Speech clearly played a substantial role in discharge
decisions, since the statute authorized the discharge of teachers specifically because of their expression. The outcome would thus have
turned on the Court's ad hocjudgment of the importance of the gov40 7
ernmental interests in preventing the speech.
2.

Application of the Balancing Model

For reasons somewhat similar to the Tenth Circuit's overbreadth analysis, ATGTF is not a difficult case to decide under the
comprehensive balancing model. Plaintiffs proved Stage I motive
objectively by showing that the relevant portion of the Oklahoma
statute disciplined teachers directly and exclusively for speaking.
The model would thus direct a court to begin the balancing process
408
at Stage III(C).
The court of appeals declined to consider the importance of the
governmental interests in restricting teachers' speech on the basis
that the school board had failed to show actual "disruption of official functions" 40 9 or "unfitness" of teachers who advocate homosexuality.41 0 The court gave short shrift to the serious implications of
allowing teachers to influence students on the morality or propriety
of a homosexual lifestyle. Federal courts have often upheld the
41 1
right of school boards to shape the moral perceptions of students
406 Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983), requires a court first to determine the
degree to which the speech addresses a matter of public concern and thus deserves first
amendment protection. Id. at 146. The court must then adjust the government's burden ofjustifying the discharge, depending upon its assessment of the nature of the expression. Id. at 149-50. Since NGTF was a declaratory suit, the court of appeals would
have had difficulty evaluating these semi-factual issues. If the court assumed that the
statute's implementation would forbid a substantial amount of expression of "public
concern," it would then have had to decide whether the government's interest in
preventing teachers from influencing children on the issue of homosexuality outweighed
the teacher's first amendment rights. Id. at 150-51.
407 The Court in Connick recognized the essentially ad hoc nature of such an evaluation. Id. at 154.
408
Even if an improper motive could not have been established, the court of appeals
held, as a factual matter, that the statute had a real and substantial chilling effect. Stage
III(C) analysis of thc governmental interests would thus have been necessary in an'
event.

409 .GTF v. Board of Educ., 729 F.2d at 1274 (citing Childers v. Independent School
Dist. No. 1, 676 F.2d 1338, 1341 (10th Cir. 1982)).
410
id. at 1275-76.
41 1
See, e.g., Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68, 76 (1979) ("The importance of public
schools in the preparation of individuals for participation as citizens, and in the preservation of the values on which our society rests, has long been recognized."); see also
Board of Educ., Island Trees Free School Dist. No. 26 v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 871 (1982)
(school board can remove books from school library if decision based on "educational
suitability," or pervasive vulgarity); Epperson v. Arkansas 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968) ("By
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or to leave that process to parents. 4 12 In addition, many typical homosexual activities are illegal in Oklahoma, 4 13 so the state had a particular interest in preventing publicly paid and certified role models
from advocating such activity to students. 4 14 Under the balancing
model, a court could legitimately conclude that Oklahoma's interest
in the NGTF statute was "very important."
The statute nonetheless would fall upon reaching Stage IV(D).
The model requires a nearly perfect accommodation of first amendment freedoms. Even if the statute's broad purpose was legitimate,
the statute made no effort whatsoever to protect expression that
would not influence students' moral perceptions. The statute did
not provide exceptions to allow teachers to participate in debate on
the subject of homosexuality, even in controlled situations. 41 5 It offered teachers no method to gain approval to make factual or neutral statements they otherwise had to avoid for fear of
"encouraging" some students. The model therefore would require
the statute's invalidation.
3.

Summary

Analysis of the NGTF statute under the model is similar to the
traditional overbreadth analysis used by the NGTF court of appeals.
But had the Supreme Court closely reviewed and analyzed the case,
it might well have had difficulty resolving the issues on overbreadth
grounds. The Supreme Court could not so easily have discarded
the state's interest in the statute. Nor could it have concluded that
most of the speech prohibited under the statute was immune from
regulation. 4 16 The outcome of NGTF under ordinary overbreadth
and large, public education in our Nation is committed to the control of state and local
authorities.").
412 See, e.g., Mercer v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 379 F. Supp. 580 (E.D. Mich.),
aff'd mere., 419 U.S. 1081 (1974) (upholding state law which in part allows parents discretion to withdraw their children from certain courses).
413
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 886-87 (West 1983).
414 To date, the Supreme Court has declined to strike down state statutes banning
homosexual conduct. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (refusing to invalidate Georgia's sodomy law); Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 425 U.S. 901 (1976),
aff'g mere. 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975) (summarily affirming lower court's refusal
to invalidate state sodomy law). But see Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. at 2847-48 (Powell, J., concurring) (leaving open the possibility of invalidating criminal enforcement of
an antisodomy law on eighth amendment grounds). See generally Note, supra note 21.
Should the Court ever hold that sexual preference or conduct is constitutionally protected, the analysis in the NGTF context would necessarily change as well.
415
For example, in a school-approved educational discussion, in a public debate
that is unlikely to come to the attention of children, or in a context where the teacher's
statements are counterbalanced by the contrary position of an equally influential role
model.
416
In finding overbreadth, the court of appeals pointed to the example of the
"teacher who went before the Oklahoma legislature or appeared on television to urge
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analysis, properly conducted, is thus far from certain. 41 7
The NGTF example underscores why adoption of the model
would make a significant contribution to the prevailing law. In contexts like NGTF, the model's approach, unlike the overbreadth doctrine, allows courts to admit the conflict of interests freely. The
model provides a means by which courts can analyze the conflict
without having to express a preference for the private or governmental interest. It not only eases the task of the courts, but makes
for more honest decisionmaking as well.
CONCLUSION

This Article has addressed the question of when courts can restrict political dissent. It has proposed a comprehensive balancing
model through which courts can resolve protest cases. The model
does not provide easy or mathematically precise answers for all situations. It does, however, reduce the number of cases that require ad
hoc balancing and it refines the issues presented in those cases where
balancing cannot be avoided. Perhaps most important, the model
provides a framework under which courts must conduct balancing
through open and honest identification of all relevant factors.

the repeal of the Oklahoma anti-sodomy statute." 729 F.2d at 1274. Had the Supreme
Court considered this example under the Connick, rather than the Brandenbing standard,
it might have had more difficulty concluding schools may not forbid the speech. The
expression may indeed influence students to accept and engage in homosexual acts.
Under the Connick rule, the court would probably have to make an ad hoc judgment of
whether the societal interest in protecting children warranted suppression of the public
employee's right to make such public utterances. See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391
U.S. 563, 568 (1968) ("The problem in any case is to arrive at a balance between the
interests of the teacher, as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern and
the interest of the State .... "). Even if the Court answered in the negative, it might
have had difficulty finding enough other examples of protected speech to warrant invalidating the statute as "'substantially" overbroad. Because the model would test the statute under the strict analysis of Stage IV(D), the existence of some examples of protected
speech, combined with the existence ofpossible alternative regulations less restrictive of
speech values, would suffice to invalidate the law.
417
See supra note 405 and accompanying text.

